The Republic

Notes on translation:
"Every translation, even the most self-consciously and flat-footedly "literal," is an interpretation. The goal is to 
get the interpretation right...one and the same Greek word may have many different meanings, and different 
Greek words may have the same meaning..." (p. vi)

The method of elenchus:
"Socrates' method of examining is the so-called elenchus — we see some examples of it in operation in 
Republic I. Polemarchus defines justice as giving to each the things he is owed (p. 6, 331e). Socrates shows him that 
this is inconsistent with other things he firmly believes. The result is that Polemarchus modifies his original 
definition, and again Socrates shows him that the new position is inconsistent with other beliefs he has. In the ideal 
situation, this process continues until a satisfactory definition emerges, one that is not inconsistent with other 
firmly held beliefs" (p. x).

Book I
Justice or lack thereof has consequences in the afterlife (p. 5; 330d).

Justice is a "craft" (techne; τέχνη) (p. 7+; 332c+)

     τέχνη: 

     From this word comes technology, technique, etc.
     Its meanings include art, craft, skill, a system or method. 
     Examples: medicine, cookery, sailing, cobbling, etc.

     The craft of medicine gives treatment to those who are ill.
     The craft of cookery gives flavor to food (p. 7; 332c-e).

     So, what does the craft of justice yield? In other words, what is the specific "work" that is done by the craft of justice?

Example of the method of elenchus:

     Polemarchus argues that justice is the skill of benefiting friends and harming enemies in war and alliances (p. 7; 332e).

     Socrates replies that justice is also useful in peacetime (p. 8, 332e).

     Polemarchus revises his claim: justice is also useful for the safekeeping of money (p. 8, 333c)

     In reply, Socrates argues that money is not used when it is kept, therefore justice is useless when money is being spent.
     Thus, "justice isn't worth much, since it is only useful for useless things..." (p. 9, 333c). But given that justice is 
     useful, Polemarchus' definition must be incorrect. 

Thrasymachus:
   
    Justice is "nothing other than the advantage of the stronger" (p. 14; 338c). In other words, justice is nothing more than the 
    laws of a society, laws which are made by those who are powerful so that they can acquire whatever they desire (money, 
    pleasure, more power, etc.). 

Socrates argues against this definition of justice in the same way: he points out inconsistencies and contradictions in the 
claims of his opponent.

However, Socrates' arguments do not tell us what justice is — they only indicate what it is not. Socrates states "I know 
nothing" (p. 31; 354c). If we do not know what justice is, how do we know if it really is a virtue — i.e., something to strive for, 
something that will make us happy or better in some way? (p. 31; 354c)

So, we are on a Socratic quest that strives to answer the question, What is justice?

Book II
Glaucon tells the story of the ring of Gyges (pp. 35-6; 359c-360d). What, if anything, does this tell us about human nature? 

Socrates states that justice in the city mirrors justice in the individual. They are analogous. But in a city justice is 
"larger" — i.e., more evident, more plain to see — hence it is easier to discover (p. 43; 368e-369a).

Socrates first describes a minimal, "healthy" city that provides only the necessities for living (p. 44-7; 369c+).
But desire for more than the necessary transforms the minimal city into a "luxurious city" or "a city with a fever" 
(p. 47-8; 372d-e)

The luxurious city desires more food and more goods. But more food requires more land, and land seizures result in war between 
and within cities. Thus, guardians are needed to protect the populace. The best soldiers are not farmers and craftsmen who go 
to war when needed, but soldiers with special training and education in warfare (p. 49; 374b-e).

Analogy: A guardian is like a good watchdog: gentle to friends, fierce to enemies (pp. 50-1; 375d-e).
How can these opposites be combined? 

Transition to Book III: The gods (1) are good, (2) without change, and (3) do not deceive (pp. 54-8; 379b-382e).

Book III
This book warns against the dangers of media. Note that media is plural for medium. Speech is a medium, 
writing is a medium, print is a medium, radio is a medium, etc. Thus, the word media signifies many phenomena, 
ancient and modern. 
  
In this book, Socrates focuses on music and poetry. Consider the latter: poetry that describes the gods as being 
violent, deceptive, lustful, etc. does a great deal of damage to the social fabric. In the ideal city, this kind of poetry 
would be banned (pp. 60-68). 

Consider this modern depiction of Cronus, the god of time, as painted by Goya (1823): Saturno Devorando a su Hijo.

As stated in Book II, Socrates argues that in the ideal city, the gods should be depicted as being good, trustworthy, 
and honest. Similarly, demigods and heroes should be described as brave and virtuous (e.g. p. 63; 388a).

Socrates' argument concerning music is similar. Music should instill courage and moderation in its words, tone, and 
rhythm (p. 75; 399a-c).

Moreover, the ideal city will have a harmony of music, poetry, and physical training. The right balance is needed, lest 
citizens become too soft or too harsh.

Finally, Socrates presents the idea of a "useful falsehood" to keep citizens segregated into three classes (pp. 91-2; 414b-415d): 

1. Rulers; also known as "complete guardians" or "true guardians" (gold) 
2. Guardians; also known as "auxiliaries" (silver)
3. Producers; e.g. farmers and craftsmen (iron and bronze) 

The illusion to be propagated is that the earth is their mother. The city comprises a single family that was born from the land. 
This compels the guardians to protect the city as they would their own family. 

Book IV
The ideal city has four virtues: wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice (p. 103; 427e).

The Principle of Non-Contradiction:
"...the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, 
at the same time" (p. 111; 436b).

The soul is divided into three parts: appetite (pp. 114-16; 439a-440a), spirit (pp. 115-117; 439e-441c), and reason 
(pp. 115-118; 439c-442a).

The rational part rules the soul with spirit as its ally (p. 117; 441e). Regulation, order, and harmony are justice 
while "civil war" and strife between the three parts of the soul are injustice (pp. 119-120; 443c-444b).

Book V
Practice must be distinguished from theory — an actual city is not the same as the ideal city. Philosopher-kings are the 
key difference (pp. 148-149; 472e-473e).

There is a difference between "the beautiful itself" and the many appearances of beauty. This difference parallels the 
distinction between knowledge and opinion (p. 151; 476a-476d). Knowledge is set over what is, while ignorance is 
about what is not (pp. 153-154; 478a-c). Opinion lies in between. Opinion concerns ambiguous appearances — e.g., things 
that are beautiful or just in one way, but not another (pp 154-155; 478c-479c).

While the majority wander in the realm of opinions (they are lovers of "sights and sounds"; p. 151), philosophers embrace 
the things themselves. They have knowledge of forms (p. 154-156; 479a-480a).

Book VI
Philosophers are dismissed as "useless," just as a true captain on a ship of confused and competitive sailors would be (pp. 161-163; 
488a-489c).

The similes of the sun (pp. 181-182; 507d-509c) and the line (p. 183-185; 509d-511e) are used to illustrate the form of the 
good and the nature of knowledge.

"...what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good. And though it is the 
cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge...it is right to think of knowledge and truth as goodlike but
wrong to think that either of them is the good — for the good is yet more prized" (p. 182; 508e).

Book VII
The image of the cave (pp. 186-190; 514a-518c) illustrates our current predicament and its solution. It extends the analogies of the sun 
and the line.

Key distinctions:

         Darkness      Light (e.g. p. 187; 515c)
       Appearance      Reality (e.g. Book V)
         Becoming      Being (e.g. p. 197; 525b)
That which is not      That which is (e.g. p. 190; 518c)
         Dreaming      Awake (p. 192; 520c)

These distinctions correspond to the two main divisions of the line (see p. 183).

The "ascent to what is" is true philosophy (p. 193; 521c).

How does one "wake up" and ascend to the realm of being? It's not easy. The soul must be "turned around" and this is painful:

     "When one of them was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his head, walk, and look up toward the light, he'd be 
      pained and dazzled and unable to see the things whose shadows he'd seen before." (p. 187; 515c).

      "...human kind cannot bear very much reality." — Four Quartets by T.S. Eliot (1943)

Most of us are pulled down by pleasure and greed (p. 191; 519a). Indeed, some prisoners would try to kill those who attempt to free them: 

     "...as for anyone who tried to free them and lead them upward, if they could somehow get their hands on him, wouldn't they
	 kill him?" (p. 189; 517a)

An extensive education provides a way out of the cave. Socrates proposes the following (pp. 193-212; 521c-541b):

     1. Music, poetry, physical training, and elementary mathematics 
     2. Physical training for 2-3 years 
     3. Advanced mathematics for 10 years* 
     4. Dialectic for five years* 
     5. Political training for fifteen years* 
     6. A philosophical study of the good* 
 
* Provided only to the most successful students from the previous stage of study.

Those who complete all six stages become philosopher-kings.

Book VIII
Socrates describes five types of government (pp. 215-240; 544e-569c). From best to worst, these are:

     1. Aristocracy 
     2. Timocracy
     3. Oligarchy
     4. Democracy
     5. Tyranny 

Each form of government corresponds to a character type. Family and society trigger transformations that 
shape, to an extent, an individual's beliefs and values (e.g., pp. 219-220; 549c-550b)

Q: How do these transformations take place? Is individual choice involved?

Book IX
The lowest type on the scale above, tyranny, is given special consideration. There are two kinds of tyrant,
one who rules a city and one who tyrannizes his own soul (pp. 241-250; 571a-580a).

The waking life of a tyrant is like a nightmare (p. 246; 576b; p. 242; 571c-d).

Q: Is the tyrant free?

Q: How does the discussion of the tyrant shed light on the story of the ring of Gyges in Book II (pp. 35-6; 359c-360d)?

Book X
Socrates discusses everyday objects, such as beds and tables, to explain the nature of forms. For example, there are three kinds 
of bed: 

1. The form of bed ("a god makes it")
2. Material beds (the work of carpenters)
3. Images of beds (what painters make)

Each form is singular — e.g., there is one, and only one, form of bed (p. 267; 597b-d). In addition, each form is timeless and pure 
(e.g., the form of justice does not change into injustice, and similarly the form of beauty does not decay into ugliness). 

Poetic imitation that nourishes base desires should be banned. In a just soul, these desires would wither and be ruled (p. 277; 606d).
Here we have a reference to Book I, where Cephalus states: "...you should know that as the physical pleasures wither away, my desire 
for conversation (τοὺς λόγους) and its pleasures grows" (p. 3; 328c).

"...justice itself is the best thing for the soul itself..."; i.e., even if a soul has the ring of Gyges, it should "do just things" 
(p. 283; 612b).

The "Myth of Er" concludes the Republic; like Book I (p. 5; 330d-331a), it relates justice (or lack thereof) in this world 
with life after death (pp. 285-292; 614b-621d).