ἦ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τὸ ἱστίον εἴη ἄν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ;
μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἑκάστου ἂν εἴη.
φαίνεται οὕτω γε.
ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἓν ἔσται;
ὅρα γάρ, φάναι: εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἕκαστον
Is not that about what you mean?”
“Perhaps it is,” said Socrates.
“Would the whole sail be over each person, or a particular part over each?”
“A part over each.”
“Then,” said he, “the ideas themselves, Socrates, are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each idea.”
“So it appears.”
“Are you, then, Socrates, willing to assert that the one idea is really divided and will still be one?”
“By no means,” he replied.
“No,” said Parmenides, “for if you divide absolute greatness,