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ἡ δ' ὀργὴ μετὰ λύπης.
12.
καὶ τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς.
καὶ ἔχοντες δὲ ἐναντίως τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι πρᾶοί εἰσιν, οἷον ἐν παιδιᾷ, ἐν γέλωτι, ἐν ἑορτῇ, ἐν εὐημερίᾳ, ἐν κατορθώσει, ἐν πληρώσει, ὅλως ἐν ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ ἡδονῇ μὴ
ὑβριστικῇ καὶ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἐπιεικεῖ. ἔτι κεχρονικότες καὶ μὴ ὑπόγυιοι τῇ ὀργῇ ὄντες: παύει γὰρ ὀργὴν ὁ χρόνος:
13.
παύει δὲ καὶ ἑτέρου ὀργὴν μείζω ἡ παρ' ἄλλου ληφθεῖσα τιμωρία πρότερον: διὸ εὖ Φιλοκράτης, εἰπόντος τινός, ὀργιζομένου τοῦ δήμου, “τί οὐκ ἀπολογεῖ;”, “οὔπω γε”, ἔφη. “ἀλλὰ πότε;”
“ὅταν ἴδω ἄλλον διαβεβλημένον”: πρᾶοι γὰρ γίγνονται ὅταν εἰς ἄλλον τὴν ὀργὴν ἀναλώσωσιν, ὃ συνέβη ἐπὶ Ἐργοφίλου: μᾶλλον γὰρ χαλεπαίνοντες ἢ Καλλισθένει ἀφεῖσαν διὰ τὸ Καλλισθένους τῇ προτεραίᾳ καταγνῶναι θάνατον.
14.
καὶ ἐὰν ἕλωσιν. καὶ ἐὰν μεῖζον κακὸν πεπονθότες ὦσιν ἢ ὃ ὀργιζόμενοι
ἂν ἔδρασαν: ὥσπερ εἰληφέναι γὰρ οἴονται τιμωρίαν.
15.
καὶ ἐὰν ἀδικεῖν οἴωνται αὐτοὶ καὶ δικαίως πάσχειν, οὐ γίγνεται [ἡ] ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον νομίζουσι πάσχειν, ἡ δ' ὀργὴ τοῦτο ἦν: διὸ δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ προκολάζειν: ἀγανακτοῦσιν γὰρ ἧττον κολαζόμενοι καὶ
οἱ δοῦλοι.
16.
καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθήσεσθαι οἴωνται ὅτι δι' αὑτοὺς καὶ ἀνθ' ὧν ἔπαθον: ἡ γὰρ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστιν: δῆλον δ' ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ: διὸ ὀρθῶς πεποίηται “φάσθαι Ὀδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον,” ὡς οὐ τετιμωρημένος εἰ μὴ ᾔσθετο καὶ ὑφ' ὅτου καὶ ἀνθ'
ὅτου: ὥστε οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι μὴ αἰσθάνονται ὀργίζονται, οὔτε τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ἔτι, ὡς πεπονθόσι τε τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ οὐκ ἀλγήσουσιν οὐδ' αἰσθησομένοις, οὗ οἱ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφίενται: διὸ εὖ περὶ τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὁ ποιητής, παῦσαι βουλόμενος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τῆς ὀργῆς τεθνεῶτος,
“κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίνων.”
17.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τοῖς καταπραύ+νειν βουλομένοις ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων λεκτέον, αὑτοὺς μὲν παρασκευάζουσι τοιούτους, οἷς δ' ὀργίζονται ἢ φοβεροὺς ἢ αἰσχύνης ἀξίους ἢ κεχαρισμένους ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ ὑπεραλγοῦντας τοῖς πεποιημένοις.
Chapter 41.
τίνας δὲ φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τί, τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ὁρισάμενοι λέγωμεν.
2.
ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ,
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but anger is
accompanied by it.
12.
And men are not angry with
those who usually show respect for them.
It is also evident that those are mild whose condition is contrary to that which
excites anger, as when laughing, in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in
success, in abundance,
and, in general, in
freedom from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult, or in virtuous hope.
Further, those whose anger is of long standing and not in its full flush, for
time appeases anger.
13.
Again, vengeance
previously taken upon one person appeases anger against another, even though it
be greater. Wherefore Philocrates,
when someone
asked him why he did not justify himself when the people were angry with him,
made the judicious reply, “Not yet.” “When
then?” “When I see someone accused of the same
offence”; for men grow mild when they have exhausted their anger upon
another, as happened in the case of Ergophilus.
For although the Athenians were more
indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they acquitted him, because they had
condemned CalIicrates to death on the previous day.
14.
Men also grow mild towards those whom they pity
; and if an offender has suffered greater evil than those who
are angry would have inflicted, for they have an idea that they have as it were
obtained reparation.
15.
And if they think that
they themselves are wrong and deserve what they suffer, for anger is not aroused
against what is just; they no longer think that they are being treated otherwise
than they should be, which, as we have said, is the essence of anger. Wherefore
we should inflict a preliminary verbal chastisement, for even slaves are less
indignant at punishment
of this kind.
16.
And men are milder if they think that those punished
will never know that the punishment comes from
in requital for
their own wrongs; for anger has to do with the individual, as is clear from our
definition.
Wherefore it is justly said by the poet: “
Tell him that it is Odysseus, sacker of cities,
” as if Polyphemus would not have been punished,
had he
remained ignorant who had blinded him and for what. So that men are not angry
either with any others who cannot know who punishes them,
or with the dead, since they have paid the last
penalty and can feel neither pain nor anything else, which is the aim of those
who are angry.
So then, in regard
to Hector, Homer, when desirous of restraining the anger of Achilles against a
dead man, well says: “
For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath.
”
17.
It is evident, then, that men must have
recourse to these topics when they desire to appease their audience, putting
them into the frame of mind required and representing those with whom they are
angry as either formidable or deserving of respect, or as having rendered them
great services, or acted involuntarily, or as exceedingly grieved at what they
have done.
Chapter 41.
Let us now
state who are the persons that men love
or hate, and why, after we have defined love and loving.
2.
Let loving, then, be defined as wishing for
anyone the things which we believe to be good, for his sake but not for our own,