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Πρωταγόρας
Print source: Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet, Oxford University Press, 1903.

Electronic source: Perseus Digital Library
Protagoras
Print source: Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 3 translated by W.R.M. Lamb., Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1967.

Electronic source: Perseus Digital Library
309a
Ἑταῖρος:
πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνῃ; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν; καὶ μήν μοι καὶ πρῴην ἰδόντι καλὸς μὲν ἐφαίνετο ἀνὴρ ἔτι, ἀνὴρ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρῆσθαι, καὶ πώγωνος ἤδη ὑποπιμπλάμενος.
Σωκράτης:
εἶτα τί τοῦτο; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης εἶ,
309a
Friend:
Where have you been now, Socrates? Ah, but of course you have been in chase of Alcibiades and his youthful beauty! Well, only the other day, as I looked at him, I thought him still handsome as a man—for a man he is, Socrates, between you and me, and with quite a growth of beard.
Socrates:
And what of that? Do you mean to say you do not approve of Homer,
309b
ὃς ἔφη χαριεστάτην ἥβην εἶναι τοῦ <πρῶτον> ὑπηνήτου, ἣν νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;
Ἑταῖρος:
τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἦ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνῃ; καὶ πῶς πρός σε ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;
Σωκράτης:
εὖ, ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τῇ νῦν ἡμέρᾳ: καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε βοηθῶν ἐμοί, καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι. ἄτοπον μέντοι τί σοι ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν: παρόντος γὰρ ἐκείνου, οὔτε προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, ἐπελανθανόμην τε αὐτοῦ θαμά.
309b
who said that youth has highest grace in him whose beard is appearing, as now in the case of Alcibiades?
Friend:
Then how is the affair at present? Have you been with him just now? And how is the young man treating you?
Socrates:
Quite well, I considered, and especially so today: for he spoke a good deal on my side, supporting me in a discussion—in fact I have only just left him. However, there is a strange thing I have to tell you: although he was present, I not merely paid him no attention, but at times forgot him altogether.
309c
Ἑταῖρος:
καὶ τί ἂν γεγονὸς εἴη περὶ σὲ κἀκεῖνον τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τινὶ καλλίονι ἐνέτυχες ἄλλῳ ἔν γε τῇδε τῇ πόλει.
Σωκράτης:
καὶ πολύ γε.
Ἑταῖρος:
τί φῄς; ἀστῷ ἢ ξένῳ;
Σωκράτης:
ξένῳ.
Ἑταῖρος:
ποδαπῷ;
Σωκράτης:
Ἀβδηρίτῃ.
Ἑταῖρος:
καὶ οὕτω καλός τις ὁ ξένος ἔδοξέν σοι εἶναι, ὥστε τοῦ Κλεινίου ὑέος καλλίων σοι φανῆναι;
Σωκράτης:
πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει, ὦ μακάριε, τὸ σοφώτατον κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι;
Ἑταῖρος:
ἀλλ' ἦ σοφῷ τινι ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐντυχὼν πάρει;
309c
Friend:
Why, what can have happened between you and him? Something serious! For surely you did not find anyone else of greater beauty there,—no, not in our city.
Socrates:
Yes, of far greater.
Friend:
What do you say? One of our people, or a foreigner?
Socrates:
A foreigner.
Friend:
Of what city?
Socrates:
Abdera.
Friend:
And you found this foreigner so beautiful that he appeared to you of greater beauty than the son of Cleinias?
Socrates:
Why, my good sir, must not the wisest appear more beautiful?
Friend:
Do you mean it was some wise man that you met just now?
309d
Σωκράτης:
σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.
Ἑταῖρος:
ὢ τί λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν;
Σωκράτης:
τρίτην γε ἤδη ἡμέραν.
Ἑταῖρος:
καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκείνῳ συγγεγονὼς ἥκεις;
309d
Socrates:
Nay, rather the wisest of our generation, I may tell you, if “wisest” is what you agree to call Protagoras.
Friend:
Ah, what a piece of news! Protagoras come to town!
Socrates:
Yes, two days ago.
Friend:
And it was his company that you left just now?
310a
Σωκράτης:
πάνυ γε, πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας.
Ἑταῖρος:
τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, εἰ μή σέ τι κωλύει, καθεζόμενος ἐνταυθί, ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτονί;
Σωκράτης:
πάνυ μὲν οὖν: καὶ χάριν γε εἴσομαι, ἐὰν ἀκούητε.
Ἑταῖρος:
καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡμεῖς σοί, ἐὰν λέγῃς.
Σωκράτης:
διπλῆ ἂν εἴη ἡ χάρις. ἀλλ' οὖν ἀκούετε.


τῆς γὰρ παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου, Ἱπποκράτης, ὁ Ἀπολλοδώρου ὑὸς Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός, τὴν
310a
Socrates:
Yes, and a great deal I said to him, and he to me.
Friend:
Then do let us hear your account of the conversation at once, if you are disengaged take my boy's place,
and sit here.
Socrates:
Very good indeed, I shall be obliged to you, if you will listen.
Friend:
And we also to you, I assure you, if you will tell us.
Socrates:
A twofold obligation. Well now, listen. During this night just past, in the small hours, Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus and brother of Phason, knocked violently at my door with his stick,
310b
θύραν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ πάνυ σφόδρα ἔκρουε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἀνέῳξέ τις, εὐθὺς εἴσω ᾔει ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων, “ὦ Σώκρατες,” ἔφη, “ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεύδεις;” καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνοὺς αὐτοῦ, “Ἱπποκράτης,” ἔφην, “οὗτος: μή τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις;” “οὐδέν γ',” ἦ δ' ὅς, “εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά γε.” “εὖ ἂν λέγοις,” ἦν δ' ἐγώ: “ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἕνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκου;” “Πρωταγόρας,” ἔφη, “ἥκει,” στὰς παρ' ἐμοί. “πρῴην,” ἔφην ἐγώ: “σὺ δὲ ἄρτι πέπυσαι;” “νὴ τοὺς θεούς,” ἔφη, “ἑσπέρας γε.”
310b
and when they opened to him he came hurrying in at once and calling to me in a loud voice: Socrates, are you awake, or sleeping? Then I, recognizing his voice, said: Hippocrates, hallo! Some news to break to me? Only good news, he replied. Tell it, and welcome, I said: what is it, and what business brings you here at such an hour? Protagoras has come, he said, standing at my side. Yes, two days ago, I said: have you only just heard? Yes, by Heaven! he replied,
310c
καὶ ἅμα ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκίμποδος ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ εἶπεν: “ἑσπέρας δῆτα, μάλα γε ὀψὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐξ Οἰνόης. ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα: καὶ δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν ὅτι διωξοίμην αὐτόν, ὑπό τινος ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμην. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθον καὶ δεδειπνηκότες ἦμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε μοι ἁδελφὸς λέγει ὅτι ἥκει Πρωταγόρας. καὶ ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἰέναι, ἔπειτά μοι λίαν πόρρω ἔδοξε τῶν νυκτῶν εἶναι: ἐπειδὴ
310c
last evening. With this he groped about for the bedstead, and sitting down by my feet he said: It was in the evening, after I had got in very late from Oenoe. My boy Satyrus, you see, had run away: I meant to let you know I was going in chase of him, but some other matter put it out of my head. On my return, when we had finished dinner and were about to retire, my brother told me, only then, that Protagoras had come. I made an effort, even at that hour, to get to you at once, but came to the conclusion that it was too late at night.
310d
δὲ τάχιστά με ἐκ τοῦ κόπου ὁ ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς οὕτω δεῦρο ἐπορευόμην.” καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν, “τί οὖν σοι,” ἦν δ' ἐγώ, “τοῦτο; μῶν τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας;” καὶ ὃς γελάσας, “νὴ τοὺς θεούς,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι γε μόνος ἐστὶ σοφός, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ.” “ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία,” ἔφην ἐγώ, “ἂν αὐτῷ διδῷς ἀργύριον καὶ πείθῃς ἐκεῖνον, ποιήσει καὶ σὲ σοφόν.” “εἰ γάρ,” ἦ δ' ὅς, “ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, ἐν
310d
But as soon as I had slept off my fatigue I got up at once and made my way straight here. Then I, noting the man's gallant spirit and the flutter he was in, remarked: Well, what is that to you? Has Protagoras wronged you? At this he laughed and, Yes, by the gods! he said, by being the only wise man, and not making me one. But, by Zeus! I said, if you give him a fee and win him over he will make you wise too. Would to Zeus and all the gods, he exclaimed,
310e
τούτῳ εἴη: ὡς οὔτ' ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίποιμι οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φίλων: ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἥκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῇς αὐτῷ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερός εἰμι, ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἑώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν: ἔτι γὰρ παῖς ἦ ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησε. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν καί φασιν σοφώτατον εἶναι λέγειν: ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτόν, ἵνα
310e
only that were needed! I should not spare either my own pocket or those of my friends. But it is on this very account I have come to you now, to see if you will have a talk with him on my behalf: for one thing, I am too young to do it myself; and for another, I have never yet seen Protagoras nor heard him speak a word—I was but a child when he paid us his previous visit. You know, Socrates, how everyone praises the man and tells of his mastery of speech: let us step over to him at once,
311a
ἔνδον καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς ἐγὼ ἤκουσα, παρὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου: ἀλλ' ἴωμεν.” καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον: “μήπω, ἀγαθέ, ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν—πρῲ γάρ ἐστιν—ἀλλὰ δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν, καὶ περιιόντες αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν ἕως ἂν φῶς γένηται: εἶτα ἴωμεν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἔνδον διατρίβει, ὥστε, θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτόν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔνδον.”


μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν περιῇμεν: καὶ ἐγὼ
311a
to make sure of finding him in; he is staying, so I was told, with Callias, son of Hipponicus. Now, let us be going. To this I replied: We had better not go there yet, my good friend, it is so very early: let us rise and turn into the court here, and spend the time strolling there till daylight comes; after that we can go. Protagoras, you see, spends most of his time indoors, so have no fear, we shall find him in all right, most likely.


So then we got up and strolled in the court;
311b
ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους τῆς ῥώμης διεσκόπουν αὐτὸν καὶ ἠρώτων, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ἰέναι, ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιξόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπενόεις παρὰ τὸν σαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον ἐλθὼν Ἱπποκράτη τὸν Κῷον, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ μισθὸν ἐκείνῳ, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο: “εἰπέ μοι, μέλλεις τελεῖν, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, Ἱπποκράτει
311b
and I, to test Hippocrates' grit, began examining him with a few questions. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, in your present design of going to Protagoras and paying him money as a fee for his services to yourself, to whom do you consider you are resorting, and what is it that you are to become? Suppose, for example, you had taken it into your head to call on your namesake Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and pay him money as your personal fee, and suppose someone asked you—Tell me, Hippocrates, in purposing to pay
311c
μισθὸν ὡς τίνι ὄντι;” τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω;
εἶπον ἄν, ἔφη, ὅτι ὡς ἰατρῷ.
“ὡς τίς γενησόμενος;”
ὡς ἰατρός, ἔφη.
εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλειτον τὸν Ἀργεῖον ἢ Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἐπενόεις ἀφικόμενος μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ τελεῖν ἐκείνοις, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο: “τελεῖν τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον ὡς τίνι ὄντι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις Πολυκλείτῳ τε καὶ Φειδίᾳ;” τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω;
εἶπον ἂν ὡς ἀγαλματοποιοῖς.
“ὡς τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐτός;”
δῆλον ὅτι ἀγαλματοποιός.
εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ:
311c
a fee to Hippocrates, what do you consider him to be? How would you answer that?


A doctor, I would say.


And what would you intend to become?


A doctor, he replied.


And suppose you had a mind to approach Polycleitus the Argive or Pheidias the Athenian and pay them a personal fee, and somebody asked you—What is it that you consider Polycleitus or Pheidias to be, that you are minded to pay them this money? What would your answer be to that?


Sculptors, I would reply.


And what would you intend to become?


Obviously, a sculptor.


Very well then, I said; you and I will go now to Protagoras,
311d
παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἀργύριον ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ἕτοιμοι ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σοῦ, ἂν μὲν ἐξικνῆται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες. εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω σφόδρα σπουδάζοντας ἔροιτο: “εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Ἱππόκρατες, ὡς τίνι ὄντι τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐν νῷ ἔχετε χρήματα τελεῖν;” τί ἂν αὐτῷ
311d
prepared to pay him money as your fee,from our own means if they are adequate for the purpose of prevailing on him, but if not, then drawing on our friends' resources to make up the sum. Now if anyone, observing our extreme earnestness in the matter, should ask us,—Pray, Socrates and Hippocrates, what is it that you take Protagoras to be, when you purpose to pay him money? What should we reply to him? What is the other name that we commonly hear attached to Protagoras? They call Pheidias a sculptor and Homer a poet:
311e
ἀποκριναίμεθα; τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιὸν καὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου ποιητήν, τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν;
σοφιστὴν δή τοι ὀνομάζουσί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, ἔφη.
ὡς σοφιστῇ ἄρα ἐρχόμεθα τελοῦντες τὰ χρήματα;
μάλιστα.
εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτό τίς σε προσέροιτο:
311e
what title do they give Protagoras?


A sophist, to be sure, Socrates, is what they call him.


Then we go to him and pay him the money as a sophist?


Certainly.


Now suppose someone asked you this further question:
312a
“αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς τίς γενησόμενος ἔρχῃ παρὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν;”
καὶ ὃς εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας—ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας, ὥστε καταφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι— εἰ μέν τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔοικεν, δῆλον ὅτι σοφιστὴς γενησόμενος.
σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων;
νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν.
ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν
312a
And what is it that you yourself hope to become when you go to Protagoras ?


To this he replied with a blush—for by then there was a glimmer of daylight by which I could see him quite clearly—If it is like the previous cases, obviously, to become a sophist.


In Heaven's name, I said, would you not be ashamed to present yourself before the Greeks as a sophist?


Yes, on my soul I should, Socrates, if I am to speak my real thoughts.


Yet after all, Hippocrates, perhaps it is not this sort of learning that you expect to get from Protagoras, but rather the sort you had
312b
ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἵαπερ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἑκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοιαύτη μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.


οἶσθα οὖν ὃ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἤ σε λανθάνει; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
τοῦ πέρι;
ὅτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν σαυτοῦ παρασχεῖν
312b
from your language-master, your harp-teacher, and your sports-instructor; for when you took your lessons from each of these it was not in the technical way, with a view to becoming a professional, but for education, as befits a private gentleman.


I quite agree, he said it is rather this kind of learning that one gets from Protagoras.


Then are you aware what you are now about to do, or is it not clear to you? I asked.


To what do you refer?


I mean your intention of submitting your soul
312c
θεραπεῦσαι ἀνδρί, ὡς φῄς, σοφιστῇ: ὅτι δέ ποτε ὁ σοφιστής ἐστιν, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἶσθα. καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ' ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα, οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὔτ' εἰ κακῷ πράγματι.
οἶμαί γ', ἔφη, εἰδέναι.
λέγε δή, τί ἡγῇ εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν;
ἐγὼ μέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὥσπερ τοὔνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἔξεστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων καὶ περὶ τεκτόνων, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες: ἀλλ'
312c
to the treatment of a man who, as you say, is a sophist; and as to what a sophist really is, I shall be surprised if you can tell me. And yet, if you are ignorant of this, you cannot know to whom you are entrusting your soul,—whether it is to something good or to something evil.


I really think, he said, that I know.


Then tell me, please, what you consider a sophist to be.


I should say, he replied, from what the name implies, that he is one who has knowledge of wise matters.


Well, I went on, we are able to say this of painters also, and of carpenters,—that they are the persons who have knowledge of wise matters;
312d
εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, “τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ ζωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες,” εἴποιμεν ἄν που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως. εἰ δέ τις ἐκεῖνο ἔροιτο, “ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστιν;” τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης;
τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν;
ἴσως ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε: ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται, περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν: ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς
312d
and if someone asked us for what those matters are wise, of which painters have knowledge, I suppose we should tell him that they are wise for the production of likenesses, and similarly with the rest. But if he should ask for what the matters of the sophist are wise, how should we answer him? What sort of workmanship is he master of?


How should we describe him, Socrates,—as a master of making one a clever speaker?


Perhaps, I replied, we should be speaking the truth, but yet not all the truth; for our answer still calls for a question, as to the subject on which the sophist makes one a clever speaker: just as the harp player
312e
δεινὸν δήπου ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως: ἦ γάρ;
ναί.
εἶεν: ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;
δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι;
εἰκός γε. τί δή ἐστιν τοῦτο περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ;
μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν.
312e
makes one clever, I presume, at speaking on the matter of which he gives one knowledge, namely harp-playing,—you agree to that?


Yes.


Well, about what does the sophist make one a clever speaker?


Clearly it must be the same thing as that of which he gives one knowledge.


So it would seem: now what is this thing, of which the sophist himself has knowledge and gives knowledge to his pupil?


Ah, there, in good faith, he said, I fail to find you an answer.
313a
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον μετὰ τοῦτο: τί οὖν; οἶσθα εἰς οἷόν τινα κίνδυνον ἔρχῃ ὑποθήσων τὴν ψυχήν; ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει τῳ διακινδυνεύοντα ἢ χρηστὸν αὐτὸ γενέσθαι ἢ πονηρόν, πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκέψω εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε οὔ, καὶ εἰς συμβουλὴν τούς τε φίλους ἂν παρεκάλεις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους σκοπούμενος ἡμέρας συχνάς: ὃ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγῇ, τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐστὶν τὰ σὰ ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν, χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ αὐτοῦ γενομένου, περὶ δὲ τούτου οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀδελφῷ
313a
I then went on to say: Now tell me, are you aware upon what sort of hazard you are going to stake your soul? If you had to entrust your body to someone, taking the risk of its being made better or worse, you would first consider most carefully whether you ought to entrust it or not, and would seek the advice of your friends and relations and ponder it for a number of days: but in the case of your soul, which you value much more highly than your body, and on which depends the good or ill condition of all your affairs, according as it is made better or worse, would you omit to consult first with either your father
313b
ἐπεκοινώσω οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν ἑταίρων οὐδενί, εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ τὴν σὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ' ἑσπέρας ἀκούσας, ὡς φῄς, ὄρθριος ἥκων περὶ μὲν τούτου οὐδένα λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλὴν ποιῇ, εἴτε χρὴ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῷ εἴτε μή, ἕτοιμος δ' εἶ ἀναλίσκειν τά τε σαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, ὡς ἤδη διεγνωκὼς ὅτι πάντως συνεστέον Πρωταγόρᾳ, ὃν οὔτε γιγνώσκεις, ὡς φῄς, οὔτε
313b
or your brother or one of us your comrades,—as to whether or no you should entrust your very soul to this newly-arrived foreigner; but choose rather, having heard of him in the evening, as you say, and coming to me at dawn, to make no mention of this question, and take no counsel upon it—whether you ought to entrust yourself to him or not; and are ready to spend your own substance and that of your friends, in the settled conviction that at all costs you must converse with Protagoras, whom you neither know, as you tell me, nor have ever met in argument before,
313c
διείλεξαι οὐδεπώποτε, σοφιστὴν δ' ὀνομάζεις, τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν φαίνῃ ἀγνοῶν, ᾧ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν;
καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας, ἔοικεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις.
ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ὢν ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται; φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις.
τρέφεται δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ψυχὴ τίνι;
μαθήμασιν δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐπαινῶν ἃ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσῃ ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, ὁ
313c
and whom you call “sophist,” in patent ignorance of what this sophist may be to whom you are about to entrust yourself?


When he heard this he said: It seems so, Socrates, by what you say.


Then can it be, Hippocrates, that the sophist is really a sort of merchant or dealer in provisions on which a soul is nourished? For such is the view I take of him.


With what, Socrates, is a soul nourished?


With doctrines, presumably, I replied. And we must take care, my good friend, that the sophist, in commending his wares, does not deceive us, as both merchant and dealer do in the case of our bodily food.
313d
ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοί που ὧν ἄγουσιν ἀγωγίμων οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν ὅτι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπαινοῦσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, οὔτε οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχῃ γυμναστικὸς ἢ ἰατρὸς ὤν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν πάντα ἃ πωλοῦσιν, τάχα δ' ἄν τινες, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ τούτων ἀγνοοῖεν ὧν πωλοῦσιν ὅτι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν
313d
For among the provisions, you know, in which these men deal, not only are they themselves ignorant what is good or bad for the body, since in selling they commend them all, but the people who buy from them are so too, unless one happens to be a trainer or a doctor. And in the same way, those who take their doctrines the round of our cities, hawking them about to any odd purchaser who desires them, commend everything that they sell, and there may well be some of these too, my good sir, who are ignorant which of their wares is
313e
πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν: ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχῃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὖ ἰατρικὸς ὤν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τί χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρόν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν: εἰ δὲ μή, ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε,
313e
good or bad for the soul; and in just the same case are the people who buy from them, unless one happens to have a doctor's knowledge here also, but of the soul. So then, if you are well informed as to what is good or bad among these wares, it will be safe for you to buy doctrines from Protagoras or from anyone else you please: but if not, take care, my dear fellow, that you do not risk your greatest treasure on a toss of the dice.
314a
μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύῃς τε καὶ κινδυνεύῃς. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολὺ μείζων κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων ὠνῇ ἢ ἐν τῇ τῶν σιτίων. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πριάμενον παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπόρου ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ σῶμα πιόντα ἢ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἴκαδε ἔξεστιν συμβουλεύσασθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαΐοντα, ὅτι τε ἐδεστέον ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὅτι μή, καὶ ὁπόσον καὶ ὁπότε: ὥστε ἐν τῇ ὠνῇ οὐ μέγας ὁ
314a
For I tell you there is far more serious risk in the purchase of doctrines than in that of eatables. When you buy victuals and liquors you can carry them off from the dealer or merchant in separate vessels, and before you take them into your body by drinking or eating you can lay them in your house and take the advice of an expert whom you can call in, as to what is fit to eat or drink and what is not, and how much you should take and when; so that in this purchase the risk is not serious.
314b
κίνδυνος. μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καταθέντα τὴν τιμὴν τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα ἀπιέναι ἢ βεβλαμμένον ἢ ὠφελημένον. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπώμεθα καὶ μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν: ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι ὥστε τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα διελέσθαι. νῦν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ὡρμήσαμεν, ἴωμεν καὶ ἀκούσωμεν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντες καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνακοινωσώμεθα: καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνος Πρωταγόρας αὐτόθι ἐστίν,
314b
But you cannot carry away doctrines in a separate vessel: you are compelled, when you have handed over the price, to take the doctrine in your very soul by learning it, and so to depart either an injured or a benefited man. These, then, are questions which we have to consider with the aid of our elders, since we ourselves are still rather young to unravel so great a matter. For the moment, however, let us pursue our design and go and hear this person; and when we have heard him we shall proceed to consult others: for Protagoras is not the only one there; we shall find Hippias of Elis
314c
ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος—οἶμαι δὲ καὶ πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον—καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί.


δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐπορευόμεθα: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περί τινος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐνέπεσεν: ἵν' οὖν μὴ ἀτελὴς γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν, στάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα ἕως συνωμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχός τις, κατήκουεν ἡμῶν, κινδυνεύει δὲ
314c
and, I believe, Prodicus of Ceos, and numerous other men of wisdom besides.


This we resolved on, and set forth; and when we arrived at the doorway, we stood discussing some question or other that had occurred to us by the way: so, not to leave it unfinished, but to get it settled before we went in, we stood there and discussed in front of the door, until we had come to an agreement with each other. Now, I fancy the doorkeeper, who was a eunuch, overheard us; very likely
314d
διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν: ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ἰδὼν ἡμᾶς, “ἔα,” ἔφη, “σοφισταί τινες: οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ:” καὶ ἅμα ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως ὡς οἷός τ' ἦν ἐπήραξεν. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούομεν, καὶ ὃς ἐγκεκλῃμένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν, “ὦ ἄνθρωποι,” ἔφη, “οὐκ ἀκηκόατε ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ;” “ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ,” ἔφην ἐγώ, “οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἥκομεν οὔτε σοφισταί ἐσμεν. ἀλλὰ θάρρει:
314d
the great number of sophists has made him annoyed with callers at the house: at any rate, when we had knocked on the door, he opened it and, on seeing us,—Hullo, he said, sophists there! Master is engaged. So saying, he seized the door with both hands and very smartly clapped it to with all his might. We tried knocking again, and then he spoke in answer through the closed door,—Sirs, have you not heard, he is engaged? But, my good fellow, I said, we have not come to see Callias,
314e
Πρωταγόραν γάρ τοι δεόμενοι ἰδεῖν ἤλθομεν: εἰσάγγειλον οὖν.” μόγις οὖν ποτε ἡμῖν ἅνθρωπος ἀνέῳξεν τὴν θύραν.


ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰσήλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῷ προστῴῳ περιπατοῦντα, ἑξῆς δ' αὐτῷ συμπεριεπάτουν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα Καλλίας ὁ Ἱππονίκου καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ
314e
nor are we sophists. Have no fear: I tell you, we have come to ask if we may see Protagoras; so go and announce us. Then with much hesitation the fellow opened the door to us and when we had entered, we came upon Protagoras as he was walking round in the cloister,
and close behind him two companies were walking round also; on the one side Callias, son of Hipponicus and his brother on the mother's side,
315a
ὁ ὁμομήτριος, Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέους, καὶ Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα ὁ ἕτερος τῶν Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος, καὶ Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου καὶ Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος, ὅσπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ μάλιστα τῶν Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστὴς ἐσόμενος. τούτων δὲ οἳ ὄπισθεν ἠκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες τῶν λεγομένων τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο—οὓς ἄγει ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ὧν διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὥσπερ
315a
Paralus, son of Pericles, and Charmides, son of Glaucon, while the other troop consisted of Pericles' other son Xanthippus, Philippides, son of Philomelus, and Antimoerus of Mende, who is the most highly reputed of Protagoras' disciples and is taking the course professionally with a view to becoming a sophist. The persons who followed in their rear, listening to what they could of the talk, seemed to e mostly strangers, brought by the great Protagoras from the several cities which he traverses, enchanting them with his voice like Orpheus, while they follow
315b
Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἕπονται κεκηλημένοι— ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ. τοῦτον τὸν χορὸν μάλιστα ἔγωγε ἰδὼν ἥσθην, ὡς καλῶς ηὐλαβοῦντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδὼν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναι Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἀναστρέφοι καὶ οἱ μετ' ἐκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ περιεσχίζοντο οὗτοι οἱ ἐπήκοοι ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ περιιόντες ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα.


“τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα,” ἔφη Ὅμηρος, Ἱππίαν τὸν
315b
where the voice sounds, enchanted; and some of our own inhabitants were also dancing attendance. As for me, when I saw their evolutions I was delighted with the admirable care they took not to hinder Protagoras at any moment by getting in front; but whenever the master turned about and those with him, it was fine to see the orderly manner in which his train of listeners split up into two parties on this side and on that, and wheeling round formed up again each time in his rear most admirably.


“And next did I mark,” as Homer says, Hippias of Elis,
315c
Ἠλεῖον, καθήμενον ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀντικρὺ προστῴῳ ἐν θρόνῳ: περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχός τε ὁ Ἀκουμενοῦ καὶ Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ Ἄνδρων ὁ Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολῖταί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἄττα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἱππίαν, ὁ δ' ἐν θρόνῳ καθήμενος ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινεν καὶ διεξῄει τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.


καὶ μὲν δὴ “καὶ Τάνταλόν” γε “εἰσεῖδον” —ἐπεδήμει
315c
seated high on a chair in the doorway opposite; and sitting around him on benches were Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, Phaedrus of Myrrhinous, Andron son of Androtion and a number of strangers,—fellow-citizens of Hippias and some others. They seemed to be asking him a series of astronomical questions on nature and the heavenly bodies, while he, seated in his chair, was distinguishing and expounding to each in turn the subjects of their questions. “Nay more, Tantalus also did I there behold.”
—for you know Prodicus of Ceos is in Athens too:
315d
γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος—ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκήματί τινι, ᾧ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμιείῳ ἐχρῆτο Ἱππόνικος, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν καταλυόντων ὁ Καλλίας καὶ τοῦτο ἐκκενώσας ξένοις κατάλυσιν πεποίηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κῳδίοις τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο: παρεκάθηντο δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίναις Παυσανίας τε ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Παυσανίου νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον, ὡς μὲν ἐγᾦμαι καλόν τε
315d
he was in a certain apartment formerly used by Hipponieus as a strong-room, but now cleared out by Callias to make more space for his numerous visitors, and turned into a guest-chamber. Well, Prodicus was still abed, wrapped up in sundry fleeces and rugs, and plenty of them too, it seemed; and near him on the beds hard by lay Pausanias from Cerames, and with Pausanias a lad who was still quite young, of good birth and breeding, I should say,
315e
κἀγαθὸν τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δ' οὖν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός. ἔδοξα ἀκοῦσαι ὄνομα αὐτῷ εἶναι Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ παιδικὰ Παυσανίου τυγχάνει ὤν. τοῦτό τ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τὼ Ἀδειμάντω ἀμφοτέρω, ὅ τε Κήπιδος καὶ ὁ Λευκολοφίδου, καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἐφαίνοντο: περὶ δὲ ὧν διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἔγωγε μαθεῖν ἔξωθεν, καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδίκου—πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἁνὴρ
315e
and at all events a very good-looking person. I fancied I heard his name was Agathon, and I should not be surprised to find he is Pausanias' favorite. Besides this youth there were the two Adeimantuses, sons of Cepis and Leucolophidas, and there seemed to be some others. The subjects of their conversation I was unable to gather from outside, despite my longing to hear Prodicus; for I regard the man as all-wise and divine:
316a
εἶναι καὶ θεῖος—ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι γιγνόμενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα.


καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἄρτι εἰσεληλύθεμεν, κατόπιν δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπεισῆλθον Ἀλκιβιάδης τε ὁ καλός, ὡς φῂς σὺ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι, καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρου.


ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς εἰσήλθομεν, ἔτι σμίκρ' ἄττα διατρίψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεασάμενοι προσῇμεν πρὸς τὸν Πρωταγόραν,
316a
but owing to the depth of his voice the room was filled with a booming sound which made the talk indistinct.


We had only just come in, when close on our heels entered Alcibiades the good-looking, as you call him and I agree that he is, and Critias, son of Callaeschrus. So, when we had entered, after some more little delays over certain points we had to examine, we went up to Protagoras,
316b
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον: ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σέ τοι ἤλθομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Ἱπποκράτης οὗτος.


πότερον, ἔφη, μόνῳ βουλόμενοι διαλεχθῆναι ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων;


ἡμῖν μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει: ἀκούσας δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα ἤλθομεν, αὐτὸς σκέψαι.


τί οὖν δή ἐστιν, ἔφη, οὗ ἕνεκα ἥκετε;


Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε ἐστὶν μὲν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, Ἀπολλοδώρου ὑός, οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαίμονος, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἡλικιώταις. ἐπιθυμεῖν δέ μοι
316b
and I said: Protagoras, you see we have come to you, Hippocrates and I.


Is it your wish, he asked, to converse with me alone, or in company with others?


It is all the same to us, I replied: let me first tell you our object in coming, and then you must decide.


Well, what is your object? he asked.


My friend Hippocrates is a native of the city, a son of Apollodorus and one of a great and prosperous family, while his own natural powers seem to make him a match for anyone of his age.
316c
δοκεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, τοῦτο δὲ οἴεταί οἱ μάλιστ' ἂ<ν> γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ συγγένοιτο: ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἴει δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους, ἢ μετ' ἄλλων.


ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, προμηθῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ἰόντα εἰς πόλεις μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς βελτίστους ἀπολείποντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας, καὶ οἰκείων καὶ ὀθνείων, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεωτέρων, ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους ἐσομένους διὰ
316c
I fancy he is anxious to gain consideration in our city, and he believes he can best gain it by consorting with you. So now it is for you to judge whether it will be fittest for you to converse on this matter privately with us alone, or in company with others.


You do right, Socrates, he said, to he so thoughtful on my behalf. For when one goes as a stranger into great cities, and there tries to persuade the best of the young men to drop their other connexions, either with their own folk or with foreigners, both old and young, and to join one's own circle, with the promise of improving them by this connexion with oneself,
316d
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν, χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα: οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί. ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν, οἷον Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμῳδίας, τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον: ἐνίους δέ τινας ᾔσθημαι καὶ γυμναστικήν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς ἥττων σοφιστὴς
316d
such a proceeding requires great caution; since very considerable jealousies are apt to ensue, and numerous enmities and intrigues. Now I tell you that sophistry is an ancient art, and those men of ancient times who practised it, fearing the odium it involved, disguised it in a decent dress, sometimes of poetry, as in the case of Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides sometimes of mystic rites and soothsayings, as did Orpheus, Musaeus and their sects; and sometimes too, I have observed, of athletics, as with Iccus
of Tarentum and another still living—as great a sophist as any—
316e
Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς: μουσικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο, μέγας ὢν σοφιστής, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί. οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγω, φοβηθέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσμασιν ἐχρήσαντο. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις
316e
Herodicus
of Selymbria, originally of Megara; and music was the disguise employed by your own Agathocles,
a great sophist, Pythocleides
of Ceos, and many more. All these, as I say, from fear of ill-will made use of these arts
317a
ἅπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὐ συμφέρομαι: ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὔ τι διαπράξασθαι ὃ ἐβουλήθησαν—οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν, ὧνπερ ἕνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ προσχήματα: ἐπεὶ οἵ γε πολλοὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἅττ' ἂν οὗτοι διαγγέλλωσι, ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσιν—τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος,
317a
as outer coverings. But I do not conform to the method of all these persons, since I believe they did not accomplish any of their designs: for the purpose of all this disguise could not escape the able men of affairs in each city; the multitude, of course, perceive practically nothing, but merely echo this or that pronouncement of their leaders. Now to try to run away, and to fail through being caught in the act,
317b
καὶ πολὺ δυσμενεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους: ἡγοῦνται γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πανοῦργον εἶναι. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἅπασαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἶμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι: καὶ ἄλλας πρὸς ταύτῃ ἔσκεμμαι, ὥστε, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν δεινὸν πάσχειν διὰ
317b
shows sad folly in the mere attempt, and must needs make people far more hostile; for they regard such an one, whatever else he may be, as a rogue. Hence the road I have taken is one entirely opposite to theirs: I admit that I am a sophist and that I educate men; and I consider this precaution, of admitting rather than denying, the better of the two. There are others besides that I have meditated, so as to avoid, under Heaven,
317c
τὸ ὁμολογεῖν σοφιστὴς εἶναι. καίτοι πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ: καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα πολλά μοί ἐστιν— οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην —ὥστε πολύ μοι ἥδιστόν ἐστιν, εἴ τι βούλεσθε, περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων ἐναντίον τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι.


καὶ ἐγώ—ὑπώπτευσα γὰρ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τε προδίκῳ καὶ τῷ Ἱππίᾳ ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι ὅτι ἐρασταὶ
317c
any harm that may come of admitting that I am a sophist. And yet many long years have I now been in the profession, for many in total number are those that I have lived: not one of you all, but in age I might be his father.
Hence it suits me by far the best, in meeting your wishes, to make my discourse on these matters in the presence of all who are in the house.


On this, as I suspected that he wished to make a display before Prodicus and Hippias, and give himself airs on the personal attachment shown by our coming to him, I remarked:
317d
αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἶμεν— τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὐ καὶ πρόδικον καὶ Ἱππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν;


πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.


βούλεσθε οὖν, ὁ Καλλίας ἔφη, συνέδριον κατασκευάσωμεν, ἵνα καθεζόμενοι διαλέγησθε;


ἐδόκει χρῆναι: ἅσμενοι δὲ πάντες ἡμεῖς, ὡς ἀκουσόμενοι ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βάθρων καὶ τῶν κλινῶν κατεσκευάζομεν παρὰ τῷ Ἱππίᾳ—ἐκεῖ γὰρ προϋπῆρχε τὰ βάθρα—ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης
317d
Then surely we must call Prodicus and Hippias and their followers to come and listen to us


By all means, said Protagoras.


Then do you agree, said Callias, to our making a session of it, so that we may sit at ease for our conversation?


The proposal was accepted; and all of us, delighted at the prospect of listening to wise men, took hold of the benches and couches ourselves and arranged them where Hippias was, since the benches were there already. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades came,
317e
ἡκέτην ἄγοντε τὸν πρόδικον, ἀναστήσαντες ἐκ τῆς κλίνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.


ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεζόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, νῦν δὴ ἄν, ἔφη, λέγοις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἵδε πάρεισιν, περὶ ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον μνείαν ἐποιοῦ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκου.
317e
bringing with them Prodicus, whom they had induced to rise from his couch, and Prodicus' circle also.


When we had all taken our seats,—So now, Socrates, said Protagoras, since these gentlemen are also present, be so good as to tell what you were mentioning to me a little while before on the young man's behalf.


To which I replied:
318a
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι ἡ αὐτή μοι ἀρχή ἐστιν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἥπερ ἄρτι, περὶ ὧν ἀφικόμην. Ἱπποκράτης γὰρ ὅδε τυγχάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὢν τῆς σῆς συνουσίας: ὅτι οὖν αὐτῷ ἀποβήσεται, ἐάν σοι συνῇ, ἡδέως ἄν φησι πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτος ὅ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος.


ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν: ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ συνῇς, ᾗ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ ἐμοὶ συγγένῃ, ἀπιέναι οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα: καὶ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι.
318a
The same point, Protagoras, will serve me for a beginning as a moment ago, in regard to the object of my visit. My friend Hippocrates finds himself desirous of joining your classes; and therefore he says he would be glad to know what result he will get from joining them. That is all the speech we have to make.


Then Protagoras answered at once, saying: Young man, you will gain this by coming to my classes, that on the day when you join them you will go home a better man, and on the day after it will be the same; every day
318b
καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον: ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν λέγεις, ἀλλὰ εἰκός, ἐπεὶ κἂν σύ, καίπερ τηλικοῦτος ὢν καὶ οὕτως σοφός, εἴ τίς σε διδάξειεν ὃ μὴ τυγχάνοις ἐπιστάμενος, βελτίων ἂν γένοιο. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτίκα μάλα μεταβαλὼν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε ἐπιθυμήσειεν τῆς συνουσίας τούτου τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ νῦν νεωστὶ ἐπιδημοῦντος, Ζευξίππου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου, καὶ ἀφικόμενος παρ' αὐτόν, ὥσπερ παρὰ σὲ
318b
you will constantly improve more and more.


When I heard this I said: Protagoras, what you say is not at all surprising, but quite likely, since even you, though so old and so wise, would be made better if someone taught you what you happen not to know. But let me put it another way: suppose Hippocrates here should change his desire all at once, and become desirous of this young fellow's lessons who has just recently come to town, Zeuxippus of Heraclea, and should approach him, as he now does you,
318c
νῦν, ἀκούσειεν αὐτοῦ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ σοῦ, ὅτι ἑκάστης ἡμέρας συνὼν αὐτῷ βελτίων ἔσται καὶ ἐπιδώσει, εἰ αὐτὸν ἐπανέροιτο: “τί δὴ φῂς βελτίω ἔσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τί ἐπιδώσειν;” εἴποι ἂν αὐτῷ ὁ Ζεύξιππος ὅτι πρὸς γραφικήν: κἂν εἰ Ὀρθαγόρᾳ τῷ Θηβαίῳ συγγενόμενος, ἀκούσας ἐκείνου ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ σοῦ, ἐπανέροιτο αὐτὸν εἰς ὅτι βελτίων καθ' ἡμέραν ἔσται συγγιγνόμενος ἐκείνῳ, εἴποι ἂν ὅτι εἰς αὔλησιν: οὕτω δὴ καὶ σὺ εἰπὲ τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ
318c
and should hear the very same thing from him as from you,—how on each day that he spent with him he would be better and make constant progress; and suppose he were to question him on this and ask: In what shall I become better as you say, and to what will my progress be? Zeuxippus's reply would be, to painting. Then suppose he came to the lessons of Orthagoras the Theban, and heard the same thing from him as from you, and then inquired of him for what he would be better each day through attending his classes, the answer would be, for fluting. In the same way you also must satisfy this youth and me
318d
τούτου ἐρωτῶντι, Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε Πρωταγόρᾳ συγγενόμενος, ᾗ ἂν αὐτῷ ἡμέρᾳ συγγένηται, βελτίων ἄπεισι γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμερῶν ἑκάστης οὕτως ἐπιδώσει εἰς τί, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ;


καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ἀκούσας, σύ τε καλῶς ἐρωτᾷς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς καλῶς ἐρωτῶσι χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος. Ἱπποκράτης γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος οὐ πείσεται ἅπερ ἂν ἔπαθεν ἄλλῳ τῳ συγγενόμενος τῶν σοφιστῶν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους:
318d
on this point, and tell us for what, Protagoras, and in what connexion my friend Hippocrates, on any day of attendance at the classes of Protagoras, will go away a better man, and on each of the succeeding days will make a like advance.


When Protagoras heard my words,—You do right, he said, to ask that, while I am only too glad to answer those who ask the right question. For Hippocrates, if he comes to me, will not be treated as he would have been if he had joined the classes of an ordinary sophist. The generality of them maltreat the young; for when they have escaped from the arts
318e
τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες—καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἱππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν—παρὰ δ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου του ἢ περὶ οὗ ἥκει. τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ,
318e
they bring them back against their will and force them into arts, teaching them arithmetic and astronomy and geometry and music (and here he glanced at Hippias); whereas, if he applies to me, he will learn precisely and solely that for which he has come. That learning consists of good judgement in his own affairs, showing how best to order his own home; and in the affairs of his city,
319a
καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.


ἆρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἕπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας.


αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.


ἦ καλόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι, εἴπερ κέκτησαι: οὐ γάρ τι ἄλλο πρός γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ ἅπερ νοῶ. ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐκ ᾤμην διδακτὸν
319a
showing how he may have most influence on public affairs both in speech and in action.


I wonder, I said, whether I follow what you are saying; for you appear to be speaking of the civic science, and undertaking to make men good citizens.


That, Socrates, he replied, is exactly the purport of what I profess.


Then it is a goodly accomplishment that you have acquired, to be sure, I remarked, if indeed you have acquired it—to such a man as you I may say sincerely what I think. For this is a thing, Protagoras,
319b
εἶναι, σοὶ δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως [ἂν] ἀπιστῶ. ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὸ ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις, δίκαιός εἰμι εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι. ὁρῶ οὖν, ὅταν συλλεγῶμεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπειδὰν μὲν περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δέῃ πρᾶξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους μεταπεμπομένους συμβούλους περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων, ὅταν δὲ περὶ ναυπηγίας, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως,
319b
that I did not suppose to be teachable; but when you say it is, I do not see how I am to disbelieve it. How I came to think that it cannot be taught, or provided by men for men, I may be allowed to explain. I say, in common with the rest of the Greeks, that the Athenians are wise. Now I observe, when we are collected for the Assembly, and the city has to deal with an affair of building, we send for builders to advise us on what is proposed to be built; and when it is a case of laying down a ship, we send for shipwrights; and so in all other matters
319c
ὅσα ἡγοῦνται μαθητά τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι: ἐὰν δέ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν ὃν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ οἴονται δημιουργὸν εἶναι, κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ᾖ καὶ πλούσιος καὶ τῶν γενναίων, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλὰ καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀποστῇ ὁ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καταθορυβηθείς, ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν ἀφελκύσωσιν ἢ ἐξάρωνται κελευόντων τῶν πρυτάνεων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται: ἐπειδὰν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς
319c
which are considered learnable and teachable: but if anyone else, whom the people do not regard as a craftsman, attempts to advise them, no matter how handsome and wealthy and well-born he may be, not one of these things induces them to accept him; they merely laugh him to scorn and shout him down, until either the speaker retires from his attempt, overborne by the clamor, or the tipstaves pull him from his place or turn him out altogether by order of the chair. Such is their procedure in matters which they consider professional. But when they have to deliberate on something connected with the administration of the State,
319d
πόλεως διοικήσεως δέῃ βουλεύσασθαι, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεὺς σκυτοτόμος, ἔμπορος ναύκληρος, πλούσιος πένης, γενναῖος ἀγεννής, καὶ τούτοις οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθών, οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ ἡγοῦνται διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν τῆς
319d
the man who rises to advise them on this may equally well be a smith, a shoemaker, a merchant, a sea-captain, a rich man, a poor man, of good family or of none, and nobody thinks of casting in his teeth, as one would in the former case, that his attempt to give advice is justified by no instruction obtained in any quarter, no guidance of any master; and obviously it is because they hold that here the thing cannot be taught. Nay further, it is not only so with the service of the State,
319e
πόλεως οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ ἡμῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι: ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, ὁ τουτωνὶ τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν,
319e
but in private life our best and wisest citizens are unable to transmit this excellence of theirs to others; for Pericles, the father of these young fellows here, gave them a first-rate training in the subjects for which he found teachers, but in those of which he is himself a master
320a
ἃ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει οὔτε τῳ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περιιόντες νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι, ἐάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου τουτουῒ νεώτερον ἀδελφόν, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ Περικλῆς, δεδιὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῇ δὴ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου, καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος ἐπαίδευε: καὶ πρὶν ἓξ μῆνας γεγονέναι,
320a
he neither trains them personally nor commits them to another's guidance, and so they go about grazing at will like sacred oxen, on the chance of their picking up excellence here or there for themselves. Or, if you like, there is Cleinias, the younger brother of Alcibiades here, whom this same Pericles, acting as his guardian, and fearing lie might be corrupted, I suppose, by Alcibiades, carried off from his brother and placed in Ariphron's family to be educated: but before six months had passed he handed him back to Alcibiades,
320b
ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι χρήσαιτο αὐτῷ. καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες οὐδένα πώποτε βελτίω ἐποίησαν οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν: ἐπειδὴ δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι καὶ οἶμαί τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαί σε πολλῶν μὲν ἔμπειρον γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξηυρηκέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς
320b
at a loss what to do with him. And there are a great many others whom I could mention to you as having never succeeded, though virtuous themselves, in making anyone else better, either of their own or of other families. I therefore, Protagoras, in view of these facts, believe that virtue is not teachable: but when I hear you speak thus, I am swayed over, and suppose there is something in what you say, because I consider you to have gained experience in many things and to have learnt many, besides finding out some for yourself. So if you can demonstrate to us more explicitly that virtue is teachable,
320c
διδακτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μὴ φθονήσῃς ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον.


ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ φθονήσω: ἀλλὰ πότερον ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθών;


πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον τῶν παρακαθημένων ὁποτέρως βούλοιτο οὕτως διεξιέναι. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν.


ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θνητὰ δὲ γένη
320c
do not grudge us your demonstration.


No, Socrates, I will not grudge it you; but shall I, as an old man speaking to his juniors, put my demonstration in the form of a fable, or of a regular exposition?


Many of the company sitting by him instantly bade him treat his subject whichever way he pleased.


Well then, he said, I fancy the more agreeable way is for me to tell you a fable.


There was once a time when there were gods, but no mortal creatures.
320d
οὐκ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν εἱμαρμένος γενέσεως, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μείξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῇ κεράννυται. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον, προσέταξαν Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ κοσμῆσαί τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἑκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. Προμηθέα δὲ παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖμαι, “νείμαντος δέ μου,” ἔφη, “ἐπίσκεψαι:” καὶ οὕτω πείσας νέμει. νέμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἰσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους προσῆπτεν,
320d
And when to these also came their destined time to be created, the gods moulded their forms within the earth, of a mixture made of earth and fire and all substances that are compounded with fire and earth. When they were about to bring these creatures to light, they charged Prometheus and Epimetheus to deal to each the equipment of his proper faculty. Epimetheus besought Prometheus that he might do the dealing himself; “And when I have dealt,” he said, “you shall examine.”
320e
τοὺς δ' ἀσθενεστέρους τάχει ἐκόσμει: τοὺς δὲ ὥπλιζε, τοῖς δ' ἄοπλον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι ἤμπισχεν, πτηνὸν φυγὴν ἢ κατάγειον οἴκησιν ἔνεμεν: ἃ δὲ ηὖξε μεγέθει, τῷδε
320e
Having thus persuaded him he dealt; and in dealing he attached strength without speed; to some, while the weaker he equipped with speed; and some he armed, while devising for others, along with an unarmed condition, some different faculty for preservation. To those which he invested with smallness he dealt a winged escape or an underground habitation; those which he increased in largeness he preserved
321a
αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἔσῳζεν: καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως ἐπανισῶν ἔνεμεν. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλάβειαν ἔχων μή τι γένος ἀϊστωθείη: ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλληλοφθοριῶν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὥρας εὐμάρειαν ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀμφιεννὺς αὐτὰ πυκναῖς τε θριξὶν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἱκανοῖς μὲν ἀμῦναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ εἰς εὐνὰς ἰοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρωμνὴ οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυὴς ἑκάστῳ: καὶ
321a
by this very means; and he dealt all the other properties on this plan of compensation. In contriving all this he was taking precaution that no kind should be extinguished; and when he had equipped them with avoidances of mutual destruction, he devised a provision against the seasons ordained by Heaven, in clothing them about with thick-set hair and solid hides, sufficient to ward off winter yet able to shield them also from the heats, and so that on going to their lairs they might find in these same things a bedding of their own that was native to each; and some he shod with hoofs,
321b
ὑποδῶν τὰ μὲν ὁπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ [θριξὶν καὶ] δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις. τοὐντεῦθεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρπούς, τοῖς δὲ ῥίζας: ἔστι δ' οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφὴν ζῴων ἄλλων βοράν: καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν προσῆψε, τοῖς δ' ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων. ἅτε δὴ οὖν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἔλαθεν αὑτὸν
321b
others with claws and solid, bloodless hides. Then he proceeded to furnish each of them with its proper food, some with pasture of the earth, others with fruits of trees, and others again with roots; and to a certain number for food he gave other creatures to devour: to some he attached a paucity in breeding, and to others, which were being consumed by these, a plenteous brood, and so procured survival of their kind. Now Epimetheus, being not so wise as he might be,
321c
καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὰ ἄλογα: λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὅτι χρήσαιτο. ἀποροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος τὴν νομήν, καὶ ὁρᾷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῷα ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον: ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἡ εἱμαρμένη ἡμέρα παρῆν, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξιέναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς φῶς. ἀπορίᾳ οὖν σχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεὺς ἥντινα σωτηρίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὕροι,
321c
heedlessly squandered his stock of properties on the brutes; he still had left unequipped the race of men, and was at a loss what to do with it. As he was casting about, Prometheus arrived to examine his distribution, and saw that whereas the other creatures were fully and suitably provided, man was naked, unshod, unbedded, unarmed; and already the destined day was come, whereon man like the rest should emerge from earth to light. Then Prometheus, in his perplexity as to what preservation he could devise for man, stole from Hephaestus and Athena wisdom in the arts
321d
κλέπτει Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί—ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ πυρὸς αὐτὴν κτητήν τῳ ἢ χρησίμην γενέσθαι—καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπῳ. τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτῃ ἔσχεν, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν: ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Διί. τῷ δὲ Προμηθεῖ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς οἴκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν—πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν—εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ Ἡφαίστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧ
321d
ogether with fire—since by no means without fire could it be acquired or helpfully used by any—and he handed it there and then as a gift to man. Now although man acquired in this way the wisdom of daily life, civic wisdom he had not, since this was in the possession of Zeus; Prometheus could not make so free as to enter the citadel which is the dwelling-place of Zeus, and moreover the guards of Zeus were terrible: but he entered unobserved the building shared by Athena and Hephaestus
321e
ἐφιλοτεχνείτην, λαθὼν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τήν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην τὴν τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορία μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ
321e
for the pursuit of their arts, and stealing Hephaestus's fiery art and all Athena's also he gave them to man, and hence it is
322a
βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθέα δὲ δι' Ἐπιμηθέα ὕστερον, ᾗπερ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετῆλθεν.


ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν ζῴων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν, καὶ ἐπεχείρει βωμούς τε ἱδρύεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν: ἔπειτα φωνὴν καὶ ὀνόματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ, καὶ οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθῆτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ στρωμνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ηὕρετο. οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι κατ' ἀρχὰς
322a
that man gets facility for his livelihood, but Prometheus, through Epimetheus' fault, later on (the story goes) stood his trial for theft.


And now that man was partaker of a divine portion,
he, in the first place, by his nearness of kin to deity, was the only creature that worshipped gods, and set himself to establish altars and holy images; and secondly, he soon was enabled by his skill to articulate speech and words, and to invent dwellings, clothes, sandals, beds, and the foods that are of the earth. Thus far provided, men dwelt separately in the beginning, and cities there were none;
322b
ἄνθρωποι ᾤκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν: ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῇ αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἱκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής —πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὔπω εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμική— ἐζήτουν δὴ ἁθροίζεσθαι καὶ σῴζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις: ὅτ' οὖν ἁθροισθεῖεν, ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο.
322b
so that they were being destroyed by the wild beasts, since these were in all ways stronger than they; and although their skill in handiwork was a sufficient aid in respect of food, in their warfare with the beasts it was defective; for as yet they had no civic art, which includes the art of war. So they sought to band themselves together and secure their lives by founding cities. Now as often as they were banded together they did wrong to one another through the lack of civic art,
322c
Ζεὺς οὖν δείσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πᾶν, Ἑρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ἵν' εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί. ἐρωτᾷ οὖν Ἑρμῆς Δία τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις: “πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηνται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω; νενέμηνται δὲ ὧδε: εἷς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί: καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ
322c
and thus they began to be scattered again and to perish. So Zeus, fearing that our race was in danger of utter destruction, sent Hermes to bring respect and right among men, to the end that there should be regulation of cities and friendly ties to draw them together. Then Hermes asked Zeus in what manner then was he to give men right and respect: “Am I to deal them out as the arts have been dealt? That dealing was done in such wise that one man possessing medical art is able to treat many ordinary men, and so with the other craftsmen. Am I to place among men right and respect in this way also, or deal them out to all?”
322d
οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω;” “ἐπὶ πάντας,” ἔφη ὁ Ζεύς, “καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων: οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν: καὶ νόμον γε θὲς παρ' ἐμοῦ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.” οὕτω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ᾖ λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται μετεῖναι συμβουλῆς, καὶ ἐάν
322d
“To all,” replied Zeus; “let all have their share: for cities cannot be formed if only a few have a share of these as of other arts. And make thereto a law of my ordaining, that he who cannot partake of respect and right shall die the death as a public pest.” Hence it comes about, Socrates, that people in cities, and especially in Athens, consider it the concern of a few to advise on cases of artistic excellence or good craftsmanship,
322e
τις ἐκτὸς ὢν τῶν ὀλίγων συμβουλεύῃ, οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῄς—εἰκότως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι—ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς
322e
and if anyone outside the few gives advice they disallow it, as you say, and not without reason, as I think: but when they meet for a consultation on civic art,
323a
ἀρετῆς ἴωσιν, ἣν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ προσῆκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. αὕτη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.


ἵνα δὲ μὴ οἴῃ ἀπατᾶσθαι ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, τόδε αὖ λαβὲ τεκμήριον. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἐάν τις φῇ ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην ἡντινοῦν τέχνην ἣν μή ἐστιν, ἢ καταγελῶσιν
323a
where they should be guided throughout by justice and good sense, they naturally allow advice from everybody, since it is held that everyone should partake of this excellence, or else that states cannot be. This, Socrates, is the explanation of it. And that you may not think you are mistaken, to show how all men verily believe that everyone partakes of justice and the rest of civic virtue, I can offer yet a further proof. In all other excellences, as you say, when a man professes to be good at flute-playing or any other art in which he has no such skill, they either laugh him to scorn or are annoyed with him, and his people come and reprove him for being so mad:
323b
ἢ χαλεπαίνουσιν, καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι προσιόντες νουθετοῦσιν ὡς μαινόμενον: ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, ἐάν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἐστιν, ἐὰν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτοῦ τἀληθῆ λέγῃ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καί φασιν πάντας δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, ἐάντε ὦσιν ἐάντε μή, ἢ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον [δικαιοσύνην]: ὡς ἀναγκαῖον
323b
but where justice or any other civic virtue is involved, and they happen to know that a certain person is unjust, if he confesses the truth about his conduct before the public, that truthfulness which in the former arts they would regard as good sense they here call madness. Everyone, they say, should profess to be just, whether he is so or not, and whoever does not make some pretension to justice is mad; since it is held that all without exception
323c
οὐδένα ὅντιν' οὐχὶ ἁμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.


ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετεῖναι αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω: ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἡγοῦνται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι
323c
must needs partake of it in some way or other, or else not be of human kind.


Take my word for it, then, that they have good reason for admitting everybody as adviser on this virtue, owing to their belief that everyone has some of it; and next, that they do not regard it as natural or spontaneous, but as something taught and acquired after careful preparation by those who acquire it,—of this I will now endeavor to convince you.
323d
φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι ὦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐλεοῦσιν: οἷον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος ὥστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ἴσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται, τὰ καλὰ καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις: ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις,
323d
In all cases of evils which men deem to have befallen their neighbors by nature or fortune, nobody is wroth with them or reproves or lectures or punishes them, when so afflicted, with a view to their being other than they are; one merely pities them. Who, for instance, is such a fool as to try to do anything of the sort to the ugly, the puny, or the weak? Because, I presume, men know that it is by nature and fortune that people get these things, the graces of life and their opposites. But as to all the good things that people are supposed to get by application and practice and teaching,
323e
ἐάν τις ταῦτα μὴ ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία τούτων κακά, ἐπὶ τούτοις που οἵ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις. ὧν ἐστιν ἓν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ
323e
where these are lacking in anyone and only their opposite evils are found, here surely are the occasions for wrath and punishment and reproof. One of them is injustice, and impiety, and in short all that is opposed
324a
συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς: ἔνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὔσης. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτό σε διδάξει ὅτι οἵ γε ἄνθρωποι ἡγοῦνται παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις
324a
to civic virtue; in such case anyone will be wroth with his neighbor and reprove him, clearly because the virtue is to be acquired by application and learning. For if you will consider punishment, Socrates, and what control it has over wrong-doers, the facts will inform you that men agree in regarding virtue as procured. No one punishes a wrong-doer from the mere contemplation
324b
μὴ ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται: ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται—οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείη—ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα. καὶ τοιαύτην διάνοιαν ἔχων διανοεῖται παιδευτὴν εἶναι ἀρετήν: ἀποτροπῆς γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει. ταύτην οὖν τὴν δόξαν πάντες ἔχουσιν ὅσοιπερ
324b
or on account of his wrong-doing, unless one takes unreasoning vengeance like a wild beast. But he who undertakes to punish with reason does not avenge himself for the past offence, since he cannot make what was done as though it had not come to pass; he looks rather to the future, and aims at preventing that particular person and others who see him punished from doing wrong again. And being so minded he must have in mind that virtue comes by training: for you observe that he punishes to deter. This then is the accepted view
324c
τιμωροῦνται καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται οἵ τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οὓς ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖν, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ σοὶ πολῖται: ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ Ἀθηναῖοί εἰσι τῶν ἡγουμένων παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν. ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἱ σοὶ πολῖται καὶ χαλκέως καὶ σκυτοτόμου συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ ὅτι διδακτὸν καὶ παρασκευαστὸν ἡγοῦνται ἀρετήν, ἀποδέδεικταί σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς, ὥς γέ μοι
324c
of all who seek requital in either private or public life; and while men in general exact requital and punishment from those whom they suppose to have wronged them, this is especially the case with the Athenians, your fellow-citizens, so that by our argument the Athenians also share the view that virtue is procured and taught. Thus I have shown that your fellow-citizens have good reason for admitting a smith's or cobbler's counsel in public affairs, and that they hold virtue to be taught and procured:
324d
φαίνεται.


ἔτι δὴ λοιπὴ ἀπορία ἐστίν, ἣν ἀπορεῖς περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί δήποτε οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοὺς αὑτῶν ὑεῖς διδάσκουσιν ἃ διδασκάλων ἔχεται καὶ σοφοὺς ποιοῦσιν, ἣν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοὶ οὐδενὸς βελτίους ποιοῦσιν. τούτου δὴ πέρι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέτι μῦθόν σοι ἐρῶ ἀλλὰ λόγον. ὧδε γὰρ ἐννόησον: πότερον ἔστιν τι ἓν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὗ ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν,
324d
of this I have given you satisfactory demonstration, Socrates, as it appears to me.


I have yet to deal with your remaining problem about good men, why it is that these good men have their sons taught the subjects in the regular teachers' courses, and so far make them wise, but do not make them excel in that virtue wherein consists their own goodness. On this point, Socrates, I shall give you argument instead of fable. Now consider: is there,
324e
εἴπερ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ αὕτη λύεται ἡ ἀπορία ἣν σὺ ἀπορεῖς ἢ ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἓν οὐ τεκτονικὴ οὐδὲ χαλκεία οὐδὲ κεραμεία
324e
or is there not, some one thing whereof all the citizens must needs partake, if there is to be a city? Here, and nowhere if not here, is the solution of this problem of yours. For if there is such a thing, and that one thing, instead of being the joiner's or smith's or potter's art, is rather justice and temperance and holiness—
325a
ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἓν αὐτὸ προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν—εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν οὗ δεῖ πάντας μετέχειν καὶ μετὰ τούτου πάντ' ἄνδρα, ἐάν τι καὶ ἄλλο βούληται μανθάνειν ἢ πράττειν, οὕτω πράττειν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτου μή, ἢ τὸν μὴ μετέχοντα καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ κολάζειν καὶ παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα, ἕωσπερ ἂν κολαζόμενος βελτίων γένηται, ὃς δ' ἂν μὴ ὑπακούῃ κολαζόμενος καὶ διδασκόμενος, ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα τοῦτον
325a
in short, what I may put together and call a man's virtue; and if it is this whereof all should partake and wherewith everyone should proceed to any further knowledge or action, but should not if he lacks it; if we should instruct and punish such as do not partake of it, whether child or husband or wife, until the punishment of such persons has made them better,
325b
ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἢ ἀποκτείνειν—εἰ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει, οὕτω δ' αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες εἰ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται τοὺς ὑεῖς, τοῦτο δὲ μή, σκέψαι ὡς θαυμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀπεδείξαμεν: διδακτοῦ δὲ ὄντος καὶ θεραπευτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς ὑεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἡ ζημία ἐὰν μὴ ἐπίστωνται, ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ ἥ τε ζημία θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ φυγαὶ μὴ μαθοῦσι
325b
and should cast forth from our cities or put to death as incurable whoever fails to respond to such punishment and instruction;—if it is like this, and yet, its nature being so, good men have their sons instructed in everything else but this, what very surprising folk the good are found to be! For we have proved that they regard this thing as teachable both in private and in public life, and then, though it may be taught and fostered, are we to say that they have their sons taught everything in which the penalty for ignorance is not death, but in a matter where the death-penalty or exile awaits their children
325c
μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσιν εἰς ἀρετήν, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν συλλήβδην τῶν οἴκων ἀνατροπαί, ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι οὗπερ ἂν ζῶσι, καὶ διδάσκουσι καὶ νουθετοῦσιν. ἐπειδὰν θᾶττον συνιῇ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς
325c
if not instructed and cultivated in virtue—and not merely death, but confiscation of property and practically the entire subversion of their house—here they do not have them taught or take the utmost care of them? So at any rate we must conclude, Socrates.


They teach and admonish them from earliest childhood till the last day of their lives. As soon as one of them grasps what is said to him, the nurse, the mother, the tutor, and the father himself strive hard
325d
ὁ πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαμάχονται, ὅπως <ὡσ> βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἕκαστον καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τόδε μὲν καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται: εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι
325d
that the child may excel, and as each act and word occurs they teach and impress upon him that this is just, and that unjust, one thing noble, another base, one holy, another unholy, and that he is to do this, and not do that. If he readily obeys,—so; but if not, they treat him as a bent and twisted piece of wood and straighten him with threats and blows. After this they send them to school and charge the master to take far more pains over their children's good behavior than over their letters
325e
εὐκοσμίας τῶν παίδων ἢ γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως: οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὰν αὖ γράμματα μάθωσιν καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα ὥσπερ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν
325e
and harp-playing. The masters take pains accordingly, and the children, when they have learnt their letters and are getting to understand the written word as before they did only the spoken, are furnished with works of good poets to read as they sit in class, and are made to learn them off by heart:
326a
ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ μὲν νουθετήσεις ἔνεισιν πολλαὶ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν μιμῆται καὶ ὀρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι. οἵ τ' αὖ κιθαρισταί, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσιν: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπειδὰν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ
326a
here they meet with many admonitions, many descriptions and praises and eulogies of good men in times past, that the boy in envy may imitate them and yearn to become even as they. Then also the music-masters, in a similar sort, take pains for their self-restraint, and see that their young charges do not go wrong: moreover, when they learn to play the harp, they are taught the works of another set of good poets,
326b
κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ὦσιν, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ὦσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν: πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται. ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβου πέμπουσιν, ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ
326b
the song-makers, while the master accompanies them on the harp; and they insist on familiarizing the boys' souls with the rhythms and scales, that they may gain in gentleness, and by advancing in rhythmic and harmonic grace may be efficient in speech and action; for the whole of man's life requires the graces of rhythm and harmony. Again, over and above all this, people send their sons to a trainer, that having improved their bodies they may perform the orders of their minds,
326c
οὔσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται ἀποδειλιᾶν διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεσιν. καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι <μάλιστα>—μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιώτατοι—καὶ οἱ τούτων ὑεῖς, πρῳαίτατα εἰς διδασκάλων τῆς ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτᾶν, ὀψιαίτατα ἀπαλλάττονται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν, ἡ πόλις αὖ τούς τε νόμους ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν κατὰ παράδειγμα,
326c
which are now in fit condition, and that they may not be forced by bodily faults to play the coward in wars and other duties. This is what people do, who are most able; and the most able are the wealthiest. Their sons begin school at the earliest age, and are freed from it at the latest. And when they are released from their schooling the city next compels them to learn the laws and to live according to them as after a pattern,
326d
ἵνα μὴ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὑτῶν εἰκῇ πράττωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ γραμματισταὶ τοῖς μήπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παίδων ὑπογράψαντες γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι οὕτω τὸ γραμματεῖον διδόασιν καὶ ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τῶν γραμμῶν, ὣς δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράψασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὑρήματα, κατὰ τούτους ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, ὃς δ' ἂν ἐκτὸς βαίνῃ τούτων, κολάζει: καὶ ὄνομα τῇ κολάσει ταύτῃ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν
326d
that their conduct may not be swayed by their own light fancies, but just as writing-masters first draw letters in faint outline with the pen for their less advanced pupils, and then give them the copy-book and make them write according to the guidance of their lines, so the city sketches out for them the laws devised by good lawgivers of yore, and constrains them to govern and be governed according to these. She punishes anyone who steps outside these borders, and this punishment among you and in many other cities,
326e
καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ, ὡς εὐθυνούσης τῆς δίκης, εὐθῦναι. τοσαύτης οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας οὔσης περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, θαυμάζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀπορεῖς εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετή; ἀλλ' οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰ μὴ διδακτόν.


διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοὶ ὑεῖς φαῦλοι γίγνονται; τοῦτο αὖ μάθε: οὐδὲν γὰρ θαυμαστόν, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος,
326e
from the corrective purpose of the prosecution, is called a Correction.
Seeing then that so much care is taken in the matter of both private and public virtue, do you wonder, Socrates, and make it a great difficulty, that virtue may be taught? Surely there is no reason to wonder at that: you would have far greater reason, if it were not so.


Then why is it that many sons of good fathers turn out so meanly? Let me explain this also: it is no wonder, granted that I was right in stating just now that no one,
327a
τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ὃ λέγω οὕτως ἔχει—ἔχει δὲ μάλιστα πάντων οὕτως—ἐνθυμήθητι ἄλλο τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὁτιοῦν καὶ μαθημάτων προελόμενος. εἰ μὴ οἷόν τ' ἦν πόλιν εἶναι εἰ μὴ πάντες αὐληταὶ ἦμεν ὁποῖός τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνει τούτου, ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδ'
327a
if we are to have a city, must be a mere layman in this affair of virtue. For if what I say is the case—and it is supremely true—reflect on the nature of any other pursuit or study that you choose to mention. Suppose that there could be no state unless we were all flute-players, in such sort as each was able, and suppose that everyone were giving his neighbor both private and public lessons in the art, and rebuked him too, if he failed to do it well, without grudging him the trouble—even as no one now thinks of grudging
327b
ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων—λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ οἶμαι ἡμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή: διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ προθύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα—εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθυμίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν εἴχομεν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν, οἴει ἄν τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐλητῶν ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς τοὺς ὑεῖς γίγνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων; οἶμαι μὲν οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὅτου ἔτυχεν ὁ ὑὸς εὐφυέστατος γενόμενος εἰς αὔλησιν, οὗτος
327b
or reserving his skill in what is just and lawful as he does in other expert knowledge; for our neighbors' justice and virtue, I take it, is to our advantage, and consequently we all tell and teach one another what is just and lawful—well, if we made the same zealous and ungrudging efforts to instruct each other in flute-playing, do you think, Socrates, that the good flute-players would be more likely than the bad to have sons who were good flute-players? I do not think they would:
327c
ἂν ἐλλόγιμος ηὐξήθη, ὅτου δὲ ἀφυής, ἀκλεής: καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἀγαθοῦ αὐλητοῦ φαῦλος ἂν ἀπέβη, πολλάκις δ' ἂν φαύλου ἀγαθός: ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γ' ἂν πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοὶ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ μηδὲν αὐλήσεως ἐπαΐοντας. οὕτως οἴου καὶ νῦν, ὅστις σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι
327c
no, wherever the son had happened to be born with a nature most apt for flute-playing, he would be found to have advanced to distinction, and where unapt, to obscurity. Often the son of a good player would turn out a bad one, and often of a bad, a good. But, at any rate, all would be capable players as compared with ordinary persons who had no inkling of the art. Likewise in the present case you must regard any man who appears to you the most unjust person ever reared among human laws and society as a just man and
327d
πρὸς ἀνθρώπους οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι μηδὲ ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄγριοί τινες οἷοίπερ οὓς πέρυσιν Φερεκράτης ὁ ποιητὴς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ. ἦ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις γενόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ μισάνθρωποι, ἀγαπήσαις ἂν εἰ ἐντύχοις Εὐρυβάτῳ καὶ Φρυνώνδᾳ, καὶ ἀνολοφύραι' ἂν ποθῶν τὴν τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων
327d
a craftsman of justice, if he had to stand comparison with people who lacked education and law courts and laws and any constant compulsion to the pursuit of virtue, but were a kind of wild folk such as Pherecrates the poet brought on the scene at last year's Lenaeum.
Sure enough, if you found yourself among such people, as did the misanthropes among his chorus, you would be very glad to meet with Eurybatus and Phrynondas,
327e
πονηρίαν. νῦν δὲ τρυφᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν ἀρετῆς καθ' ὅσον δύνανται ἕκαστος, καὶ οὐδείς σοι φαίνεται: εἶθ', ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος
327e
and would bewail yourself with longing for the wickedness of the people here. Instead of that you give yourself dainty airs, Socrates, because everyone is a teacher of virtue to the extent of his powers, and you think there is no teacher. Why, you might as well ask who is a teacher of Greek;
328a
τοῦ ἑλληνίζειν, οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φανείη, οὐδέ γ' ἂν οἶμαι εἰ ζητοῖς τίς ἂν ἡμῖν διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν ὑεῖς αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἣν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μεμαθήκασιν, καθ' ὅσον οἷός τ' ἦν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς φίλοι ὄντες ὁμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτι τίς ἂν διδάξειεν, οὐ ῥᾴδιον οἶμαι εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων διδάσκαλον φανῆναι, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων παντάπασι ῥᾴδιον, οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων: ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστιν τις ὅστις διαφέρει
328a
you would find none anywhere; and I suppose you might ask, who can teach the sons of our artisans the very crafts which of course they have learnt from their fathers, as far as the father was competent in each case, and his friends who followed the same trade,—I say if you asked who is to give these further instruction, I imagine it would be hard, Socrates, to find them a teacher, but easy enough in the case of those starting with no skill at all. And so it must be with virtue and everything else; if there is somebody who excels us ever so little
328b
ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν, ἀγαπητόν. ὧν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἷς εἶναι, καὶ διαφερόντως ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὀνῆσαί τινα πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀξίως τοῦ μισθοῦ ὃν πράττομαι καὶ ἔτι πλείονος, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ μαθόντι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πεποίημαι: ἐπειδὰν γάρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθῃ, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὃ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον:
328b
in showing the way to virtue, we must be thankful. Such an one I take myself to be, excelling all other men in the gift of assisting people to become good and true, and giving full value for the fee that I charge—nay, so much more than full, that the learner himself admits it. For this reason I have arranged my charges on a particular plan: when anyone has had lessons from me, if he likes he pays the sum that I ask; if not,
328c
ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὀμόσας ὅσου ἂν φῇ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκε.


τοιοῦτόν σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ καὶ μῦθον καὶ λόγον εἴρηκα, ὡς διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι οὕτως ἡγοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων φαύλους ὑεῖς γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων ἀγαθούς, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ Πολυκλείτου ὑεῖς, Παράλου καὶ Ξανθίππου τοῦδε ἡλικιῶται, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εἰσίν, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλων δημιουργῶν. τῶνδε δὲ
328c
he goes to a temple, states on oath the value he sets on what he has learnt, and disburses that amount. So now, Socrates, I have shown you by both fable and argument that virtue is teachable and is so deemed by the Athenians, and that it is no wonder that bad sons are born of good fathers and good of bad, since even the sons of Polycleitus, companions of Paralus and Xanthippus here, are not to be compared with their father, and the same is the case in other craftsmen's families. As for these two, it is not fair to make this complaint of them yet;
328d
οὔπω ἄξιον τοῦτο κατηγορεῖν: ἔτι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰσιν ἐλπίδες: νέοι γάρ.


Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξάμενος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον κεκηλημένος ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔβλεπον ὡς ἐροῦντά τι, ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούειν: ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ᾐσθόμην ὅτι τῷ ὄντι πεπαυμένος εἴη, μόγις πως ἐμαυτὸν ὡσπερεὶ συναγείρας εἶπον, βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Ἱπποκράτη: ὦ παῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου, ὡς χάριν σοι ἔχω ὅτι προύτρεψάς με ὧδε ἀφικέσθαι: πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦμαι
328d
there is still hope in their case, for they are young.


After this great and fine performance Protagoras ceased from speaking. As for me, for a good while I was still under his spell and kept on looking at him as though he were going to say more, such was my eagerness to hear: but when I perceived that he had really come to a stop, I pulled myself together, as it were, with an effort, and looking at Hippocrates I said: Son of Apollodorus, I am very grateful to you for inducing me to come hither;
328e
ἀκηκοέναι ἃ ἀκήκοα Πρωταγόρου. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν ᾗ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται: νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμικρόν τί μοι ἐμποδών, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥᾳδίως ἐπεκδιδάξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξεν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μέν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων συγγένοιτο ὁτῳοῦν τῶν
328e
for it is a great treat to have heard what I have heard from Protagoras. I used formerly to think that there was no human treatment by which the good were made good, but now I am convinced that there is. Only I find one slight difficulty, which Protagoras will of course easily explain away, since he has explained so many puzzles already. If one should be present when any of the public speakers were dealing with
329a
δημηγόρων, τάχ' ἂν καὶ τοιούτους λόγους ἀκούσειεν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἱκανῶν εἰπεῖν: εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροιτό τινά τι, ὥσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἠχεῖ καὶ ἀποτείνει ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηταί τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω, σμικρὰ
329a
these same subjects, one could probably hear similar discourses from Pericles or some other able speaker: but suppose you put a question to one of them—they are just like books, incapable of either answering you or putting a question of their own; if you question even a small point in what has been said, just as brazen vessels ring a long time after they have been struck and prolong the note unless you put your hand on them, these orators too, on being asked a little question,
329b
ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρόμενος περιμεῖναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἃ ὀλίγοις ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα. νῦν οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε. τὴν ἀρετὴν φῂς διδακτὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι:
329b
extend their speech over a full-length course.
But Protagoras here, while able to deliver, as events have shown, a long and excellent speech, is also able when questioned to reply briefly, and after asking a question to await and accept the answer—accomplishments that few can claim. And now, Protagoras, there is one little thing wanting to the completeness of what I have got, so please answer me this. You say that virtue may be taught, and if there is anybody in the world who could convince me, you are the man: but there was a point in your speech
329c
ὃ δ' ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος, τοῦτό μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον. ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ πέμψειε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὖ πολλαχοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἕν τι εἴη συλλήβδην, ἀρετή: ταῦτ' οὖν αὐτὰ δίελθέ μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἓν μέν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ
329c
at which I wondered, and on which my spirit would fain be satisfied. You said that Zeus had sent justice and respect to mankind, and furthermore it was frequently stated in your discourse that justice, temperance, holiness and the rest were all but one single thing, virtue: pray, now proceed to deal with these in more precise exposition, stating whether virtue is a single thing, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts,
329d
ἔλεγον πάντα ὀνόματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἔτι ἐπιποθῶ.


ἀλλὰ ῥᾴδιον τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι ἑνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόριά ἐστιν ἃ ἐρωτᾷς.
πότερον, ἔφην, ὥσπερ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόριά ἐστιν, στόμα τε καὶ ῥὶς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, ἢ ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ' ἢ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι;
ἐκείνως μοι φαίνεται, ὦ
329d
or whether the qualities I have just mentioned are all names of the same single thing. This is what I am still hankering after.


Why, the answer to that is easy, Socrates, he replied: it is that virtue is a single thing and the qualities in question are parts of it.


Do you mean parts, I asked, in the sense of the parts of a face, as mouth, nose, eyes, and ears; or, as in the parts of gold, is there no difference among the pieces, either between the parts or between a part and the whole, except in greatness and smallness?


In the former sense, I think, Socrates; as the parts of the face
329e
Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον.
πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο, ἢ ἀνάγκη, ἐάνπερ τις ἓν λάβῃ, ἅπαντα ἔχειν;
οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, ἄδικοι δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὖ, σοφοὶ δὲ οὔ.
ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια
329e
are to the whole face.


Well then, I continued, when men partake of these portions of virtue, do some have one, and some another, or if you get one, must you have them all?


By no means, he replied, since many are brave but unjust, and many again are just but not wise.


Then are these also parts of virtue,
330a
τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία;
πάντων μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη: καὶ μέγιστόν γε ἡ σοφία τῶν μορίων.
ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο;
ναί.
ἦ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἰδίαν ἔχει; ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου, οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμὸς οἷον τὰ ὦτα, οὐδ' ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτή: οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα: ἆρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ
330a
I asked—wisdom and courage?


Most certainly, I should say, he replied and of the parts, wisdom is the greatest.


Each of them, I proceeded, is distinct from any other?


Yes.


Does each also have its particular function? Just as, in the parts of the face, the eye is not like the ears, nor is its function the same; nor is any of the other parts like another, in its function or in any other respect: in the same way, are the parts of virtue unlike each other,
330b
ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ τῷ παραδείγματί γε ἔοικε;
ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον: οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλο οἷον ἐπιστήμη, οὐδ' οἷον δικαιοσύνη, οὐδ' οἷον ἀνδρεία, οὐδ' οἷον σωφροσύνη, οὐδ' οἷον ὁσιότης.
οὐκ ἔφη.
φέρε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα ποῖόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἕκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε:
330b
both in themselves and in their functions? Are they not evidently so, if the analogy holds?


Yes, they are so, Socrates, he said.


So then, I went on, among the parts of virtue, no other part is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness.


He agreed.


Come now, I said, let us consider together what sort of thing is each of these parts. First let us ask,
330c
ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τί ἐστιν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ: τί δὲ σοί;
κἀμοί, ἔφη.
τί οὖν; εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ: “ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἴπετον δή μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδικον;” ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον: σὺ δὲ τίν' ἂν ψῆφον θεῖο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην;
τὴν αὐτήν, ἔφη.
ἔστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ
330c
is justice something, or not a thing at all? I think it is; what do you say?


So do I, he replied.


Well then, suppose someone should ask you and me: Protagoras and Socrates, pray tell me this—the thing you named just now, justice, is that itself just or unjust? I should reply, it is just: what would your verdict be? The same as mine or different?


The same, he said.


Then justice,
330d
ἐρωτῶντι: οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ;
ναί, ἔφη.
εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο: “οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁσιότητά τινά φατε εἶναι;” φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι.
ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς.
“οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμά τι εἶναι;” φαῖμεν ἄν: ἢ οὔ;
καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη.
“πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμά φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἷον ὅσιον;” ἀγανακτήσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ εἴποιμ' ἄν: εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε: σχολῇ μεντἄν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή
330d
I should say in reply to our questioner, is of a kind that is just: would you also?


Yes, he said.


Now suppose he proceeded to ask us: Do you also speak of a “holiness”? We should say we do, I fancy.


Yes, he said.


Then do you call this a thing also? We should say we do, should we not?


He assented again.


Do you say this thing itself is of such nature as to be unholy, or holy? For my part I should be annoyed at this question, I said, and should answer: Hush, my good sir!
330e
γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται. τί δὲ σύ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν ἀποκρίναιο;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.


εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο εἴποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς: “πῶς οὖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἆρ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα; ἐδόξατέ μοι φάναι <τὰ> τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον:” εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἤκουσας, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἴει εἰπεῖν τοῦτο, παρήκουσας: Πρωταγόρας γὰρ
330e
It is hard to see how anything could be holy, if holiness itself is not to be holy! And you—would you not make the same reply?


Certainly I would, he said.


Now suppose he went on to ask us: Well, and what of your statement a little while since? Perhaps I did not hear you aright, but I understood you two to say that the parts of virtue are in such a relation to each other that one of them is not like another. Here my answer would be: As to the substance of it, you heard aright, but you made a mistake in thinking that I had any share in that statement.
331a
ὅδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐγὼ δὲ ἠρώτων. εἰ οὖν εἴποι: “ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φῂς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον μόριον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν;” τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρίναιο;
ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογεῖν.


τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται: “οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁσιότης οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὅσιον ἀλλ' οἷον μὴ ὅσιον: ἡ δ' ὁσιότης οἷον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἄδικον
331a
It was Protagoras here who made that answer; I was only the questioner. Then suppose he were to ask: Is our friend telling the truth, Protagoras? Is it you who say that one part of virtue is not like another? Is this statement yours? What answer would you give him?


I must needs admit it, Socrates, he said.


Well now, Protagoras, after that admission, what answer shall we give him, if he goes on to ask this question: Is not holiness something of such nature as to be just, and justice such as to be holy, or can it be unholy? Can holiness be not just, and therefore unjust, and justice unholy?
331b
ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον;” τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινούμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπέρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίην ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον: καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δέ, εἴ με ἐῴης, ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοίμην, ὅτι ἤτοι ταὐτόν γ' ἐστιν δικαιότης ὁσιότητι ἢ ὅτι ὁμοιότατον, καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὁσιότης καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης οἷον δικαιοσύνη. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ διακωλύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτως.
οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἁπλοῦν
331b
What is to be our reply? I should say myself, on my own behalf, that both justice is holy and holiness just, and with your permission I would make this same reply for you also; since justness is either the same thing as holiness or extremely like it, and above all, justice is of the same kind as holiness, and holiness as justice. Are you minded to forbid this answer, or are you in agreement with it?


I do not take quite so simple a view of it, Socrates,
331c
εἶναι, ὥστε συγχωρῆσαι τήν τε δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον, ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο διαφέρει; ἔφη: εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη ὅσιον καὶ ὁσιότης δίκαιον.
μή μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ: οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ “εἰ βούλει” τοῦτο καὶ “εἴ σοι δοκεῖ” ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ: τὸ δ' “ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ” τοῦτο λέγω, οἰόμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστ'
331c
as to grant that justice is holy and holiness just. I think we have to make a distinction here. Yet what difference does it make? he said: if you like, let us assume that justice is holy and holiness just.


No, no, I said; I do not want this “if you like” or “if you agree” sort of thing
to be put to the proof, but you and me together; and when I say “you and me” I mean that our statement will be most properly tested
331d
ἂν ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἴ τις τὸ “εἴ” ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, προσέοικέν τι δικαιοσύνη ὁσιότητι: καὶ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ὁτῳοῦν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ προσέοικεν. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὅπῃ προσέοικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις: καὶ ἃ τότε ἔφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια, ἁμῇ γέ πῃ προσέοικεν καὶ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον. ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ τρόπῳ
331d
if we take away the “if.”


Well, at any rate, he said, justice has some resemblance to holiness; for anything in the world has some sort of resemblance to any other thing. Thus there is a point in which white resembles black, and hard soft, and so with all the other things which are regarded as most opposed to each other; and the things which we spoke of before as having different faculties and not being of the same kind as each other—the parts of the face—these in some sense resemble one another and are of like sort. In this way therefore you could prove, if you chose,
331e
κἂν ταῦτα ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἅπαντά ἐστιν ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὅμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ὅμοια δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὅμοιον.
καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν: ἦ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ὅσιον πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχει, ὥστε ὅμοιόν τι σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις;
οὐ πάνυ,
331e
that even these things are all like one another. But it is not fair to describe things as like which have some point alike, however small, or ash unlike that have some point unlike.


This surprised me, and I said to him: What, do you regard just and holy as so related to each other that they have only some small point of likeness?


Not so, he replied, at all, nor yet,
332a
ἔφη, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι.
ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐάσωμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὧν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς;
ἔφη.
τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία;
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.
πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἅνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, ἢ [εἰ] τοὐναντίον [ἔπραττον];
σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν
332a
on the other hand, as I believe you regard them.


Well then, I said, since I find you chafe at this suggestion, we will let it pass, and consider another instance that you gave. Is there a thing you call folly?


Yes, he said.


Is not the direct opposite to that thing wisdom?


I think so, he said.


And when men behave rightly and usefully, do you consider them temperate in so behaving, or the opposite?


Temperate, he said.
332b
σωφροσύνῃ σωφρονοῦσιν;
ἀνάγκη.
οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσιν καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες;
συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.
τοὐναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως;
ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνῃ πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνῃ;
ὡμολόγει.
οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἰσχύϊ πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἀσθενείᾳ, ἀσθενῶς;
ἐδόκει.
καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυτῆτος,
332b
Then is it by temperance that they are temperate?


Necessarily.


Now those who do not behave rightly behave foolishly, and are not temperate in so behaving?


I agree, he said.


And behaving foolishly is the opposite to behaving temperately?


Yes, he said.


Now foolish behavior is due to folly, and temperate behavior to temperance?


He assented.


And whatever is done by strength is done strongly, and whatever by weakness, weakly?


He agreed.


And whatever with swiftness, swiftly, and whatever with slowness, slowly ?
332c
βραδέως;
ἔφη.
καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου;
συνέφη.
φέρε δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι καλόν;
συνεχώρει.
τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν;
οὐκ ἔστιν.
τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν;
ἔστιν.
τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν;
οὐκ ἔστιν.
τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῇ;
ἔφη.
τούτῳ μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ;
οὐκ ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐναντίων ἓν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά;
συνωμολόγει.
332c
Yes, he said.


And so whatever is done in a certain way is done by that kind of faculty, and whatever in an opposite way, by the opposite kind?


He agreed.


Pray now, I proceeded, is there such a thing as the beautiful?


He granted it.


Has this any opposite except the ugly?


None.


Well, is there such a thing as the good?


There is.


Has it any opposite but the evil?


None.


Tell me, is there such a thing as “shrill” in the voice?


Yes, he said.


Has it any other opposite than “deep.”


No, he said.


Now, I went on, each single opposite has but one opposite,
332d
ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή;
ὡμολογήκαμεν.
τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι;
ἔφη.
ὡμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ ἂν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ;
ἔφη.
τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης;
332d
not many?


He admitted this.


Come now, I said, let us reckon up our points of agreement. We have agreed that one thing has but one opposite, and no more?


We have.


And that what is done in an opposite way is done by opposites?


Yes, he said.


And we have agreed that what is done foolishly is done in an opposite way to what is done temperately?


Yes, he said.


And that what is done temperately is done by temperance, and what foolishly by folly?
332e
συνεχώρει.
οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ ἐναντίου πράττοιτ' ἄν;
ναί.
πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης;
ναί.
ἐναντίως;
πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων;
ναί.
ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνης;
φαίνεται.
μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη σοφίᾳ ἐναντίον εἶναι;
συνωμολόγει.
ἓν δὲ ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον
332e
He assented.


Now if it is done in an opposite way, it must be done by an opposite?


Yes?


And one is done by temperance, and the other by folly?


Yes.


In an opposite way?


Certainly.


And by opposite faculties?


Yes.


Then folly is opposite to temperance


Apparently.


Now do you recollect that in the previous stage we have agreed that folly is opposite to wisdom?


He admitted this.


And that one thing has but one opposite?


Yes.
333a
εἶναι;
φημί.
πότερον οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων; τὸ ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγετο ἕτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία, μόριον δὲ ἑκάτερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια; πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν; οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται: οὐ γὰρ συνᾴδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις. πῶς γὰρ ἂν συνᾴδοιεν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ
333a
Then which, Protagoras, of our propositions are we to reject—the statement that one thing has but one opposite; or the other, that wisdom is different from temperance, and each is a part of virtue, and moreover, a different part, and that the two are as unlike, both in themselves and in their faculties, as the parts of the face? Which are we to upset? The two of them together are not quite in tune; they do not chime in harmony. How could they,
333b
μὲν ἓν μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείοσιν δὲ μή, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνῃ ἑνὶ ὄντι σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὖ φαίνεται: ἦ γάρ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλως πως;
ὡμολόγησεν καὶ μάλ' ἀκόντως.
οὐκοῦν ἓν ἂν εἴη ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὖ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν ὄν.


ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψώμεθα. ἆρά τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν
333b
if one thing must needs have but one opposite and no more, while wisdom, and temperance likewise, appear both to be opposite to folly, which is a single thing? Such is the position, Protagoras, I said or is it otherwise?


He admitted it was so, much against his will.


Then temperance and wisdom must be one thing? And indeed we found before that justice and holiness were almost the same thing. Come, Protagoras, I said, let us not falter, but carry out our inquiry to the end. Tell me, does a man who acts unjustly seem to you to be temperate
333c
ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ;
αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοί γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι, ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ;
εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶτον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι τὸν τῶν πολλῶν.
ἀλλ' οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, ἐὰν μόνον σύ γε ἀποκρίνῃ, εἴτ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα εἴτε μή: τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι.
333c
in so acting?


I should be ashamed, Socrates, he replied, to admit that, in spite of what many people say.


Then shall I address my argument to them, I asked, or to you?


If you please, he answered, debate first against that popular theory.


It is all the same to me, I said, so long as you make answer, whether it be your own opinion or not. For although my first object is to test the argument, the result perhaps will be that both I, the questioner, and my respondent are brought to the test.
333d
τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας—τὸν γὰρ λόγον ᾐτιᾶτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι—ἔπειτα μέντοι συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι. δοκοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες;
ἔστω, ἔφη.
τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν;
ἔφη.
τὸ δ' εὖ φρονεῖν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν;
ἔστω, ἔφη.
πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς;
εἰ εὖ.
λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἄττα εἶναι;
λέγω.
ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ἅ ἐστιν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;
333d
At first Protagoras appeared to be coy, alleging that the argument was too disconcerting: however he consented at length to make answer. Well now, I said, begin at the beginning, and tell me, do you consider people to be temperate when they are unjust?


Let us suppose so, he said.


And by being temperate you mean being sensible?


Yes.


And being sensible is being well-advised in their injustice?


Let us grant it, he said.


Does this mean, I asked, if they fare well by their injustice, or if they fare ill?


If they fare well.


Now do you say there are things that are good?


I do.


Then, I asked, are those things good which are profitable to men?
333e
καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, κἂν μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὠφέλιμα ᾖ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθά.
καί μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι: ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἑώρων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος ἠρέμα ἠρόμην. πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ
333e
Oh yes, to be sure, he replied, and also when they are not profitable to men I call them good.


Here Protagoras seemed to me to be in a thoroughly provoked and harassed state, and to have set his face against answering: so when I saw him in this mood I grew wary and went gently with my questions. Do you mean, Protagoras, I asked,
334a
Πρωταγόρα, ἃ μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλιμά ἐστιν, ἢ ἃ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ὠφέλιμα; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖς;
οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη: ἀλλ' ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ' ἃ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστι, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δέ γε ὠφέλιμα: τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δέ: τὰ δὲ βουσὶν μόνον, τὰ δὲ κυσίν: τὰ δέ γε τούτων μὲν οὐδενί, δένδροις δέ: τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθά, ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις πονηρά, οἷον καὶ ἡ κόπρος πάντων
334a
things that are profitable to no human being, or things not profitable in any way at all? Can you call such things as these good?


By no means, he replied; but I know a number of things that are unprofitable to men, namely, foods, drinks, drugs, and countless others, and some that are profitable; some that are neither one nor the other to men, but are one or the other to horses; and some that are profitable only to cattle, or again to dogs; some also that are not profitable to any of those, but are to trees; and some that are good for the roots of a tree, but bad for its shoots—such as dung,
334b
τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλλομένη, εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλῶνας ἐπιβάλλειν, πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἅπασίν ἐστιν πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς θριξὶν πολεμιώτατον ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων πλὴν ταῖς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρωγὸν καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι. οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν, ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ
334b
which is a good thing when applied to the roots of all plants, whereas if you chose to cast it on the young twigs and branches, it will ruin all. And oil too is utterly bad for all plants, and most deadly for the hair of all animals save that of man, while to the hair of man it is helpful, as also to the rest of his body. The good is such an elusive and diverse thing that in this instance it is good for the outward parts of man's body,
334c
σώματος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δ' ἐντὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κάκιστον: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἰατροὶ πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσιν τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ ἀλλ' ἢ ὅτι σμικροτάτῳ ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει ἔδεσθαι, ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν γιγνομένην ἐν τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὄψοις.


εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν ὡς εὖ λέγοι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον: ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι μακρὰ λέγῃ,
334c
but at the same time as bad as can be for the inward; and for this reason all doctors forbid the sick to take oil, except the smallest possible quantity, in what one is going to eat—just enough to quench the loathing that arises in the sensations of one's nostrils from food and its dressings.


When he had thus spoken, the company acclaimed it as an excellent answer; and then I remarked: Protagoras, I find I am a forgetful sort of person,
334d
ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ὁ λόγος. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος ὤν, ᾤου ἂν χρῆναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μεῖζον φθέγγεσθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ἐπιλήσμονι ἐνέτυχες, σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἕπεσθαι.


πῶς οὖν κελεύεις με βραχέα ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ἢ βραχύτερά σοι, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνωμαι ἢ δεῖ;


μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.


ἀλλ' ὅσα δεῖ; ἔφη.
334d
and if someone addresses me at any length I forget the subject on which he is talking. So, just as you, in entering on a discussion with me, would think fit to speak louder to me than to others if I happened to be hard of hearing, please bear in mind now that you have to deal with a forgetful person, and therefore cut up your answers into shorter pieces, that I may be able to follow you.


Well, what do you mean by short answers? he asked: do you want me to make them shorter than they should be?


Not at all, I said.


As long as they should be? he asked.


Yes, I said.
334e
ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.


πότερα οὖν ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσαῦτά σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί;


ἀκήκοα γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι σὺ οἷός τ' εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, οὕτως ὥστε τὸν λόγον μηδέποτε ἐπιλιπεῖν, καὶ αὖ βραχέα
334e
Then are my answers to be as long as I think they should be, or as you think they should be?


Well, for instance, I have heard, I said, that you yourself are able, in treating one and the same subject, not only to instruct another person in it but to speak on it at length, if you choose, without ever being at a loss for matter; or again briefly,
335a
οὕτως ὥστε μηδένα σοῦ ἐν βραχυτέροις εἰπεῖν: εἰ οὖν μέλλεις ἐμοὶ διαλέξεσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρῶ τρόπῳ πρός με, τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ.


ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγὼ πολλοῖς ἤδη εἰς ἀγῶνα λόγων ἀφικόμην ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο ἐποίουν ὃ σὺ κελεύεις, ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἐκέλευέν με διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω διελεγόμην, οὐδενὸς ἂν βελτίων ἐφαινόμην οὐδ' ἂν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.


καὶ ἐγώ—ἔγνων γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ταῖς
335a
so as to yield to no one in brevity of expression. So, if you are going to argue with me, employ with me the latter method, that of brevity.


Socrates, he said, I have undertaken in my time many contests of speech, and if I were to do what you demand, and argue just in the way that my opponent demanded, I should not be held superior to anyone nor would Protagoras have made a name among the Greeks.


Then, as I saw that he had not been quite satisfied with himself in making his former answers, and that he would not readily
335b
ἀποκρίσεσιν ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθελήσοι ἑκὼν εἶναι ἀποκρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι—ἡγησάμενος οὐκέτι ἐμὸν ἔργον εἶναι παρεῖναι ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἀλλά τοι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐδ' ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω παρὰ τὰ σοὶ δοκοῦντα τὴν συνουσίαν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν σὺ βούλῃ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἕπεσθαι, τότε σοι διαλέξομαι. σὺ μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέγεται περὶ σοῦ, φῂς δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ οἷός τ' εἶ συνουσίας ποιεῖσθαι
335b
accept the part of answerer in debate, I considered it was not my business to attend his meetings further, and remarked: But you know, Protagoras, I too feel uncomfortable about our having this discussion against your inclination; but when you agree to argue in such a way that I can follow, then I will argue with you. For you—as people relate of you, and you yourself assert—are able to hold a discussion in the form of either long or short speeches; you are a man of knowledge:
335c
—σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ—ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός τ' εἶναι. ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφότερα δυνάμενον, ἵνα ἡ συνουσία ἐγίγνετο: νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοί τις ἀσχολία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' εἴην σοι παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς λόγους—ἐλθεῖν γάρ ποί με δεῖ—εἶμι: ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον.


καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών: καί μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῇ δεξιᾷ,
335c
but I have no ability for these long speeches, though I could wish that I had it. Surely you, who are proficient in both ways, ought to have made us this concession, that so we might have had our debate. But now that you refuse, and I am somewhat pressed for time and could not stay to hear you expatiate at any length—for I have an appointment—I will be off; though I daresay I should be happy enough to hear your views.


With these words I rose as if to go away; but, as I was getting up,
335d
τῇ δ' ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τοῦ τρίβωνος τουτουΐ, καὶ εἶπεν: οὐκ ἀφήσομέν σε, ὦ Σώκρατες: ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ ἐξέλθῃς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι. δέομαι οὖν σου παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν: ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὸς ἥδιον ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου διαλεγομένων. ἀλλὰ χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν.


καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον—ἤδη δὲ ἀνειστήκη ὡς ἐξιών—ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου, ἀεὶ μὲν ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, ἀτὰρ
335d
Callias laid hold of my arm with his right hand, and grasped this cloak of mine with his left, and said: We will not let you go, Socrates; for if you leave us our discussions will not go so well. I beg you therefore to stay with us, for there is nothing I would rather hear than an argument between you and Protagoras. Come, you must oblige us all.


Then I said (I was now standing up as though to go out): Son of Hipponicus, I always admire your love of knowledge, but especially do I commend and love it now,
335e
καὶ νῦν ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, ὥστε βουλοίμην ἂν χαρίζεσθαί σοι, εἴ μου δυνατὰ δέοιο: νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἱμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι ἕπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῳ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἕπεσθαι,
335e
so that I should be very glad to oblige you if you asked of me something that I could do: but I am afraid it is as though you asked me to keep pace with Criso the runner of Himera in his prime, or to keep up in a match with one of the long-distance
or day-course
racers, and I could only tell you that
336a
εἴποιμι ἄν σοι ὅτι πολὺ σοῦ μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ δέομαι θέουσιν τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ' εἴ τι δέῃ θεάσασθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμέ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θέοντας, τούτου δέου συγκαθεῖναι: ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι ταχὺ θεῖν, οὗτος δὲ δύναται βραδέως. εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέου, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι:
336a
I wish that of myself, without your asking, I could keep pace with such runners, but of course I cannot. If you want to have the spectacle of Criso and me running together, you must ask him to adapt his pace; for whereas I cannot run fast, he can run slowly. So if you desire to hear Protagoras and me, ask him to resume the method of answering which he used at first—in short sentences and keeping to the point raised. Otherwise
336b
εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ ἔγωγ' ᾤμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναί τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν.


ἀλλ'—ὁρᾷς; —ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν Πρωταγόρας ἀξιῶν αὑτῷ τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται, καὶ σὺ ὅπως ἂν αὖ σὺ βούλῃ.


ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Καλλία: Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅδε ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετεῖναί οἱ μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι
336b
what is to be our mode of discussion? For I thought that to hold a joint discussion and to make a harangue were two distinct things.


Ah, but you see, Socrates, he said, Protagoras thinks it only fair to claim that he be allowed to discuss in his chosen style, in return for your claim that it should be in yours.


At this Alcibiades intervened, saying: You do not state it quite philosophically, Callias,
for Socrates here confesses he is no hand at long discourses, and yields therein to Protagoras;
336c
οἷός τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἴ τῳ ἀνθρώπων παραχωρεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους διαλεχθῆναι, ἐξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει: εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται, διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ' ἑκάστῃ ἐρωτήσει μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτείνων, ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων
336c
but I should be surprised if he yields to any man in ability to argue, or in understanding the interchange of reason. Now if Protagoras confesses himself inferior to Socrates in argumentation, Socrates has no more to ask: but if he challenges him, let him discuss by question and answer; not spinning out a lecture on each question—beating off the arguments, refusing to give a reason, and so dilating
336d
διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀπομηκύνων ἕως ἂν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκουόντων: ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καί φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν: χρὴ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι.


μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ εἰπών: ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἱππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μάλα πρὸς
336d
until most of his hearers have forgotten the point at issue. For Socrates, I warrant you, will not forget, despite his jesting way of calling himself forgetful. Now I think Socrates' proposal is the more equitable—for each of us should declare his personal opinion.


After Alcibiades, the next, I believe, to speak was Critias: Prodicus and Hippias, he said, it seems to me that Callias is all for supporting Protagoras, while Alcibiades is always for a contest
336e
Πρωταγόρου εἶναι, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἀεὶ φιλόνικός ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὁρμήσῃ: ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμφιλονικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλῦσαι τὴν συνουσίαν.
336e
in anything he takes up. It is not for us to contend on either side for Socrates or for Protagoras, but jointly to request them both not to break off
337a
εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, ὁ Πρόδικος, καλῶς μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Κριτία: χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγομένοιν ἀκροατάς, ἴσους δὲ μή—ἔστιν γὰρ οὐ ταὐτόν: κοινῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἴσον δὲ νεῖμαι ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλέον, τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν καὶ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μέν,
337a
our conference unconcluded.


When he had said this, Prodicus
remarked: I think you are right, Critias: those who attend this sort of discussion ought to be joint, but not equal, hearers of both disputants. For there is a difference: we should listen jointly to them both, yet not give equal heed to each, but more to the wiser and less to the less intelligent. I on my part also, Protagoras and Socrates, call upon you to accede to our request, and to dispute,
337b
ἐρίζειν δὲ μή—ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι' εὔνοιαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσιν δὲ οἱ διάφοροί τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις—καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλλίστη ἡμῖν ἡ συνουσία γίγνοιτο: ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε—εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων—
337b
but not wrangle, with each other over your arguments: for friends dispute with friends, just from good feeling; whereas wrangling is between those who are at variance and enmity with one another. In this way our meeting will have highest success, since you the speakers will thus earn the greatest measure of good repute, not praise, from us who hear you. For good repute is present in the hearers' souls without deception, but praise is too often in the words of liars who hide what they really think.
337c
ἡμεῖς τ' αὖ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως εὐφραινοίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεσθα—εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν μανθάνοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἥδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθίοντά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἡδὺ πάσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι.


ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο: μετὰ δὲ τὸν πρόδικον Ἱππίας ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι—
337c
Again, we listeners would thus be most comforted, not pleased; for he is comforted who learns something and gets a share of good sense in his mind alone, whereas he is pleased who eats something or has some other pleasant sensation only in his body.


When Prodicus had thus spoken, quite a number of the company showed their approval then after Prodicus the learned Hippias
spoke: Gentlemen, he said, who are here present, I regard you all as kinsmen and intimates and fellow-citizens by nature, not by law:
337d
φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ: τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται—ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ
337d
for like is akin to like by nature, whereas law, despot of mankind, often constrains us against nature. Hence it would be shameful if we, while knowing the nature of things, should yet—being the wisest of the Greeks, and having met together for the very purpose in the very sanctuary of the wisdom of Greece, and in this the greatest and most auspicious house of the city of cities—display no worthy sign of this dignity,
337e
ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφήνασθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων
337e
but should quarrel with each other like low churls. Now let me beg and advise you, Protagoras and Socrates, to come to terms arranged, as it were, under our arbitration: you, Socrates, must, not require that precise form
338a
εἰς τὸ μέσον, καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν, εἰ μὴ ἡδὺ Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρίᾳ ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν. ὣς οὖν ποιήσετε, καὶ πείθεσθέ μοι ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν ἑλέσθαι ὃς ὑμῖν
338a
of discussion with its extreme brevity, if it is disagreeable to Protagoras, but let the speeches have their head with a loose rein, that they may give us a more splendid and elegant impression; nor must you, Protagoras, let out full sail, as you run before the breeze, and so escape into the ocean of speech leaving the land nowhere in sight; rather, both of you must take a middle course. So you shall do as I say, and I strongly urge you to choose an umpire or supervisor or chairman
338b
φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μῆκος τῶν λόγων ἑκατέρου.


ταῦτα ἤρεσε τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπῄνεσαν, καὶ ἐμέ τε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσειν καὶ ἑλέσθαι ἐδέοντο ἐπιστάτην. εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν εἴη βραβευτὴν ἑλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἴτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ αἱρεθείς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιστατεῖν, εἴτε ὅμοιος, οὐδ' οὕτως ὀρθῶς: ὁ γὰρ ὅμοιος ἡμῖν ὅμοια καὶ ποιήσει, ὥστε ἐκ
338b
who will keep watch for you over the due measure of either's speeches.


His proposal was approved by the company, and they all applauded it: Callias said he would not let me go, and they requested me to choose a supervisor. To this I replied that it would be a shame to choose an arbiter for our discussion; for if he who is chosen, said I, is to be our inferior, it would not be right to have the inferior overseeing the superior; while if he is our equal, that will be just as wrong, for our equal will only do very much as we do, and it will be superfluous to choose him.
338c
περιττοῦ ᾑρήσεται. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἱρήσεσθε. τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα ἑλέσθαι: εἰ δὲ αἱρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε δέ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε γίγνεται, ὥσπερ φαύλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστάτην αἱρεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει. ἀλλ' οὑτωσὶ ἐθέλω ποιῆσαι, ἵν' ὃ προθυμεῖσθε συνουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίγνωνται: εἰ μὴ βούλεται
338c
You may say you will choose one who is our superior. This, in very truth, I hold to be impossible—to choose someone who is wiser than our friend Protagoras; and if you choose one who is not his superior, though you may say he is, that again would cast a slur on him, as if he were some paltry fellow requiring a supervisor; for, as far as I am concerned, the matter is indifferent. But let me tell you how I would have the thing done, so that your eagerness for a conference and a discussion may be satisfied. If Protagoras does not wish to answer,
338d
Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὗτος μὲν ἐρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, καὶ ἅμα πειράσομαι αὐτῷ δεῖξαι ὡς ἐγώ φημι χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι: ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὁπός' ἂν οὗτος βούληται ἐρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ δοκῇ πρόθυμος εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῇ δεησόμεθα αὐτοῦ ἅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ, μὴ διαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν:
338d
let him ask questions, and I will answer: at the same time I will try to show him how the answerer, in my view, ought to answer; and when I have answered all the questions that he wishes to ask, in his turn he shall render account in like manner to me. So if he does not seem very ready to answer the particular question put to him, you and I will join in beseeching him, as you have besought me, not to upset our conference. And for this plan there is no need to have one man as supervisor;
338e
καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τούτου ἕνεκα ἕνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντες κοινῇ ἐπιστατήσετε. ἐδόκει πᾶσιν οὕτω ποιητέον εἶναι: καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν, ὅμως δὲ ἠναγκάσθη ὁμολογῆσαι ἐρωτήσειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἱκανῶς ἐρωτήσῃ, πάλιν δώσειν λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀποκρινόμενος.


ἤρξατο οὖν ἐρωτᾶν οὑτωσί πως:
ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν
338e
you will all supervise it together.


They all resolved that it should be done in this way: Protagoras, though very unwilling, was obliged after all to agree to ask questions and then, when he had asked a sufficient number, to take his turn at making due response in short answers.


And so he began to put questions in this sort of way: I consider, Socrates, that the greatest part
339a
δεινὸν εἶναι: ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν περὶ οὗπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετενηνεγμένον δ' εἰς ποίησιν: τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίσει. λέγει γάρ που Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν τὸν Κρέοντος ὑὸν τοῦ Θετταλοῦ ὅτι—
339a
of a man's education is to be skilled in the matter of verses; that is, to be able to apprehend, in the utterances of the poets, what has been rightly and what wrongly composed, and to know how to distinguish them and account for them when questioned. Accordingly my question now will be on the same subject that you and I are now debating, namely virtue, but taken in connexion with poetry: that will be the only difference. Now, Simonides, I think, somewhere remarks to Scopas, the son of Creon of Thessaly—
339b
“ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.” τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ᾆσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω;


καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ: ἐπίσταμαί τε γάρ, καὶ πάνυ μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος.


εὖ, ἔφη, λέγεις. πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὔ;
πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, <καλῶσ> τε καὶ ὀρθῶς.
δοκεῖ δέ σοι καλῶς πεποιῆσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ ποιητής;
οὐ καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
ὅρα δή, ἔφη,
339b
“For a man, indeed, to become good truly is hard, In hands and feet and mind foursquare, Fashioned without reproach.” Do you know the ode, or shall I recite the whole?


To this I replied: There is no need, for I know it it happens that I have especially studied that ode.


I am glad to hear it, he said. Now do you regard it as finely and correctly composed or not?


Very finely and correctly, I replied.


And do you regard it as finely composed, if the poet contradicts himself?


No, I replied.


Then observe it more closely, he said.
339c
βέλτιον.
ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, ἔσκεμμαι ἱκανῶς.
οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προιόντος τοῦ ᾄσματος λέγει που— “οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον: χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.” ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κἀκεῖνα τὰ ἔμπροσθεν;
οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι;
φαίνεται ἔμοιγε (καὶ ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τὶ λέγοἰ ἀτάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοὶ οὐ φαίνεται;
πῶς γὰρ ἂν
339c
My good sir, I have given it ample attention.


Are you aware, then, he asked, that as the ode proceeds he says at one point— “Nor ringeth true to me That word of Pittacus—
And yet 'twas a sage who spake—Hard, quoth he, to be good.” Do you note that this and the former are statements of the same person?


I know that, I said.


Then do you think the second agrees with the first?


So far as I can see, it does, I replied (at the same time, though, I was afraid there was something in what he said). Why, I asked, does it not seem so to you?
339d
φαίνοιτο ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα λέγων, ὅς γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀλαθείᾳ, ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιττακὸν τὸν ταὐτὰ λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι “χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι” , τοῦτον μέμφεταί τε καὶ οὔ φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος; καίτοι ὁπότε τὸν ταὐτὰ λέγοντα αὑτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὥστε ἤτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει.


εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον
339d
How can anyone, he replied, be thought consistent, who says both of these things? First he laid it down himself that it is hard for a man to become good in truth, and then a little further on in his poem he forgot, and he proceeds to blame Pittacus for saying the same as he did—that it is hard to be good, and refuses to accept from him the same statement that he made himself. Yet, as often as he blames the man for saying the same as himself he obviously blames himself too, so that in either the former or the latter place his statement is wrong.


This speech of his won a clamorous approval
339e
τῶν ἀκουόντων: καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ ἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθορυβησάντων: ἔπειτα—ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρῆσθαι τἀληθῆ, ἵνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής—τρέπομαι πρὸς τὸν πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτόν, ὦ Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης:
339e
from many of his hearers; and at first I felt as though I had been struck by a skilful boxer, and was quite blind and dizzy with the effect of his words and the noise of their applause. Then—to tell you the honest truth—in order to gain time for considering the poet's meaning, I turned to Prodicus and calling him—Prodicus, I said, surely Simonides was your townsman: it behoves you to come to the man's rescue. Accordingly I allow myself to call for your assistance—
340a
δίκαιος εἶ βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνδρί. δοκῶ οὖν μοι ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ: ὥσπερ ἔφη Ὅμηρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμόεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα— “φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ σχῶμεν, . . .” ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ ὑπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ᾗ τό τε βούλεσθαι καὶ
340a
just as Scamander, in Homer, when besieged by Achilles, called Simois to his aid, saying— “Dear brother, let us both together stay this warriors might.”


In the same way I call upon you, lest Protagoras lay Simonides in ruins. For indeed to rehabilitate Simonides requires your artistry,
340b
ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸν ὄν, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν σκόπει εἴ σοι συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἐμοί. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γάρ, ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σὴν γνώμην: ταὐτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο;
ἄλλο νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.
οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα
340b
by which you can discriminate between wishing and desiring as two distinct things in the fine and ample manner of your statement just now. So please consider if you agree with my view. For it is not clear that Simonides does contradict himself. Now you, Prodicus, shall declare your verdict first: do you consider becoming and being to be the same or different?


Different, to be sure, said Prodicus.


Now in the first passage, I said, Simonides gave it as his own opinion that it is hard for a man
340c
ἀγαθὸν ἀληθείᾳ γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν εἴη;
ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.
τὸν δέ γε Πιττακόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέμφεται, οὐχ ὡς οἴεται Πρωταγόρας, ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιττακὸς ἔλεγεν τὸ χαλεπόν, γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμμεναι: ἔστιν δὲ οὐ ταὐτόν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ὥς φησιν Πρόδικος ὅδε, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν τὸ εἶναι τῷ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης αὐτὸς αὑτῷ. καὶ ἴσως ἂν
340c
to become good in truth.


Quite true, said Prodicus.


And he blames Pittacus, I went on, for saying not, as Protagoras holds, the same as himself, but something different. For what Pittacus said was not, as Simonides said, that it is hard “to become” but “to be” good. Now being and becoming, Protagoras, as our friend Prodicus says, are not the same thing; and if being and becoming are not the same thing, Simonides does not contradict himself. Perhaps Prodicus
340d
φαίη Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καθ' Ἡσίοδον γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν εἶναι—τῆς γὰρ “ἀρετῆς ἔμπροσθεν” τοὺς θεοὺς “ἱδρῶτα” θεῖναι—ὅταν δέ τις αὐτῆς “εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, ῥηϊδίην δἤπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπήν περ ἐοῦσαν” , ἐκτῆσθαι.


ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἐπῄνεσέν με: ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας, τὸ ἐπανόρθωμά σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μεῖζον ἁμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὃ ἐπανορθοῖς.


καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον: κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ
340d
and many others might say with Hesiod that to become good is hard, “for Heaven hath set hard travail on the way to virtue; and when one reacheth the summit thereof, 'tis an easy thing to possess, though hard before.”


When Prodicus heard this he gave me his approval: but Protagoras observed: Your correction, Socrates, contains an error greater than that which you are correcting.


To which I answered: then it is a bad piece of work I have done, it would seem, Protagoras, and I am an absurd sort of physician;
340e
Πρωταγόρα, καὶ εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός: ἰώμενος μεῖζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ.


ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη.


πῶς δή; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.


πολλὴ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀμαθία εἴη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω φαῦλόν τί φησιν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκτῆσθαι, ὅ ἐστιν πάντων χαλεπώτατον, ὡς ἅπασιν δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις.


καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον: νὴ τὸν Δία, εἰς καιρόν γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Πρόδικος ὅδε. κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ
340e
my treatment increases the malady.


Just so, he said.


How is that? I asked.


Great, he replied, would be the ignorance of the poet, if he calls it such a slight matter to possess virtue, which is the hardest thing in the world, as all men agree.


Then I remarked: Upon my word, how opportunely it has happened that Prodicus is here to join in our discussion! For it is very likely, Protagoras, that Prodicus' wisdom is a gift of long ago from heaven,
341a
Πρωταγόρα, ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἤτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρα. σὺ δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ὢν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι φαίνῃ, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι Προδίκου τουτουΐ: καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ μανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ τὸ “χαλεπὸν” τοῦτο ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως Σιμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανεν ὥσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ “δεινοῦ” Πρόδικός με οὑτοσὶ νουθετεῖ ἑκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινός ἐστιν ἀνήρ, ἐρωτᾷ
341a
beginning either in the time of Simonides or even earlier. But you, so skilled in many other things, appear to be unskilled in this, and lack the skill that I can boast because I am a disciple of the great Prodicus; and so now I find you do not understand that perhaps Simonides did not conceive “hard” in the way that you conceive it—just as, in the case of “awful,” Prodicus here corrects me each time I use the word in praising you or someone else; when I say, for instance, that
341b
εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τἀγαθὰ δεινὰ καλῶν. τὸ γὰρ δεινόν, φησίν, κακόν ἐστιν: οὐδεὶς γοῦν λέγει ἑκάστοτε “δεινοῦ πλούτου” οὐδὲ “δεινῆς εἰρήνησ” οὐδὲ “δεινῆς ὑγιείας,” ἀλλὰ “δεινῆς νόσου” καὶ “δεινοῦ πολέμου” καὶ “δεινῆς πενίας,” ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος. ἴσως οὖν καὶ τὸ “χαλεπὸν” αὖ οἱ Κεῖοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἢ κακὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι ἢ ἄλλο τι ὃ σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις: ἐρώμεθα οὖν πρόδικον—δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνὴν τοῦτον ἐρωτᾶν—τί ἔλεγεν, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸ
341b
Protagoras is an awfully wise man, he asks if I am not ashamed to call good things awful. For awful, he says, is bad; thus no one on this or that occasion speaks of “awful wealth” or “awful peace” or “awful health,” but we say “awful disease,” “awful war” or “awful poverty,” taking “awful” to be “bad.” So perhaps “hard” also was intended by the Ceans and Simonides as either “bad” or something else that you do not understand: let us therefore ask Prodicus, for it is fair to question him on the dialect of Simonides.
341c
“χαλεπὸν” Σιμωνίδης;


κακόν, ἔφη.


διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ μέμφεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸν Πιττακὸν λέγοντα “χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι” , ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶν κακὸν “ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι” .


ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ἔφη, λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Σιμωνίδην ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, καὶ ὀνειδίζειν τῷ Πιττακῷ ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἠπίστατο ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν ἅτε Λέσβιος ὢν καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ τεθραμμένος;


ἀκούεις δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου τοῦδε.
341c
What did Simonides mean, Prodicus, by “hard”?


“Bad,” he replied.


Then it is on this account, Prodicus, I said, that he blames Pittacus for saying it is hard to be good, just as though he heard him say it is bad to be good.


Well, Socrates, he said, what else do you think Simonides meant? Was he not reproaching Pittacus for not knowing how to distinguish words correctly, Lesbian as he was, and nurtured in a foreign tongue?


You hear, Protagoras, I said,
341d
ἔχεις τι πρὸς ταῦτα λέγειν;


καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Πρόδικε: ἀλλ' ἐγὼ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ “χαλεπὸν” ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μὴ ῥᾴδιον ᾖ ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων γίγνηται.


ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι εἰ οἷός τ' ἔσῃ τῷ σαυτοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν. ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε Σιμωνίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν
341d
what Prodicus here suggests: have you anything to say upon it?


The case, said Protagoras, is far otherwise, Prodicus: I am quite sure that Simonides meant by “hard” the same as we generally do—not “bad,” but whatever is not easy and involves a great amount of trouble.


Ah, I agree with you, Protagoras, I said, that this is Simonides' meaning, and that our friend Prodicus knows it, but is joking and chooses to experiment on you to see if you will be able to support your own statement. For that Simonides does not mean
341e
κακόν, μέγα τεκμήριόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ῥῆμα: λέγει γὰρ ὅτι— “θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας,” οὐ δήπου τοῦτό γε λέγων, κακὸν “ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι” , εἶτα τὸν θεόν φησιν μόνον τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο γέρας ἀπένειμε μόνῳ: ἀκόλαστον γὰρ ἄν τινα λέγοι Σιμωνίδην ὁ Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. ἀλλ' ἅ μοι δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ᾄσματι, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν,
341e
that “hard” is “bad” we have clear proof forthwith in the next phrase, where he says— “God alone can have this privilege.” Surely he cannot mean that it is bad to be good, if he proceeds here to say that God alone can have this thing, and attributes this privilege to God only; otherwise Prodicus would call Simonides a rake, and no true Cean. But I should like to tell you what I take to be Simonides' intention in this ode, if you care to test my powers,
342a
εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πεῖραν ὅπως ἔχω, ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν: ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, σοῦ ἀκούσομαι.


ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου ταῦτα λέγοντος, εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες: ὁ δὲ Πρόδικός τε καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας ἐκελευέτην πάνυ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.


ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἅ γέ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ ᾄσματος τούτου, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διεξελθεῖν. φιλοσοφία γάρ ἐστιν παλαιοτάτη τε καὶ πλείστη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ
342a
as you put it,
in the matter of verses; though if you would rather, I will hear your account.


When Protagoras heard me say this—As you please, Socrates, he said; then Prodicus and Hippias strongly urged me, and the rest of them also.


Well then, I said, I will try to explain to you my own feeling about this poem. Now philosophy is of more ancient and abundant growth in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Greece,
342b
ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, καὶ σοφισταὶ πλεῖστοι γῆς ἐκεῖ εἰσιν: ἀλλ' ἐξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματίζονται ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι ὦσιν ὅτι σοφίᾳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν, ὥσπερ οὓς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς, ἀλλὰ δοκῶσιν τῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ περιεῖναι, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ γνωσθεῖεν ᾧ περίεισιν, πάντας τοῦτο ἀσκήσειν, τὴν σοφίαν. νῦν δὲ ἀποκρυψάμενοι ἐκεῖνο ἐξηπατήκασιν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι λακωνίζοντας, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὦτά τε κατάγνυνται μιμούμενοι
342b
and sophists are more numerous in those regions: but the people there deny it and make pretence of ignorance, in order to prevent the discovery that it is by wisdom that they have ascendancy over the rest of the Greeks, like those sophists of whom Protagoras was speaking
; they prefer it to be thought that they owe their superiority to fighting and valor, conceiving that the revelation of its real cause would lead everyone to practise this wisdom. So well have they kept their secret that they have deceived the followers of the Spartan cult in our cities, with the result that some get broken ears
342c
αὐτούς, καὶ ἱμάντας περιειλίττονται καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσιν καὶ βραχείας ἀναβολὰς φοροῦσιν, ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρατοῦντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους: οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπειδὰν βούλωνται ἀνέδην τοῖς παρ' αὑτοῖς συγγενέσθαι σοφισταῖς καὶ ἤδη ἄχθωνται λάθρᾳ συγγιγνόμενοι, ξενηλασίας ποιούμενοι τῶν τε λακωνιζόντων τούτων καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλος ξένος ὢν ἐπιδημήσῃ, συγγίγνονται τοῖς σοφισταῖς λανθάνοντες τοὺς ξένους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδένα ἐῶσιν τῶν νέων
342c
by imitating them, bind their knuckles with thongs, go in for muscular exercises, and wear dashing little cloaks,
as though it were by these means that the Spartans were the masters of Greece. And when the Spartans wish to converse unrestrainedly with their sophists, and begin to chafe at the secrecy of their meetings, they pass alien acts against the laconizing set
and any other strangers within their gates, and have meetings with the sophists unknown to the foreigners; while on their part they do not permit any of their young men
342d
εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐξιέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Κρῆτες, ἵνα μὴ ἀπομανθάνωσιν ἃ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσιν. εἰσὶν δὲ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ παιδεύσει μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες. γνοῖτε δ' ἂν ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους ἄριστα πεπαίδευνται, ὧδε: εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει τις Λακεδαιμονίων τῷ φαυλοτάτῳ συγγενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὑρήσει
342d
to travel abroad to the other cities—in this rule they resemble the Cretans—lest they unlearn what they are taught at home. In those two states there are not only men but women also who pride themselves on their education; and you can tell that what I say is true and that the Spartans have the best education in philosophy and argument by this: if you choose to consort with the meanest of Spartans,
342e
αὐτὸν φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἂν τύχῃ τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλεν ῥῆμα ἄξιον λόγου βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσὶν οἳ κατανενοήκασι καὶ τῶν πάλαι, ὅτι τὸ λακωνίζειν πολὺ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ φιλογυμναστεῖν, εἰδότες ὅτι τοιαῦτα οἷόν τ' εἶναι ῥήματα φθέγγεσθαι
342e
at first you will find him making a poor show in the conversation; but soon, at some point or other in the discussion, he gets home with a notable remark, short and compressed—a deadly shot that makes his interlocutor seem like a helpless child. Hence this very truth has been observed by certain persons both in our day and in former times—that the Spartan cult is much more the pursuit of wisdom than of athletics; for they know that a man's ability
343a
τελέως πεπαιδευμένου ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου. τούτων ἦν καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιττακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριηνεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεύς, καὶ ἕβδομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων. οὗτοι πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας, καὶ καταμάθοι ἄν τις αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὖσαν, ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιομνημόνευτα ἑκάστῳ εἰρημένα: οὗτοι καὶ κοινῇ συνελθόντες
343a
to utter such remarks is to be ascribed to his perfect education. Such men were Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, Solon of our city, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chen, and, last of the traditional seven, Chilon of Sparta. All these were enthusiasts, lovers and disciples of the Spartan culture; and you can recognize that character in their wisdom by the short, memorable sayings that fell from each of them they assembled together
343b
ἀπαρχὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι εἰς τὸν νεὼν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα ἃ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, “γνῶθι σαυτόν” καὶ “μηδὲν ἄγαν” . τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις Λακωνική: καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ἰδίᾳ περιεφέρετο τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ “χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι” . ὁ οὖν Σιμωνίδης,
343b
and dedicated these as the first-fruits of their lore to Apollo in his Delphic temple, inscribing there those maxims which are on every tongue—“Know thyself” and “Nothing overmuch.” To what intent do I say this? To show how the ancient philosophy had this style of laconic brevity; and so it was that the saying of Pittacus was privately handed about with high approbation among the sages—that it is hard to be good.
343c
ἅτε φιλότιμος ὢν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἔγνω ὅτι εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀθλητὴν καὶ περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμήσει ἐν τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις. εἰς τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων κολοῦσαι αὐτὸ ἅπαν τὸ ᾆσμα πεποίηκεν, ὥς μοι φαίνεται.


ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ ἅπαντες, εἰ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὐθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ᾄσματος μανικὸν ἂν φανείη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπόν,
343c
Then Simonides, ambitious to get a name for wisdom, perceived that if he could overthrow this saying, as one might some famous athlete, and become its conqueror, he would win fame himself amongst men of that day. Accordingly it was against this saying, and with this aim, that he composed the whole poem as a means of covertly assailing and abasing this maxim, as it seems to me.


Now let us all combine in considering whether my account is really true. The opening of the ode must at once appear crazy if, while intending to say that
343d
ἔπειτα ἐνέβαλε τὸ μέν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβλῆσθαι, ἐὰν μή τις ὑπολάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ ἐρίζοντα λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην: λέγοντος τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ὅτι “χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι” , ἀμφισβητοῦντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὔκ, ἀλλὰ “γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν” ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ὦ Πιττακέ, ὡς ἀληθῶς—οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέγει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἄρα ὄντων τινῶν
343d
it is hard for a man to become good, he inserted “indeed.” There is no sort of sense, I imagine, in this insertion, unless we suppose that Simonides is addressing himself to the saying of Pittacus as a disputant: Pittacus says—It is hard to be good; and the poet controverts this by observing—No, but to become good, indeed, is hard for a man, Pittacus, truly—not truly good; he does not mention truth in this connexion,
343e
τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς—εὔηθες γὰρ τοῦτό γε φανείη ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου —ἀλλ' ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως, οὑτωσί πως ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπόντα: ὦ ἄνθρωποι, “χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι” , τὸν δὲ
343e
or imply that some things are truly good, while others are good but not truly so: this would seem silly and unlike Simonides. We must rather take the “truly” as a poetical transposition, and first quote the saying of Pittacus in some such way as this: let us suppose Pittacus himself to be speaking and Simonides replying, as thus—Good people, he says, it is hard to be good; and the poet answers—Pittacus,
344a
ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις: οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μέν ἐστιν ἄνδρα “ἀγαθὸν χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέωσ” . οὕτω φαίνεται [τὸ] πρὸς λόγον τὸ μέν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον: καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν
344a
what you say is not true, for it is not being but becoming good, indeed—in hands and feet and mind foursquare, fashioned without reproach—that is truly hard. In this way we see a purpose in the insertion of “indeed,” and that the “truly” is correctly placed at the end; and all that comes after corroborates this view of his meaning. There are many points in the various expressions of the poem
344b
ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι εἰρημένων ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς εὖ πεποίηται—πάνυ γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ μεμελημένως ἔχει—ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ οὕτω διελθεῖν: ἀλλὰ τὸν τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξέλθωμεν καὶ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός ἐστιν τοῦ Πιττακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος.


λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὀλίγα διελθών, ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως, οἷόν τε μέντοι ἐπί γε χρόνον τινά: γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν
344b
which might be instanced to show its fine composition, for it is a work of very elegant and elaborate art; but it would take too long to detail all its beauties. However, let us go over its general outline and intention, which is assuredly to refute Pittacus' saying, throughout the ode.


Proceeding a little way on from our passage, just as though he were making a speech, he says to become, indeed, a good man is truly hard (not but what it is possible for a certain space of time); “but to continue in this state of what one has become,
344c
ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἕξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Πιττακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας, “ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι, ὃν [ἂν] ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ.” τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίου ἀρχῇ; δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτης ἀεὶ καθῄρηται. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενόν τις ἂν καταβάλοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἑστῶτά ποτε καταβάλοι ἄν τις ὥστε κείμενον ποιῆσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον
344c
and to be a good man is, as you say, Pittacus, impossible, superhuman: God alone can have this privilege— “For that man cannot help but be bad Whom irresistible mischance has overthrown.” Now who is it that an irresistible mischance overthrows in the command of a ship? Clearly not the ordinary man, for he may be overcome at any time; just as you cannot knock over one who is lying down, but one who is standing; you might knock over a standing man so as to make him lie down,
344d
οὔ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον ὄντα ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἂν συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ ἀμήχανον ὄντα οὔ, καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμὼν ἐπιπεσὼν ἀμήχανον ἂν ποιήσειεν, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπὴ ὥρα ἐπελθοῦσα ἀμήχανον ἂν θείη, καὶ ἰατρὸν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλῷ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος— “αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός:”
344d
not one who is lying down already. So it is a man apt to resist that an irresistible mischance would overthrow, and not one who could never resist anything. A great storm breaking over a steersman will render him helpless, and a severe season will leave a farmer helpless, and a doctor will be in the same case. For the good has the capacity of becoming bad, as we have witness in another poet
who said— “Nay more, the virtuous man is at one time bad, at another good.” whereas the bad man has no capacity for becoming, but must ever be, what he is;
344e
τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη. ὥστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ, “οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι” : σὺ δὲ φῄς, ὦ Πιττακέ, “χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι” : τὸ δ' ἐστὶ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν, δυνατὸν δέ, ἐσθλόν, ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον: “πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς.”
344e
so that when an irresistible mischance overthrows him who is resourceful, wise, and good, he cannot but be bad; and you say, Pittacus, that it is hard to be good—that is, to become good, indeed, is hard, though possible, but to be good is impossible: for—
“If he hath fared well, every man is good; Bad, if ill.” Now what is good faring in letters—the thing
345a
τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἀγαθὴ πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, καὶ τίς ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ εἰς γράμματα; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τούτων μάθησις. τίς δὲ εὐπραγία ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖ; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῶν καμνόντων τῆς θεραπείας μάθησις. “κακὸς δὲ κακῶσ” : τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ἰατρὸς γένοιτο; δῆλον ὅτι ᾧ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῷ εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀγαθῷ ἰατρῷ—οὗτος γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακὸς γένοιτο—ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἰατρικῆς ἰδιῶται οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε ἰατροὶ οὔτε τέκτονες οὔτε
345a
that makes a man good at them? Clearly, the study of letters. What welfare makes a good doctor? Clearly, the study of the cure of the ailing. “Bad, if ill”: who could become a bad doctor? Clearly, he who in the first place is a doctor, and in the second, a good doctor; for he could become a bad one also: whereas we, who are laymen in respect of medicine, could never by faring ill become either doctors or joiners or anything else of that sort;
345b
ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων: ὅστις δὲ μὴ ἰατρὸς ἂν γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ἰατρός. οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε καὶ κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος— αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι—ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο κακός—ἔστιν γὰρ ἀεί— ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι. ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ᾄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει,
345b
and if one cannot become a doctor by faring ill, clearly one cannot become a bad one either. In the same way the good man may one day become bad through the effect either of time or work or illness or some other accident; for there is only one sort of ill fare—the deprivation of knowledge. But the bad man can never become bad: he is that always. If he is to become bad, he must previously become good. Hence the upshot of this part of the poem
345c
ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε, διατελοῦντα ἀγαθόν, γενέσθαι δὲ ἀγαθὸν οἷόν τε, καὶ κακόν γε τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον: “ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.” ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιττακὸν εἴρηται, καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα γε τοῦ ᾄσματος ἔτι μᾶλλον δηλοῖ. φησὶ γάρ— “τοὔνεκεν οὔ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄ- πρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός: ἐπί θ' ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω,”
345c
is that it is impossible to be a good man, continuing to be good, but possible to become good, and bad also, in the case of the same person. And then— “Best also for the longest space are they whom the gods love.” All this has been said with reference to Pittacus, as is made still plainer by the ensuing verses, in which he says— “Therefore never shall I, in quest of what cannot come to pass, vainly cast my life's lot upon a hope impracticable—of finding a man wholly blameless amongst us who partake of the fruit of the broad-based earth. If I light upon him, be sure I will report it—” says he;
345d
φησίν—οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ᾄσματος ἐπεξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι— “πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκὼν ὅστις ἕρδῃ μηδὲν αἰσχρόν: ἀνάγκῃ δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται:” καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰρημένον. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἑκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ, ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ ἑκόντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν
345d
and in this vehement tone he pursues the saying of Pittacus all through the poem: “But I praise and love everyone willingly committing no baseness; for against necessity not even the gods make war.” This also is spoken with the same intent. For Simonides was not so ill-educated as to say that he praised a person who willingly did no evil, as though there were some who did evil willingly. I am fairly sure of this—that none of the wise men considers that anybody ever willingly errs
345e
σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἑκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακὰ ἑκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες ποιοῦσιν: καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης οὐχ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιῇ ἑκών, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ ἑκών. ἡγεῖτο γὰρ ἄνδρα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν πολλάκις αὑτὸν ἐπαναγκάζειν φίλον τινὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαινέτην
345e
or willingly does base and evil deeds; they are well aware that all who do base and evil things do them unwillingly; and so Simonides does not say he gives his praise to the person who willingly does no evil, but uses the word “willingly” of himself. For he considered that a man of sense and honor often constrains himself
346a
[φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν], οἷον ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τοὺς μὲν οὖν πονηρούς, ὅταν τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτοῖς συμβῇ, ὥσπερ ἁσμένους ὁρᾶν καὶ ψέγοντας ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατηγορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἢ πατρίδος, ἵνα αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδ' ὀνειδίζωσιν ὅτι ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας
346a
to become a friend and approver of some person, as when a man chances to have an uncongenial mother or father or country or other such connexion. Now when this sort of thing befalls the wicked, they seem glad to see their parents' or country's faults, and complainingly point them out and inveigh against them, in order that their own neglect of them may not be denounced by their neighbors, who might otherwise reproach them for being so neglectful; and hence they multiply
346b
ἑκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι: τοὺς δ' ἀγαθοὺς ἐπικρύπτεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἄν τι ὀργισθῶσιν τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι προσαναγκάζοντας ἑαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν. πολλάκις δὲ οἶμαι καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἡγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ τύραννον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ ἑκών, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιττακῷ λέγει ὅτι ἐγώ,
346b
their complaints and add voluntary to unavoidable feuds. But good men, he knew, conceal the trouble and constrain themselves to praise, and if they have any reason to be angered against their parents or country for some wrong done to them they pacify and conciliate their feelings, compelling themselves to love and praise their own people. And many a time, I think, Simonides was conscious that he had praised and eulogized some tyrant or other such person, not willingly,
346c
ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐ διὰ ταῦτά σε ψέγω, ὅτι εἰμὶ φιλόψογος, ἐπεὶ— “ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ᾖ μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰ- δώς τ' ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ: οὔ μιν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι—” οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος— “τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα,” “πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμεικται.”
346c
but under compulsion. So he proceeds to tell Pittacus—I, Pittacus, do not reproach you merely because I am apt to reproach, since— “For my part I am content with whosoever is not evil or too intractable. He who knows Right, the support of a city, is a healthy man; him I shall never blame,” for to blame I am not apt. “Infinite is the race of fools.” “” By this he does not mean to say, as it were, that all things are white
346d
οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἔλεγε πάντα τοι λευκά, οἷς μέλανα μὴ μέμεικται—γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη πολλαχῇ—ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὥστε μὴ ψέγειν. καὶ οὐ ζητῶ, ἔφη, “πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός, ἐπί θ' ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω” : ὥστε τούτου γ' ἕνεκα οὐδένα ἐπαινέσομαι, ἀλλά μοι ἐξαρκεῖ ἂν ᾖ μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας “φιλέω καὶ ἐπαίνημι” —καὶ τῇ φωνῇ ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ
346d
that have no admixture of black; that would be ridiculous in many ways; but that he himself accepts the average sort without reproaching them. “I do not seek,” said he, “a man wholly blameless amongst us who partake of the fruit of the broad-based earth: if I light upon him, be sure I will report it”—meaning, “If I wait for that, I shall never find anyone to praise. No, I am content if a man be average and do nothing evil, since I love and praise all”—and there he has used a Mytilenaean word,
for his
346e
τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς Πιττακὸν λέγων τὸ “πάντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκών” —ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν τῷ ἑκών διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα— “ὅστις ἕρδῃ μηδὲν αἰσχρόν” , ἄκων δ' ἔστιν οὓς ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ. σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως
346e
“I praise and love all willingly” is addressed to Pittacus (here at “willingly” one should make a pause);—“all who commit nothing base, but some there are whom I praise and love unwillingly. Hence I should never reproach you, Pittacus, if you would only speak what is moderately reasonable and true.
347a
ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἔψεγον: νῦν δὲ σφόδρα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ ταῦτά σε ἐγὼ ψέγω. ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ᾆσμα.


καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας, εὖ μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ᾄσματος διεληλυθέναι: ἔστιν μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ
347a
But as it is, since you lie so grievously about the greatest matters with an air of speaking the truth, on this score I reproach you.”


Such is my view, Prodicus and Protagoras, I said, of Simonides' intention in composing this ode.


Then Hippias remarked: It certainly seems to me, Socrates, that you have given a good exposition of the poem: but I also have an elegant discourse upon it,
347b
ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω, ἂν βούλησθε.


καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ναί, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, εἰς αὖθίς γε: νῦν δὲ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἃ ὡμολογησάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλω Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωταγόρας μὲν εἰ ἔτι βούλεται ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σωκράτη, εἰ δὲ δὴ βούλεται Σωκράτει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐρωτᾶν τὸν ἕτερον.


καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον: Ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἔγωγε Πρωταγόρᾳ ὁπότερον αὐτῷ ἥδιον: εἰ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ᾀσμάτων τε καὶ ἐπῶν
347b
which I will perform for you if you wish.


Yes, Hippias, said Alcibiades, but some other time: for the moment the proper thing, according to the agreement which Protagoras and Socrates made between them, will be for Socrates to answer any questions that Protagoras may still wish to put to him, but if he prefers to answer Socrates, then it will be for Socrates to ask.


On this I remarked: For my part I place it in Protagoras's hands to do whichever he likes best.
347c
ἐάσωμεν, περὶ δὲ ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ἐγώ σε ἠρώτησα, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἡδέως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενος. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τοῖς συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι' ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι
347c
But if he does not mind, let us talk no more of poems and verses, but consider the points on which I questioned you at first, Protagoras, and on which I should be glad to reach, with your help, a conclusion. For it seems to me that arguing about poetry is comparable to the wine-parties of common market-folk. These people, owing to their inability to carry on a familiar conversation over their wine by means of their own voices and discussions—
347d
τὰς αὐλητρίδας, πολλοῦ μισθούμενοι ἀλλοτρίαν φωνὴν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλοις σύνεισιν: ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἴδοις οὔτ' αὐλητρίδας οὔτε ὀρχηστρίδας οὔτε ψαλτρίας, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὄντας συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὑτῶν φωνῆς, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἑαυτῶν κοσμίως, κἂν πάνυ
347d
such is their lack of education—put a premium on flute-girls by hiring the extraneous voice of the flute at a high price, and carry on their intercourse by means of its utterance. But where the party consists of thorough gentlemen who have had a proper education, you will see neither flute-girls nor dancing-girls nor harp-girls, but only the company contenting themselves with their own conversation, and none of these fooleries and frolics—each speaking and listening decently in his turn,
347e
πολὺν οἶνον πίωσιν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε συνουσίαι, ἐὰν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν οἷοίπερ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοί φασιν εἶναι, οὐδὲν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν, οὓς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτά φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οἱ δ' ἕτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ὃ ἀδυνατοῦσι ἐξελέγξαι: ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας
347e
even though they may drink a great deal of wine. And so a gathering like this of ours, when it includes such men as most of us claim to be, requires no extraneous voices, not even of the poets, whom one cannot question on the sense of what they say; when they are adduced in discussion we are generally told by some that the poet thought so and so, and by others, something different, and they go on arguing about a matter which they are powerless to determine. No, this sort of meeting is avoided by men of culture,
348a
ἐῶσιν χαίρειν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἑαυτοῖς σύνεισιν δι' ἑαυτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις πεῖραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες. τοὺς τοιούτους μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μᾶλλον μιμεῖσθαι ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ, καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνοντας: κἂν μὲν βούλῃ ἔτι ἐρωτᾶν, ἕτοιμός εἰμί σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος: ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, σὺ ἐμοὶ παράσχες, περὶ ὧν μεταξὺ ἐπαυσάμεθα διεξιόντες, τούτοις τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι.
348a
who prefer to converse directly with each other, and to use their own way of speech in putting one another by turns to the test. It is this sort of person that I think you and I ought rather to imitate; putting the poets aside, let us hold our discussion together in our own persons, making trial of the truth and of ourselves. So if you wish to question me further, I am at your service as answerer; but if you like, put yourself at my service, so that we may clear up the several points of the inquiry in which we stopped half-way.
348b
λέγοντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν ἀπεσάφει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ὁπότερα ποιήσοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέψας, ὦ Καλλία, δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἐθέλων εἴτε δώσει λόγον εἴτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ: ἀλλ' ἤτοι διαλεγέσθω ἢ εἰπέτω ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν, Σωκράτης δὲ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαλέγηται ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις ἂν βούληται ἄλλῳ.
348b
On my saying this and something more of the sort, Protagoras gave no indication as to which course he would take. So Alcibiades, looking at Callias, said: Do you consider, Callias, that Protagoras is behaving properly now in refusing to signify whether he will or will not answer? I do not think he is. Let him either debate or say that he does not want to debate, so that we may have this understanding with him; then Socrates can debate with someone else, or another of us with some other,
348c
καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυνθείς, ὥς γέ μοι ἔδοξεν, τοῦ τε Ἀλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου δεομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι τῶν παρόντων, μόγις προυτράπετο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτᾶν αὑτὸν ὡς ἀποκρινούμενος.


εἶπον δὴ ἐγώ: ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ οἴου διαλέγεσθαί μέ σοι ἄλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἃ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἑκάστοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ πάνυ λέγειν τι τὸν Ὅμηρον τὸ—
348c
as may be agreed.


Then Protagoras was ashamed, as it seemed to me, at these words of Alcibiades, and the more so when Callias requested him, together with almost the whole of the company; and so he reluctantly prevailed on himself to take up the debate, and asked to have questions put to him, since he was ready to answer.


So I proceeded to say—Protagoras, do not suppose that I have any other desire in debating with you than to examine the difficulties which occur to myself at each point. For I hold that there is a good deal in what Homer says—
348d
“σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν.” εὐπορώτεροι γάρ πως ἅπαντές ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἅπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον καὶ διανόημα: “ “μοῦνος δ' εἴπερ τε νοήσῃ” ,” αὐτίκα περιιὼν ζητεῖ ὅτῳ ἐπιδείξηται καὶ μεθ' ὅτου βεβαιώσηται, ἕως ἂν ἐντύχῃ. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕνεκα τούτου σοὶ ἡδέως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί, ἡγούμενός σε βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
348d
“When two go together, one observes before the other;”


for somehow it makes all of us human beings more resourceful in every deed or word or thought; but if one observes something alone, forthwith one has to go about searching until one discovers somebody to whom one can show it off and who can corroborate it. And I also have my reason for being glad to debate with you rather than with anyone else; it is that I regard you as the best person to investigate in general any matters
348e
περὶ ὧν εἰκὸς σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ σέ; ὅς γε οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς οἴει καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι, ὥσπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν: σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τ' εἶ ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς, καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων
348e
that a sensible man may be expected to examine, and virtue in particular. Whom else should I choose but you? Not only do you consider yourself a worthy gentleman, like sundry other people, who are sensible enough themselves, but cannot make others so; but you are both good yourself and have the gift of making others good. And you are so confident of yourself that, while others make a secret of this art, you have had yourself
349a
σύ γ' ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας σεαυτόν, ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνυσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ σὲ χρῆν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὔ. καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, ἅπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἠρώτων περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθῆναι παρὰ σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι. ἦν δέ,
349a
publicly proclaimed to all the Greeks with the title of sophist, and have appointed yourself preceptor of culture and virtue, and are the first who has ever demanded a regular fee for such work. What then could I do but call upon you to deal with our problem both by question and communication? I had no other course. So now with regard to those points which I have raised on the subject in my opening questions, I desire to be reminded of some
349b
ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, τὸ ἐρώτημα τόδε: σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε ὄντα ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἑνὶ πράγματί ἐστιν, ἢ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ὂν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν τὸ ἕτερον; ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἑνὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
349b
by you and to have your help in investigating others. The question, I believe, was this:
Are the five names of wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and holiness attached to one thing, or underlying each of these names is there a distinct existence or thing that has its own particular function, each thing being different from the others? And your answer was that they are not names attached to one thing,
349c
ἕκαστον ἰδίῳ πράγματι τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἐπικεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὅμοιά ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ μόριά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ μόριά ἐστιν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδίαν ἕκαστα δύναμιν ἔχοντα. ταῦτα εἰ μέν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ὥσπερ τότε, φάθι: εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, ἐάν πῃ ἄλλῃ νῦν φήσῃς: οὐ γὰρ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενός
349c
but that each of these names applies to a distinct thing, and that all these are parts of virtue; not like the parts of gold, which are similar to each other and to the whole of which they are parts, but like the parts of the face, dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts and to each other, and each having a distinct function. If you still hold the same opinion of them, say so; if you have a new one, define what it is, for I make no objection to your replying now on other lines. Indeed I should not be surprised
349d
μου ταῦτα ἔλεγες.


ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα μόρια μέν ἐστιν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον πάντων τούτων. ὧδε δὲ γνώσῃ ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω: εὑρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως.
349d
if you were merely experimenting upon me when you spoke before.


Well, Socrates, he replied, I say that all these are parts of virtue, and that while four of them are fairly on a par with each other, courage is something vastly different from all the rest. You may perceive the truth of what I say from this: you will find many people extremely unjust, unholy, dissolute, and ignorant, and yet pre-eminently courageous.
349e
ἔχε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ: ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι;
καὶ ἴτας γε, ἔφη, ἐφ' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἰέναι.
φέρε δή, τὴν ἀρετὴν καλόν τι φῂς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον σαυτὸν παρέχεις;
κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε.
πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ αἰσχρόν, τὸ δέ τι καλόν, ἢ ὅλον καλόν;
ὅλον που καλὸν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.
οἶσθα οὖν τίνες εἰς τὰ
349e
Stop now, I said: we must duly examine what you say. Do you call courageous men bold, or something else?


Yes, and impetuous also, he replied, where most men fear to tread.


Well now, do you say that virtue is a good thing, and of this good thing offer yourself as teacher?


Nay, it is the best of things, he said, unless I am out of my senses.


Then is one part of it base and another good, or is the whole good?


Surely the whole is good in the highest possible degree.


Now do you know who
350a
φρέατα κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως;
ἔγωγε, ὅτι οἱ κολυμβηταί.
πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι;
ὅτι ἐπίστανται.
τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ ἱππικοὶ ἢ οἱ ἄφιπποι;
οἱ ἱππικοί.
τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μή;
οἱ πελταστικοί. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς, ἔφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν
350a
dive boldly into wells?


I do; divers.


Is this because they have knowledge, or for some other reason?


Because they have knowledge.


And who are bold in going to war on horseback—those who are practised horsemen, or those who are not?


Practised horsemen.


And who with bucklers—buckler-men, or those who are not?


Buckler-men: and so with all other cases, he went on, if that is your point; those who have knowledge are bolder than those who lack it, and individually they are bolder when they have learnt
350b
ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν.
ἤδη δέ τινας ἑώρακας, ἔφην, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων;
ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας.
οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλέοι οὗτοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν;
αἰσχρὸν μεντἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἡ ἀνδρεία: ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε μαινόμενοί εἰσιν.
πῶς οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι;
καὶ νῦν γ', ἔφη.
350b
than before learning.


But you must have seen at times, I said, persons who are without knowledge of any of these affairs, yet behaving boldly in each of them.


I have, he said, and very boldly too.


Then are these bold ones courageous also?


Nay, that would make courage a base thing, he replied; for those you speak of are out of their senses.


What then, I asked, do you mean by courageous men? Surely the same as bold men?
350c
οὐκοῦν οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀλλὰ μαινόμενοι φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι καὶ θαρραλεώτατοί εἰσιν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι; καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἴη;


οὐ καλῶς, ἔφη, μνημονεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ ἔλεγόν τε καὶ ἀπεκρινόμην σοι. ἔγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα: εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην—εἰ γάρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι
350c
Yes, I do still, he said.


Then these men, I went on, who are so brave, are found to be not courageous but mad? And in those former cases our wisest men are boldest too, and being boldest are most courageous? And on this reasoning, wisdom will be courage?


You do not rightly recall, Socrates, what I stated in replying to you. When you asked me whether courageous men are bold, I admitted it: I was not asked whether bold men are courageous. Had you asked me this before, I should have said—
350d
οὐ πάντες—τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολόγησα. ἔπειτα τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν θαρραλεωτέρους ὄντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένων ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἴει τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ταὐτὸν εἶναι: τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ μετιὼν καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν οἰηθείης ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰ οὕτω μετιὼν ἔροιό με εἰ οἱ ἰσχυροὶ
350d
“Not all.” And as to proving that courageous men are not bold, you have nowhere pointed out that I was wrong in my admission that they are. Next you show that such persons individually are bolder when they have knowledge, and bolder than others who lack it, and therewith you take courage and wisdom to be the same: proceeding in this manner you might even take strength to be wisdom. On this method you might begin by asking me whether the strong are powerful, and I should say “Yes”;
350e
δυνατοί εἰσιν, φαίην ἄν: ἔπειτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι παλαίειν δυνατώτεροί εἰσιν τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων παλαίειν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίην ἄν: ταῦτα δὲ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογήσαντος ἐξείη ἄν σοι, χρωμένῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις, λέγειν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁμολογίαν ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἰσχύς. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ὁμολογῶ τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἰσχυροὺς εἶναι, τοὺς μέντοι ἰσχυροὺς δυνατούς:
350e
and then, whether those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not know how to wrestle, and whether individually they are more powerful when they have learnt than before learning, and I should say “Yes.” And on my admitting these points it would be open to you to say, by the same token, that according to my admission wisdom is strength. But neither there nor elsewhere do I admit that the powerful are strong, only that the strong are powerful; for I hold that power and strength
351a
οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι δύναμίν τε καὶ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας γε καὶ θυμοῦ, ἰσχὺν δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν σωμάτων. οὕτω δὲ κἀκεῖ οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι θάρσος τε καὶ ἀνδρείαν: ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι τούς γε θαρραλέους ἀνδρείους πάντας: θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ
351a
are not the same, but that one of them, power, comes from knowledge, or from madness or rage, whereas strength comes from constitution and fit nurture of the body. So, in the other instance, boldness and courage are not the same, and therefore it results that the courageous are bold, but not that the bold are courageous; for boldness comes to a man from art, or
351b
ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ δύναμις, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται.


λέγεις δέ τινας, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς;
ἔφη.
ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος ἂν εὖ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος ζῴη;
οὐκ ἔφη.
τί δ' εἰ ἡδέως βιοὺς τὸν βίον τελευτήσειεν; οὐκ εὖ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι;
ἔμοιγ', ἔφη.
τὸ μὲν ἄρα
351b
from rage or madness, like power, whereas courage comes from constitution and fit nurture of the soul.


Do you speak of some men, Protagoras, I asked, as living well, and others ill?


Yes.


Then do you consider that a man would live well if he lived in distress and anguish?


No, he said.


Well now, if he lived pleasantly and so ended his life, would you not consider he had thus contrived to live well?


I would, he said.


And, I suppose, to live pleasantly is good,
351c
ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀηδῶς κακόν.
εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζῴη ἡδόμενος.
τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἡδέ' ἄττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἀγαθά; ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἆρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, μὴ εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο; καὶ αὖθις αὖ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιαρά, κακά;
οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς,
351c
and unpleasantly, bad?


Yes, he said, if one lived in the enjoyment of honorable things.


But, Protagoras, will you tell me you agree with the majority in calling some pleasant things bad and some painful ones good? I mean to say—Are not things good in so far as they are pleasant, putting aside any other result they may have; and again, are not painful things in just the same sense bad—in so far as they are painful?


I cannot tell, Socrates, he replied, whether I am to answer, in such absolute fashion as that of your question,
351d
εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστὶν ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακά: ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, ἔστι δ' αὖ καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἔστι κακά, ἔστι δ' ἃ ἔστι, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθά.
ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς
351d
that all pleasant things are good and painful things bad: I rather think it safer for me to reply, with a view not merely to my present answer but to all the rest of my life, that some pleasant things are not good, and also that some painful things are not bad, and some are, while a third class of them are indifferent—neither bad nor good.


You call pleasant, do you not, I asked, things that partake of pleasure or
351e
μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἡδονήν;
πάνυ γ', ἔφη.
τοῦτο τοίνυν λέγω, καθ' ὅσον ἡδέα ἐστίν, εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθά, τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.
ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἑκάστοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα αὐτό, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνηται ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, συγχωρησόμεθα: εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἤδη ἀμφισβητήσομεν.


πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σὺ βούλει ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἐγὼ ἡγῶμαι;


δίκαιος, ἔφη, σὺ ἡγεῖσθαι: σὺ γὰρ καὶ κατάρχεις τοῦ λόγου.
351e
cause pleasure?


Certainly, he said.


So when I put it to you, whether things are not good in so far as they are pleasant, I am asking whether pleasure itself is not a good thing.


Let us examine the matter, Socrates, he said, in the form in which you put it at each point, and if the proposition seems to be reasonable, and pleasant and good are found to be the same, we shall agree upon it; if not, we shall dispute it there and then.


And would you like, I asked, to be leader in the inquiry, or am I to lead?


You ought to lead, he replied, since you are the inaugurator of this discussion.


Well then,
352a
ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῇδέ πῃ καταφανὲς ἂν ἡμῖν γένοιτο; ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπον σκοπῶν ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας εἴποι: “ἴθι δή μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι σαφέστερον,” καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν: θεασάμενος ὅτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς φῄς, δέομαι τοιοῦτόν τι εἰπεῖν: ἴθι δή μοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,
352a
I proceeded, will the following example give us the light we need? Just as, in estimating a man's health or bodily efficiency by his appearance, one might look at his face and the lower part of his arms and say: Come now, uncover your chest too and your back and show them, that I may examine you thoroughly—so the same sort of desire comes over me in regard to our inquiry. Observing your condition to be as you describe in respect of the good and the pleasant, I am fain to say something like this: Come, my good Protagoras, uncover some more of your thoughts:
352b
καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον: πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι: οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς
352b
how are you in regard to knowledge? Do you share the view that most people take of this, or have you some other? The opinion generally held of knowledge is something of this sort—that it is no strong or guiding or governing thing; it is not regarded as anything of that kind, but people think that, while a man often has knowledge in him, he is not governed by it, but by something else—now by passion, now by pleasure, now by pain, at times by love, and often by fear; their feeling about knowledge
352c
διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκῃ τις τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ὥστε ἄλλ' ἄττα πράττειν ἢ ἃν ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ;


καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα,
352c
is just what they have about a slave, that it may be dragged about by any other force. Now do you agree with this view of it, or do you consider that knowledge is something noble and able to govern man, and that whoever learns what is good and what is bad will never be swayed by anything to act otherwise than as knowledge bids, and that intelligence is a sufficient succor for mankind?


My view, Socrates, he replied, is precisely that which you express,
352d
εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.


καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα πράττειν: καὶ ὅσους δὴ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ὅτι ποτε αἴτιόν ἐστι τούτου, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασιν
352d
and what is more, it would be a disgrace for me above all men to assert that wisdom and knowledge were aught but the highest of all human things.


Well and truly spoken, I said. Now you know that most people will not listen to you and me, but say that many, while knowing what is best, refuse to perform it, though they have the power, and do other things instead. And whenever I have asked them to tell me what can be the reason of this, they say that those who act so are acting under the influence of pleasure or pain,
352e
ἡττωμένους ἢ λύπης ἢ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπό τινος τούτων κρατουμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιοῦντας.


πολλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι.


ἴθι δὴ μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διδάσκειν ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὅ φασιν ὑπὸ
352e
or under the control of one of the things I have just mentioned.


Yes, Socrates, he replied, I regard this as but one of the many erroneous sayings of mankind.


Come then, and join me in the endeavor to persuade the world and explain what is this experience of theirs, which they call “being overcome by pleasure,” and which they give as the reason why they fail to do what is best though they have knowledge of it. For perhaps if we said to them: What you assert, good people, is not correct, but quite untrue—they might ask us: Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not “being overcome by pleasure”
353a
τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεσθε, ἔροιντ' ἂν ἡμᾶς: “ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατον ἡμῖν.”


τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν;
353a
what on earth is it, and what do you call it? Tell us that.


Why, Socrates, must we consider the opinion of the mass of mankind,
353b
οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναί τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς τἆλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς ποτ' ἔχει. εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ ἡγήσασθαι ᾗ οἶμαι ἂν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερὸν γενέσθαι, ἕπου: εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον, ἐῶ χαίρειν.


ἀλλ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις: καὶ πέραινε ὥσπερ ἤρξω.
353b
who say just what occurs to them?


I fancy, I replied, that this will be a step towards discovering how courage is related to the other parts of virtue. So if you think fit to abide by the arrangement we made a while ago—that I should lead in the direction which seems best for elucidating the matter—you must now follow; but if you would rather not, to suit your wishes I will let it pass.


No, he said, your plan is quite right: go on to the end as you began.
353c
πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο ἡμᾶς: “τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν;” εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡδί: Ἀκούετε δή: πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φράσαι. ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν τοῖσδε, οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἡδέων ὄντων, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν;
φαῖεν ἄν.
οὐκοῦν ἐροίμεθ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν: Πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πῇ φατε εἶναι;
353c
Once more then, I proceeded, suppose they should ask us: Then what do you call this thing which we described as “being overcome by pleasures”? The answer I should give them would be this: Please attend; Protagoras and I will try to explain it to you. Do you not say that this thing occurs, good people, in the common case of a man being overpowered by the pleasantness of food or drink or sexual acts, and doing what he does though he knows it to be wicked? They would admit it. Then you and I would ask them again: In what sense do you call such deeds wicked?
353d
πότερον ὅτι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρασκευάζει; ἢ κἂν εἴ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅτι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὁπῃοῦν; ἆρ' οἰόμεθ' ἂν αὐτούς, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἄλλο τι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἢ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς παραχρῆμα ἐργασίαν κακά ἐστιν,
353d
Is it that they produce those pleasures and are themselves pleasant at the moment, or that later on they cause diseases and poverty, and have many more such ills in store for us? Or, even though they have none of these things in store for a later day, and cause us only enjoyment, would they still be evil just because, forsooth, they cause enjoyment in some way or other? Can we suppose, Protagoras, that they will make any other answer than that these things are evil, not according to the operation of the actual pleasure
353e
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ὕστερον γιγνόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ τἆλλα.
ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.
οὐκοῦν νόσους ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ; Ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι.
συνέφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.
οὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν, ὥς φαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτᾷ καὶ ἄλλων
353e
of the moment, but owing to the later results in disease and those other ills?


I think, said Protagoras, that most people would answer thus.


Then in causing diseases they cause pains? And in causing poverty they cause pains?
354a
ἡδονῶν ἀποστερεῖ; Ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν;
συνεδόκει ἡμῖν ἀμφοῖν.
οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον εἰ ἐροίμεθα: ὦ ἄνθρωποι οἱ λέγοντες αὖ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιαρὰ εἶναι, ἆρα οὐ τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε, οἷον τά τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπείας τὰς διὰ καύσεών τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακειῶν καὶ λιμοκτονιῶν γιγνομένας, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ μέν ἐστιν, ἀνιαρὰ δέ; φαῖεν ἄν;
συνεδόκει.
πότερον
354a
They would admit this, I imagine.


Protagoras agreed.


Then does it seem to you, my friends, as Protagoras and I assert, that the only reason why these things are evil is that they end at last in pains, and deprive us of other pleasures? Would they admit this?


We both agreed that they would.


Then again, suppose we should ask them the opposite: You, sirs, who tell us on the other hand that good things are painful—do you not give such instances as physical training, military service, and medical treatment conducted by cautery, incision, drugs, or starvation, and say that these are good, but painful? Would they not grant it?
354b
οὖν κατὰ τόδε ἀγαθὰ αὐτὰ καλεῖτε, ὅτι ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ὀδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον ὑγίειαί τε ἀπ' αὐτῶν γίγνονται καὶ εὐεξίαι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων σωτηρίαι καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαὶ καὶ πλοῦτοι; φαῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι.
συνεδόκει.
ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστι δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι εἰς ἡδονὰς ἀποτελευτᾷ καὶ λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγάς τε καὶ ἀποτροπάς; ἢ ἔχετέ τι ἄλλο τέλος
354b
He agreed that they would.


Then do you call them good because they produce extreme pangs and anguish for the moment, or because later on they result in health and good bodily condition, the deliverance of cities, dominion over others, and wealth? They would assent to this, I suppose.


He agreed.


And are these things good for any other reason than that they end at last in pleasures and relief and riddance of pains? Or have you some other end to mention,
354c
λέγειν, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἀλλ' <ἢ> ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας; οὐκ ἂν φαῖεν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι.
οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.
οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς κακόν;
συνεδόκει.
τοῦτ' ἄρα ἡγεῖσθ' εἶναι κακόν, τὴν λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακὸν εἶναι, ὅταν μειζόνων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερῇ ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μείζους παρασκευάζῃ τῶν ἐν
354c
with respect to which you call them good, apart from pleasures and pains? They could not find one, I fancy.


I too think they could not, said Protagoras.


Then do you pursue pleasure as being a good thing, and shun pain as being a bad one?


He agreed that we do.


So one thing you hold to be bad—pain; and pleasure you hold to be good, since the very act of enjoying you call bad as soon as it deprives us of greater pleasures than it has in itself, or leads to greater pains than the pleasures it contains.
354d
αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν: ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ' ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν: ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε.
οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.
ἄλλο τι οὖν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν ἢ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἢ μείζους ἡδονὰς τῶν λυπῶν παρασκευάζῃ; ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι
354d
For if it is with reference to something else that you call the act of enjoyment bad, and with a view to some other end, you might be able to tell it us but this you will be unable to do.


I too think that they cannot, said Protagoras.


Then is not the same thing repeated in regard to the state of being pained? You call being pained a good thing as soon as it either rids us of greater pains than those it comprises, or leads to greater pleasures than its pains. Now if you have in view some other end
354e
ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν: ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε.
ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρας.


πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἴ με ἀνέροισθε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, “τίνος οὖν δήποτε ἕνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῇ;” Συγγιγνώσκετέ μοι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδεῖξαι τί ἐστίν ποτε τοῦτο ὃ ὑμεῖς καλεῖτε τῶν ἡδονῶν ἥττω εἶναι: ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις. ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν,
354e
than those which I mention when you call being pained good, you can tell it us; but you never can.


Truly spoken, said Protagoras.


Once more then, I proceeded; if you were to ask me, my friends, Now why on earth do you speak at such length on this point, and in so many ways? I should reply, Forgive me: in the first place, it is not easy to conclude what it is that you mean when you say “overcome by pleasures”; and secondly, on this point hang all our conclusions. But it is still quite possible to retract, if you can somehow contrive to say that
355a
εἴ πῃ ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν: ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾷ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε. φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν λέγητε ὅτι πολλάκις γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἄνθρωπος ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως πράττει αὐτά, ἐξὸν μὴ πράττειν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν
355a
the good is different from pleasure, or the bad from pain. Is it enough for you to live out your life pleasantly, without pain? If it is, and you are unable to tell us of any other good or evil that does not end in pleasure or pain, listen to what I have to say next. I tell you that if this is so, the argument becomes absurd, when you say that it is often the case that a man, knowing the evil to be evil, nevertheless commits it, when he might avoid it, because he is driven and dazed
355b
ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος: καὶ αὖθις αὖ λέγετε ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τἀγαθὰ πράττειν οὐκ ἐθέλει διὰ τὰς παραχρῆμα ἡδονάς, ὑπὸ τούτων ἡττώμενος. ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστιν, κατάδηλον ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα ἅμα, ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυοῖν καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἔπειτα αὖθις ἡδεῖ τε
355b
by his pleasures; while on the other hand you say that a man, knowing the good, refuses to do good because of the momentary pleasures by which he is overcome.


The absurdity of all this will be manifest if we refrain from using a number of terms at once, such as pleasant, painful, good, and bad; and as there appeared to be two things, let us call them by two names—first, good and evil, and then later on, pleasant and painful. Let us then lay it down as our statement,
355c
καὶ ἀνιαρῷ. θέμενοι δὴ οὕτω λέγωμεν ὅτι Γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. ἐὰν οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται, “διὰ τί;” Ἡττώμενος, φήσομεν: “ὑπὸ τοῦ;” ἐκεῖνος ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς: ἡμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν—ἄλλο γὰρ ὄνομα μετείληφεν ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ ἀγαθόν—ἐκείνῳ δὴ ἀποκρινώμεθα καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι Ἡττώμενος
“ὑπὸ τίνος;” φήσει. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φήσομεν νὴ Δία. ἂν οὖν τύχῃ ὁ ἐρόμενος ἡμᾶς ὑβριστὴς ὤν, γελάσεται
355c
that a man does evil in spite of knowing the evil of it. Now if someone asks us: Why? we shall answer: Because he is overcome. By what? the questioner will ask us and this time we shall be unable to reply: By pleasure—for this has exchanged its name for “the good.” So we must answer only with the words: Because he is overcome. By what? says the questioner. The good—must surely be our reply. Now if our questioner chance to be an arrogant person he will laugh and exclaim: What a ridiculous statement,
355d
καὶ ἐρεῖ: “ἦ γελοῖον λέγετε πρᾶγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακά, γιγνώσκων ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἆρα,” φήσει, “οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων νικᾶν ἐν ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἢ ἀξίων;” φήσομεν δῆλον ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξημάρτανεν ὅν φαμεν ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν. “κατὰ τί δέ,” φήσει ἴσως, “ἀνάξιά ἐστιν τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἢ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν τὰ μὲν μείζω, τὰ δὲ
355d
that a man does evil, knowing it to be evil, and not having to do it, because he is overcome by the good! Is this, he will ask, because the good is not worthy of conquering the evil in you, or because it is worthy?


Clearly we must reply: Because it is not worthy; otherwise he whom we speak of as overcome by pleasures would not have offended. But in what sense, he might ask us, is the good unworthy of the bad, or the bad of the good? This can only be when the one is greater and the other smaller, or when there are more on the one side and fewer on the other. We shall not find
355e
σμικρότερα ᾖ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ᾖ;” οὐχ ἕξομεν εἰπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. “δῆλον ἄρα,” φήσει, “ὅτι τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μείζω κακὰ λαμβάνειν.” ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτω. μεταλάβωμεν δὴ τὰ ὀνόματα πάλιν τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι Ἄνθρωπος πράττει—τότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακά, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν τὰ ἀνιαρά, γιγνώσκων ὅτι ἀνιαρά ἐστιν, ἡττώμενος
355e
any other reason to give; So it is clear, he will say, that by “being overcome” you mean getting the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good. That must be agreed. Then let us apply the terms “pleasant” and “painful”


to these things instead, and say that a man does what we previously called evil, but now call painful, knowing it to be painful, because he is overcome by the pleasant, which is obviously
356a
ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι ἀναξίων ὄντων νικᾶν. καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία ἡδονῇ πρὸς λύπην ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβολὴ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔλλειψις; ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω τε καὶ σμικρότερα γιγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι “ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ,” μῶν ἄλλῳ τῳ, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἢ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ; οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
356a
unworthy to conquer. What unworthiness can there be in pleasure as against pain, save an excess or defect of one compared with the other? That is, when one becomes greater and the other smaller, or when there are more on one side and fewer on the other, or here a greater degree and there a less. For if you should say: But, Socrates, the immediately pleasant differs widely from the subsequently pleasant or painful, I should reply: Do they differ in anything but pleasure and pain?
356b
ἀγαθὸς ἱστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθεὶς τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεὶς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ, εἰπὲ πότερα πλείω ἐστίν. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἱστῇς, τὰ μείζω ἀεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτέα: ἐὰν δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ σμικρότερα: ἐὰν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρά, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἐάντε τὰ ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐάντε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν πρακτέον ἐν ᾗ ἂν ταῦτ' ἐνῇ: ἐὰν
356b
That is the only distinction. Like a practised weigher, put pleasant things and painful in the scales, and with them the nearness and the remoteness, and tell me which count for more. For if you weigh pleasant things against pleasant, the greater and the more are always to be preferred: if painful against painful, then always the fewer and smaller. If you weigh pleasant against painful, and find that the painful are outbalanced by the pleasant—whether the near by the remote or the remote by the near—you must take that course of action to which the pleasant are attached;
356c
δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα. μή πῃ ἄλλῃ ἔχει, φαίην ἄν, ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνθρωποι; οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν ἄλλως λέγειν.
συνεδόκει καὶ ἐκείνῳ.


ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε, φήσω. φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῇ ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζω, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω: ἢ οὔ;
φήσουσιν.
καὶ τὰ παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ αἱ φωναὶ <αἱ> ἴσαι ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι;
φαῖεν ἄν.
εἰ οὖν
356c
but not that course if the pleasant are outweighed by the painful. Can the case be otherwise, I should ask, than thus, my friends? I am certain they could state no alternative.


To this he too assented.


Since that is the case, then, I shall say, please answer me this: Does not the same size appear larger to your sight when near, and smaller when distant? They will admit this. And it is the same with thickness and number? And sounds of equal strength are greater when near, and smaller when distant?
356d
ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ εὖ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἆρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; ἢ αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταὐτὰ καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ σμικρῶν, ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα
356d
They would agree to this. Now if our welfare consisted in doing and choosing things of large dimensions, and avoiding and not doing those of small, what would be our salvation in life? Would it be the art of measurement, or the power of appearance? Is it not the latter that leads us astray, as we saw, and many a time causes us to take things topsy-turvy and to have to change our minds both in our conduct and in our choice of great or small? Whereas the art of measurement would have made this appearance ineffective,
356e
δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον; ἆρ' ἂν ὁμολογοῖεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σῴζειν ἂν τέχνην ἢ ἄλλην;
τὴν μετρητικήν, ὡμολόγει.
τί δ' εἰ ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αἱρέσει ἡμῖν ἦν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου, ὁπότε τὸ πλέον ὀρθῶς ἔδει ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὁπότε τὸ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, εἴτ' ἐγγὺς εἴτε πόρρω εἴη; τί ἂν ἔσῳζεν ἡμῖν τὸν
356e
and by showing us the truth would have brought our soul into the repose of abiding by the truth, and so would have saved our life. Would men acknowledge, in view of all this, that the art which saves our life is measurement, or some other?


It is measurement, he agreed.


Well now, if the saving of our life depended on the choice of odd or even, and on knowing when to make a right choice of the greater and when of the less—taking each by itself or comparing it with the other, and whether near
357a
βίον; ἆρ' ἂν οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; καὶ ἆρ' ἂν οὐ μετρητική τις, ἐπειδήπερ ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου, ἆρα ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθμητική; Ὁμολογοῖεν ἂν ἡμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ οὔ;
ἐδόκουν ἂν καὶ τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὁμολογεῖν.
εἶεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι: ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἱρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὖσα, τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ
357a
or distant—what would save our life? Would it not be knowledge; a knowledge of measurement, since the art here is concerned with excess and defect, and of numeration, as it has to do with odd and even? People would admit this, would they not?


Protagoras agreed that they would.


Well then, my friends, since we have found that the salvation of our life depends on making a right choice of pleasure and pain—of the more and the fewer,
357b
μείζονος καὶ σμικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρω καὶ ἐγγυτέρω, ἆρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὖσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις;
ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη.
ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητική, ἀνάγκῃ δήπου τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη.
συμφήσουσιν.
ἥτις μὲν τοίνυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν αὕτη, εἰς αὖθις σκεψόμεθα: ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, τοσοῦτον ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἣν ἐμὲ δεῖ καὶ Πρωταγόραν
357b
the greater and the smaller, and the nearer and the remoter—is it not evident, in the first place, that measurement is a study of their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?


This must needs be so.


And being measurement, I presume it must be an art or science?


They will assent to this.


Well, the nature of this art or science we shall consider some other time
; but the mere fact of its being a science will suffice for the proof which Protagoras and I
357c
ἀποδεῖξαι περὶ ὧν ἤρεσθ' ἡμᾶς. ἤρεσθε δέ, εἰ μέμνησθε, ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὡμολογοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ κρατεῖν, ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων: ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἔφατε τὴν ἡδονὴν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὡμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο ἤρεσθε ἡμᾶς: “ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατε
357c
are required to give in answer to the question you have put to us. You asked it, if you remember, when we were agreeing
that there is nothing stronger than knowledge, and that knowledge, wherever it may be found, has always the upper hand of pleasure or anything else; and then you said that pleasure often masters even the man of knowledge, and on our refusing to agree with you, you went on to ask us: Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not “being overcome by pleasure,”
357d
ἡμῖν.” εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἴπομεν ὅτι ἀμαθία, κατεγελᾶτε ἂν ἡμῶν: νῦν δὲ ἂν ἡμῶν καταγελᾶτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε. καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὡμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδείᾳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἵρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας—ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθά τε καὶ κακά—καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἧς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ὡμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς: ἡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη πρᾶξις
357d
whatever can it be, and what do you call it? Tell us. If on the spur of the moment we had replied, “Ignorance,” you would have laughed us to scorn: but now if you laugh at us you will be laughing at yourselves as well. For you have admitted that it is from defect of knowledge that men err, when they do err, in their choice of pleasures and pains—that is, in the choice of good and evil; and from defect not merely of knowledge but of the knowledge which you have now admitted also to be that of measurement. And surely you know well enough for yourselves
357e
ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἴστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθίᾳ πράττεται. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἥττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη, ἧς Πρωταγόρας ὅδε φησὶν ἰατρὸς εἶναι καὶ Πρόδικος καὶ Ἱππίας: ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε τοὺς ὑμετέρους παῖδας παρὰ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους τούσδε τοὺς σοφιστὰς πέμπετε, ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κηδόμενοι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ διδόντες τούτοις κακῶς πράττετε καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.
357e
that the erring act committed without knowledge is done through ignorance. Accordingly “to be overcome by pleasure” means just this—ignorance in the highest degree, which Protagoras here and Prodicus and Hippias profess to cure. But you, through supposing it to be something else than ignorance, will neither go yourselves nor send your children to these sophists, who are the teachers of those things—you say it cannot be taught; you are chary of your money and will give them none,
358a
ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἂν ἦμεν: ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἐρωτῶ, <ὦ> Ἱππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε (κοινὸς γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ὑμῖν ὁ λόγοσ) πότερον δοκῶ ὑμῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι.
ὑπερφυῶς ἐδόκει ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα.
ὁμολογεῖτε ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακόν. τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παραιτοῦμαι: εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν, εἴτε ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα
358a
and so you fare badly both in private and in public life.


Such would have been our answer to the world at large. And I ask you now, Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras—for I would have you make a joint reply—whether you think what I say is true or false.


They all thought what I had said was absolutely true.


Then you agree, I continued, that the pleasant is good and the painful bad. And let me entreat my friend Prodicus to spare me his distinction of terms:
358b
ὀνομάζων, ὦ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὃ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι.
γελάσας οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος συνωμολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.
τί δὲ δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε; αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, ἆρ' οὐ καλαί [καὶ ὠφέλιμοι]; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον;
συνεδόκει.
εἰ ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδεὶς οὔτε εἰδὼς οὔτε οἰόμενος ἄλλα βελτίω εἶναι ἢ
358b
for whether you say pleasant or delightful or enjoyable, my excellent Prodicus, or in whatever style or manner you may be pleased to name these things, pray reply to the sense of my question.


At this Prodicus laughed and consented, as did the rest.


Well now, my friends, I said, what of this? All actions aimed at living painlessly and pleasantly are honorable, are they not? And the honorable work is both good and useful?


They agreed.


Then if, I proceeded, the pleasant is good, no one who has knowledge
358c
ἃ ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά, ἔπειτα ποιεῖ ταῦτα, ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω: οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι αὑτοῦ ἄλλο τι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἀμαθία, οὐδὲ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία.
συνεδόκει πᾶσιν.
τί δὲ δή; ἀμαθίαν ἆρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων;
καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει.
ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπί γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἔρχεται οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ'
358c
or thought of other actions as better than those he is doing, and as possible, will do as he proposes if he is free to do the better ones; and this yielding to oneself is nothing but ignorance, and mastery of
oneself is as certainly wisdom.


They all agreed.


Well then, by ignorance do you mean having a false opinion and being deceived about matters of importance?


They all agreed to this also.


Then surely, I went on, no one willingly goes after evil or what he thinks to be evil;
358d
ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν: ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῇ δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μεῖζον αἱρήσεται ἐξὸν τὸ ἔλαττον;
ἅπαντα ταῦτα συνεδόκει ἅπασιν ἡμῖν.
τί οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ, καλεῖτέ <τι> δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἆρα ὅπερ ἐγώ; (πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὦ Πρόδικἐ. προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε.
ἐδόκει Πρωταγόρᾳ μὲν καὶ Ἱππίᾳ δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο,
358d
it is not in human nature, apparently, to do so—to wish to go after what one thinks to be evil in preference to the good; and when compelled to choose one of two evils, nobody will choose the greater when he may the lesser.


All this met with the assent of everyone.


Well, I said, is there something you call dread, or fear? And is it—I address myself to you, Prodicus —the same as I have in mind—something I describe as an expectation of evil, whether you call it fear or dread?


Protagoras and Hippias agreed
358e
προδίκῳ δὲ δέος, φόβος δ' οὔ.
ἀλλ' οὐδέν, ἔφην ἐγώ, Πρόδικε, διαφέρει: ἀλλὰ τόδε. εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν ἐστιν, ἆρά τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθελήσει ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἰέναι ἃ δέδοικεν, ἐξὸν ἐπὶ ἃ μή; ἢ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων; ἃ γὰρ δέδοικεν, ὡμολόγηται ἡγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι: ἃ δὲ ἡγεῖται κακά, οὐδένα οὔτε ἰέναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὔτε λαμβάνειν ἑκόντα.
ἐδόκει
358e
to this description of dread or fear; but Prodicus thought this was dread, not fear.


No matter, Prodicus, I said, but my point is this: if our former statements are true, will any man wish to go after what he dreads, when he may pursue what he does not? Surely this is impossible after what we have admitted—that he regards as evil that which he dreads? And what is regarded as evil is neither pursued nor accepted willingly, we saw, by anyone.
359a
καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσιν.


οὕτω δὴ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Πρόδικέ τε καὶ Ἱππία, ἀπολογείσθω ἡμῖν Πρωταγόρας ὅδε ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεκρίνατο πῶς ὀρθῶς ἔχει—μὴ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον παντάπασι: τότε μὲν γὰρ δὴ πέντε ὄντων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδὲν ἔφη εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, ἰδίαν δὲ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστον ἔχειν δύναμιν: ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλ' ἃ τὸ ὕστερον εἶπεν. τὸ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔφη τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις
359a
Here also they were all in agreement.


So much, then, being granted, Prodicus and Hippias, I said, let our friend Protagoras vindicate the correctness of the answer he made at first—not that which he made at the very beginning,
when he said that, while there were five parts of virtue, none of them was like any other, but each had its particular function: I do not refer to that, but the statement he made afterwards,
when he proceeded to say that four of them had a considerable resemblance to each other,
359b
εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἓν πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, γνώσεσθαι δέ μ' ἔφη τεκμηρίῳ τῷδε: “εὑρήσεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀδικωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ: ᾧ γνώσῃ ὅτι πολὺ διαφέρει ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν ἄλλων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς.” καὶ ἐγὼ εὐθὺς τότε πάνυ ἐθαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μεθ' ὑμῶν διεξῆλθον. ἠρόμην δ' οὖν τοῦτον εἰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους: ὁ δέ, “καὶ
359b
but one was quite different from the rest—courage; and he told me I should perceive this by the following token: You will find, Socrates, said he, that men may be most unholy, most unjust, most dissolute, and most ignorant, yet most courageous; whence you may judge that courage is very different from the other parts of virtue. His answer caused me great surprise at the moment, and still more when I went into the matter with your help. But anyhow, I asked him whether by the brave he meant “bold.” Yes, he replied, and impetuous.
359c
ἴτας γ',” ἔφη. μέμνησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος;
ὡμολόγει.
ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ τί λέγεις ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἦ ἐφ' ἅπερ οἱ δειλοί;
οὐκ ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἕτερα.
ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς.
πότερον οἱ μὲν δειλοὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά;
λέγεται δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις: ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο
359c
Protagoras, I said, do you remember making this answer?


He admitted he did.


Well now, I said, tell us, towards what do you mean they are impetuous when they are courageous? Towards the same things as cowards?


No, he said.


Then towards other things?


Yes, he said.


Do cowards go after things that allow boldness, and the courageous after dreadful things?


So people say, Socrates.


Quite true, I said. But my point is rather,
359d
ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τί φῂς ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἆρ' ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά, ἡγουμένους δεινὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰ μή;
ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις ἀπεδείχθη ἄρτι ὅτι ἀδύνατον.
καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθὲς λέγεις: ὥστ' εἰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ἃ δεινὰ ἡγεῖται εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ ηὑρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα.
ὡμολόγει.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἅ γε θαρροῦσι πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ταύτῃ γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ
359d
towards what, according to you, are the brave impetuous? Dreadful things, in the belief that they are dreadful, or towards what is not dreadful?


No, he said; the former has just been shown, by the arguments you put forward, to be impossible.


Quite true again, I said; so that if this proof was correct, no one goes to meet what he regards as dreadful, since to be overcome by oneself was found to be ignorance.


He admitted this.


And yet all men go also to meet what they can face boldly, whether cowardly or brave, and in this respect cowardly and brave
359e
ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοί τε καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πᾶν γε τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ἃ οἵ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι. αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν.
πότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλὸν ὂν ἰέναι ἢ αἰσχρόν;
καλόν, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν: τὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας ἀγαθὰς ὡμολογήσαμεν.
ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ ἀεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.
ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ.
359e
go to meet the same things.


But still, Socrates, he said, what cowards go to meet is the very opposite of what the courageous go to meet. For instance, the latter are willing to go to war, but the former are not.


Is going to war an honorable thing, I asked, or a base thing?


Honorable, he replied.


Then if it is honorable, we have admitted, by our former argument, that it is also good for we agreed that all honorable actions were good.


True, and I abide by that decision.


You are right to do so, I said.
360a
ἀλλὰ ποτέρους φῂς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἰέναι, καλὸν ὂν καὶ ἀγαθόν;
τοὺς δειλούς, ἦ δ' ὅς.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδύ;
ὡμολόγηται γοῦν, ἔφη.
ἆρ' οὖν γιγνώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον;
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν, ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας.
τί δ' ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἔρχεται;
ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν.
οὐκοῦν ὅλως οἱ
360a
But which sort of men do you say are not willing to go to war, that being an honorable and good thing to do?


The cowardly, he replied.


Then, I went on, if it is honorable and good, is it also pleasant?


That certainly has been admitted, he said.


Now do the cowards wittingly refuse to go to what is more honorable, better, and pleasanter?


Well, if we admit that too, he replied, we shall undo our previous admissions.


But what of the courageous man? Does he not go to the more honorable and better and pleasanter?
360b
ἀνδρεῖοι οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν;
ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.
εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρά, ἆρ' οὐ καλά;
ὡμολόγει.
εἰ δὲ καλά, καὶ ἀγαθά;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι τοὐναντίον αἰσχρούς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται καὶ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν;
ὡμολόγει.
θαρροῦσιν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν;
οὕτως
360b
I am forced to admit that, he said.


Now, in general, courageous men do not feel base fears, when they fear, nor is there anything base in their boldness?


True, he said.


And if not base, then it must be honorable?


He admitted this.


And if honorable, then good?


Yes.


And the cowardly and the bold and the mad, on the contrary, feel base fears and base boldness?


He agreed.


Do they feel base and evil boldness solely through stupidity and ignorance?
360c
ἔχει, ἔφη.
τί οὖν; τοῦτο δι' ὃ δειλοί εἰσιν οἱ δειλοί, δειλίαν ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς;
δειλίαν ἔγωγ', ἔφη.
δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ὄντες;
πάνυ γ', ἔφη.
διὰ ταύτην ἄρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοί εἰσιν;
ὡμολόγει.
δι' ὃ δὲ δειλοί εἰσιν, δειλία ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ;
συνέφη.
οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν εἴη;
ἐπένευσε.
ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντίον
360c
Just so, he said.


Well now, the cause of cowards being cowardly, do you call this cowardice or courage?


Cowardice, I call it, he replied.


And were they not found to be cowards through ignorance of what is dreadful?


Certainly, he said.


And so they are cowards because of that ignorance?


He agreed.


And the cause of their being cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?


He assented.


Then ignorance of what is dreadful and not dreadful will be cowardice?


He nodded assent.


But surely courage, I went on,
360d
ἀνδρεία δειλίᾳ.
ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῇ τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ ἐστίν;
καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν.
ἡ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία δειλία;
πάνυ μόγις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν.
ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἐναντία οὖσα τῇ τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ;
οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὔτ' ἐπινεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε.
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον: τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε σὺ φῂς ἃ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφῃς;
αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον.
ἕν γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, μόνον
360d
is the opposite of cowardice.


Yes.


Then the wisdom that knows what is and what is not dreadful is opposed to the ignorance of these things?


To this he could still nod assent.


And the ignorance of them is cowardice?


To this he nodded very reluctantly.


So the wisdom that knows what is and what is not dreadful is courage, being opposed to the ignorance of these things?


Here he could no longer bring himself to nod agreement, and remained silent. Then I proceeded: Why is it, Protagoras, that you neither affirm nor deny what I ask you?


Finish it, he said, by yourself.
360e
ἐρόμενος ἔτι σέ, εἴ σοι ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἔτι δοκοῦσιν εἶναί τινες ἄνθρωποι ἀμαθέστατοι μέν, ἀνδρειότατοι δέ.
φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον: χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀδύνατόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.


οὔτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλου ἕνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτου φανεροῦ
360e
I must first ask you, I said, just one more question: Do you still think, as at the beginning, that there are any people who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?


I see, Socrates, you have set your heart on making me your answerer; so, to oblige you, I will say that by what we have admitted I consider it impossible.


My only motive, I then said, in asking all these questions has been a desire to examine the various relations of virtue and its own special nature.
361a
γενομένου μάλιστ' ἂν κατάδηλον γένοιτο ἐκεῖνο περὶ οὗ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἑκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτὸν ἀρετή, σὺ δ' ὡς διδακτόν. καί μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἄρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελᾶν, καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι “ἄτοποί γ' ἐστέ, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα: σὺ μὲν λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν σεαυτῷ τἀναντία
361a
For I know that, were it once made plain, that other question on which you and I have argued at such length on either side—you maintaining and I denying that virtue can be taught—would be cleared up satisfactorily. Our discussion, in its present result, seems to me as though it accused and mocked us like some human person; if it were given a voice it would say: “What strange creatures you are, Socrates and Protagoras! You on the one hand, after having said at first that virtue cannot be taught,
361b
σπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πάντα χρήματά ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ᾧ τρόπῳ μάλιστ' ἂν διδακτὸν φανείη ἡ ἀρετή. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετή, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν ἦν διδακτόν: νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὄν. Πρωταγόρας δ' αὖ διδακτὸν τότε ὑποθέμενος, νῦν τοὐναντίον ἔοικεν σπεύδοντι ὀλίγου πάντα
361b
are now hot in opposition to yourself, endeavoring to prove that all things are knowledge—justice, temperance, and courage—which is the best way to make virtue appear teachable: for if virtue were anything else than knowledge, as Protagoras tried to make out, obviously it would not be teachable; but if as a matter of fact it turns out to be entirely knowledge, as you urge, Socrates, I shall be surprised if it is not teachable. Protagoras, on the other hand, though at first he claimed that it was teachable,
361c
μᾶλλον φανῆναι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπιστήμην: καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἥκιστα εἴη διδακτόν.” ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἄνω κάτω ταραττόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ αὐτὰ γενέσθαι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἡμᾶς ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅτι ἔστιν, καὶ πάλιν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν, μὴ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐν τῇ σκέψει
361c
now seems as eager for the opposite, declaring that it has been found to be almost anything but knowledge, which would make it quite unteachable!” Now I, Protagoras, observing the extraordinary tangle into which we have managed to get the whole matter, am most anxious to have it thoroughly cleared up. And I should like to work our way through it until at last we reach what virtue is, and then go back and consider whether it is teachable or not, lest perchance your Epimetheus beguile and trip us up in our investigation
361d
σφήλῃ ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ ἠμέλησεν ἡμῶν, ὡς φῂς σύ. ἤρεσεν οὖν μοι καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὁ Προμηθεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐπιμηθέως: ᾧ χρώμενος ἐγὼ καὶ προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ εἰ σὺ ἐθέλοις, ὅπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ ἂν ἥδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποίην.


καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπαινῶ σου τὴν προθυμίαν καὶ τὴν διέξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε
361d
as he overlooked us in your account of his distribution.
I like the Prometheus of your fable better than the Epimetheus; for he is of use to me, and I take Promethean thought continually for my own life when I am occupied with all these questions; so, with your consent, as I said at the beginning, I should be delighted to have your aid in the inquiry.


I approve your zeal, Socrates, said Protagoras, and the way you develop your arguments;
361e
τἆλλα οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε ἥκιστ' ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἴρηκα ὅτι ὧν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἄγαμαι σέ, τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων καὶ πάνυ: καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰς αὖθις, ὅταν βούλῃ, διέξιμεν: νῦν δ' ὥρα ἤδη καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλο τι τρέπεσθαι.
361e
for I think I am not ill-natured, and I am the last person on earth to be envious. Indeed I have told many people how I regard you—as the man I admire far above any that I meet, and as quite an exception to men of your age; and I say I should not be surprised if you won high repute for wisdom. We shall pursue the subject on some other occasion, at your pleasure: for the present,
362a
ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οἷπερ ἔφην ἰέναι πάλαι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ καλῷ χαριζόμενος παρέμεινα.


ταῦτ' εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπῇμεν.
362a
it is time to turn to another affair.


I quite agree, said I, if you think so: for I was long ago due to be where I told you I was going; I stayed merely to oblige our excellent Callias.


Here our colloquy ended, and each went his way.