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Χαρμίδης
Print source: Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet, Oxford University Press, 1903.

Electronic source: Perseus Digital Library
Charmides
Print source: Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 8 translated by W.R.M. Lamb., Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1955.

Electronic source: Perseus Digital Library
153a
Σωκράτης:
ἥκομεν τῇ προτεραίᾳ ἑσπέρας ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, οἷον δὲ διὰ χρόνου ἀφιγμένος ἁσμένως ᾖα ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις διατριβάς. καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰς τὴν Ταυρέου παλαίστραν τὴν καταντικρὺ τοῦ τῆς Βασίλης ἱεροῦ εἰσῆλθον, καὶ αὐτόθι κατέλαβον πάνυ πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν καὶ ἀγνῶτας ἐμοί, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους γνωρίμους. καί με ὡς
153a
We arrived yesterday evening from the army at Potidaea,
and I sought with delight, after an absence of some time, my wonted conversations. Accordingly I went into the wrestling-school of Taureas,
opposite the Queen's shrine,
and there I came upon quite a number of people, some of whom were unknown to me, but most of whom I knew. And as soon as they saw me
153b
εἶδον εἰσιόντα ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου, εὐθὺς πόρρωθεν ἠσπάζοντο ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν: Χαιρεφῶν δέ, ἅτε καὶ μανικὸς ὤν, ἀναπηδήσας ἐκ μέσων ἔθει πρός με, καί μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρός, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦ δ' ὅς, πῶς ἐσώθης ἐκ τῆς μάχης; Ὀλίγον δὲ πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι μάχη ἐγεγόνει ἐν τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ, ἣν ἄρτι ἦσαν οἱ τῇδε πεπυσμένοι.


καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκρινόμενος, Οὑτωσί, ἔφην, ὡς σὺ ὁρᾷς.


καὶ μὴν ἤγγελταί γε δεῦρο, ἔφη, ἥ τε μάχη πάνυ ἰσχυρὰ
153b
appear thus unexpectedly, they hailed me from a distance on every side; but Chaerephon, like the mad creature that he is, jumped up from their midst and ran to me, and grasping me by the hand—


Socrates, he said, how did you survive the battle? (Shortly before we came away there had been a battle at Potidaea, of which the people here had only just had news.)


In the state in which you see me, I replied.


It has been reported here, you know, said he, that the battle was very
153c
γεγονέναι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων τεθνάναι.


καὶ ἐπιεικῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ ἀπήγγελται.


παρεγένου μέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τῇ μάχῃ;


παρεγενόμην.


δεῦρο δή, ἔφη, καθεζόμενος ἡμῖν διήγησαι: οὐ γάρ τί πω πάντα σαφῶς πεπύσμεθα. καὶ ἅμα με καθίζει ἄγων παρὰ Κριτίαν τὸν Καλλαίσχρου.


παρακαθεζόμενος οὖν ἠσπαζόμην τόν τε Κριτίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ διηγούμην αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου, ὅτι μέ
153c
severe, and that many of our acquaintance have lost their lives in it.


Then the report, I replied, is pretty near the truth.


You were present, he asked, at the fighting?


I was present.


Then sit down here, he said, and give us a full account; for as yet we have had no clear report of it all. And with that he led me to a seat by Critias, son of Callaeschrus. So I sat down there and greeted Critias and the rest, and gave them all the news from the battlefield, in answer to their various questions; each had his inquiry to make.
153d
τις ἀνέροιτο: ἠρώτων δὲ ἄλλος ἄλλο.


ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἅδην εἴχομεν, αὖθις ἐγὼ αὐτοὺς ἀνηρώτων τὰ τῇδε, περὶ φιλοσοφίας ὅπως ἔχοι τὰ νῦν, περί τε τῶν νέων, εἴ τινες ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφέροντες ἢ σοφίᾳ ἢ κάλλει ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐγγεγονότες εἶεν. καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀποβλέψας
153d
When we had had enough of such matters, I in my turn began to inquire about affairs at home, how philosophy was doing at present, and whether any of the rising young men had distinguished themselves for wisdom or beauty or both. Then Critias, looking towards the door,
154a
πρὸς τὴν θύραν, ἰδών τινας νεανίσκους εἰσιόντας καὶ λοιδορουμένους ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἄλλον ὄχλον ὄπισθεν ἑπόμενον, περὶ μὲν τῶν καλῶν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτίκα μοι δοκεῖς εἴσεσθαι: οὗτοι γὰρ τυγχάνουσιν οἱ εἰσιόντες πρόδρομοί τε καὶ ἐρασταὶ ὄντες τοῦ δοκοῦντος καλλίστου εἶναι τά γε δὴ νῦν, φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγγὺς ἤδη που εἶναι προσιών.


ἔστιν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίς τε καὶ τοῦ;


οἶσθά που σύ γε, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὔπω ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ἦν πρίν σε
154a
for he saw some young fellows who were coming in with some railing at each other, and a crowd of people following on behind them, said—Concerning the beauties, Socrates, I expect you will get your knowledge at once: for these who are coming in are in fact forerunners and lovers of the person who is held, for the moment at least, to be the greatest beauty; and he himself, I imagine, must by now be nearly upon us.


Who is he, I asked, and whose son?


You must know, he replied, but he was not yet grown up when you went away,—Charmides, son of
154b
ἀπιέναι, Χαρμίδην τὸν τοῦ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ ἡμετέρου θείου ὑόν, ἐμὸν δὲ ἀνεψιόν.


οἶδα μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ: οὐ γάρ τι φαῦλος οὐδὲ τότε ἦν ἔτι παῖς ὤν, νῦν δ' οἶμαί που εὖ μάλα ἂν ἤδη μειράκιον εἴη.


αὐτίκα, ἔφη, εἴσῃ καὶ ἡλίκος καὶ οἷος γέγονεν. καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ' αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὁ Χαρμίδης εἰσέρχεται.


ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐδὲν σταθμητόν: ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ λευκὴ στάθμη εἰμὶ πρὸς τοὺς καλούς—σχεδὸν γάρ τί μοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καλοὶ φαίνονται—ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ
154b
our uncle Glaucon, and my cousin.


I do know, to be sure, I said; for he was not to be despised even then, when he was still a child, and now, I suppose, he will be quite a youth by this time.


You will know this moment, he said, both how much and to what purpose he has grown. And just as he spoke these words, Charmides entered.


Now I, my good friend, am no measurer: I am a mere “white line”
in measuring beautiful people, for almost everyone who has just grown up appears beautiful to me. Nay and this time, moreover, the young man appeared to me
154c
τότε ἐκεῖνος ἐμοὶ θαυμαστὸς ἐφάνη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος, οἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐρᾶν ἔμοιγε ἐδόκουν αὐτοῦ— οὕτως ἐκπεπληγμένοι τε καὶ τεθορυβημένοι ἦσαν, ἡνίκ' εἰσῄει—πολλοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄπισθεν εἵποντο. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἧττον θαυμαστὸν ἦν: ἀλλ' ἐγὼ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος' ἔβλεπεν αὐτῶν, οὐδ' ὅστις σμικρότατος ἦν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὥσπερ ἄγαλμα ἐθεῶντο αὐτόν. καὶ ὁ
154c
a marvel of stature and beauty; and all the rest, to my thinking, were in love with him, such was their astonishment and confusion when he came in, and a number of other lovers were following in his train. On the part of men like us it was not so surprising; but when I came to observe the boys I noticed that none of them, not even the smallest, had eyes for anything else, but that
154d
Χαιρεφῶν καλέσας με, τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος;


ὑπερφυῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.


οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφη, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἀποδῦναι, δόξει σοι ἀπρόσωπος εἶναι: οὕτως τὸ εἶδος πάγκαλός ἐστιν.


συνέφασαν οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα τῷ Χαιρεφῶντι: κἀγώ, Ἡράκλεις, ἔφην, ὡς ἄμαχον λέγετε τὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ ἔτι αὐτῷ ἓν δὴ μόνον τυγχάνει προσὸν σμικρόν τι.


τί; ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας.
154d
they all gazed at him as if he were a statue. Then Chaerephon called me and said—How does the youth strike you, Socrates? Has he not a fine face?


Immensely so, I replied.


Yet if he would consent to strip, he said, you would think he had no face, he has such perfect beauty of form.


And these words of Chaerephon were repeated by the rest. Then,—By Heracles! I said, what an irresistible person you make him out to be, if he has but one more thing—a little thing—besides.


What? said Critias.
154e
εἰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυγχάνει εὖ πεφυκώς. πρέπει δέ που, ὦ Κριτία, τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν εἶναι τῆς γε ὑμετέρας ὄντα οἰκίας.


ἀλλ', ἔφη, πάνυ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός ἐστιν καὶ ταῦτα.


τί οὖν, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀπεδύσαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα πρότερον τοῦ εἴδους; πάντως γάρ που τηλικοῦτος ὢν ἤδη ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι.


καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ἐπεί τοι καὶ ἔστιν φιλόσοφός
154e
If in his soul, I replied, he is of good grain. And I should think, Critias, he ought to be, since he is of your house.


Ah, he said, he is right fair and good in that way also.


Why then, I said, let us strip that very part of him and view it first, instead of his form; for anyhow, at that age, I am sure he is quite ready to have a discussion.


Very much so, said Critias; for, I may say, he is in fact
155a
τε καί, ὡς δοκεῖ ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ, πάνυ ποιητικός.


τοῦτο μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Κριτία, πόρρωθεν ὑμῖν τὸ καλὸν ὑπάρχει ἀπὸ τῆς Σόλωνος συγγενείας. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπέδειξάς μοι τὸν νεανίαν καλέσας δεῦρο; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν που εἰ ἔτι ἐτύγχανε νεώτερος ὤν, αἰσχρὸν ἂν ἦν αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμῖν ἐναντίον γε σοῦ, ἐπιτρόπου τε ἅμα καὶ ἀνεψιοῦ ὄντος.


ἀλλὰ καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, καὶ καλοῦμεν αὐτόν. καὶ
155a
a philosopher, and also—as others besides himself consider—quite a poet.


That, my dear Critias, I said, is a gift which your family has had a long while back, through your kinship with Solon. But why not call the young man here and show him to me? For surely, even if he were younger still, there could be no discredit in our having a talk with him before you, who are at once his guardian and his cousin.


You are quite right he said, and we will call him.
155b
ἅμα πρὸς τὸν ἀκόλουθον, Παῖ, ἔφη, κάλει Χαρμίδην, εἰπὼν ὅτι βούλομαι αὐτὸν ἰατρῷ συστῆσαι περὶ τῆς ἀσθενείας ἧς πρῴην πρός με ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀσθενοῖ. πρὸς οὖν ἐμὲ ὁ Κριτίας, Ἔναγχός τοι ἔφη βαρύνεσθαί τι τὴν κεφαλὴν ἕωθεν ἀνιστάμενος: ἀλλὰ τί σε κωλύει προσποιήσασθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαί τι κεφαλῆς φάρμακον;


οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ: μόνον ἐλθέτω.


ἀλλ' ἥξει, ἔφη.


ὃ οὖν καὶ ἐγένετο. ἧκε γάρ, καὶ ἐποίησε γέλωτα
155b
Thereupon he said to his attendant,—Boy, call Charmides; tell him I want him to see a doctor about the ailment with which he told me he was troubled yesterday. Then, turning to me,—You know, he has spoken lately of having a headache, said Critias, on getting up in the morning: now why should you not represent to him that you know a cure for headache?


Why not? I said: only he must come.


Oh, he will be here, he said.


And so it was; for he came, and caused much laughter, because each of us who were seated
155c
πολύν: ἕκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν τῶν καθημένων συγχωρῶν τὸν πλησίον ἐώθει σπουδῇ, ἵνα παρ' αὑτῷ καθέζοιτο, ἕως τῶν ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ καθημένων τὸν μὲν ἀνεστήσαμεν, τὸν δὲ πλάγιον κατεβάλομεν. ὁ δ' ἐλθὼν μεταξὺ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Κριτίου ἐκαθέζετο. ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε, ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠπόρουν, καί μου ἡ πρόσθεν θρασύτης ἐξεκέκοπτο, ἣν εἶχον ἐγὼ ὡς πάνυ ῥᾳδίως αὐτῷ διαλεξόμενος: ἐπειδὴ δέ, φράσαντος τοῦ Κριτίου ὅτι ἐγὼ εἴην ὁ τὸ φάρμακον ἐπιστάμενος, ἐνέβλεψέν τέ μοι
155c
made room for him by pushing hard at his neighbor so as to have him sitting beside himself, until at either end of the seat one had to stand up, and we tumbled the other off sideways; and he came and sat down between me and Critias. But here, my friend, I began to feel perplexed, and my former confidence in looking forward to a quite easy time in talking with him had been knocked out of me. And when, on Critias telling him that it was I who knew the cure,
155d
τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμήχανόν τι οἷον καὶ ἀνήγετο ὡς ἐρωτήσων, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ παλαίστρᾳ ἅπαντες περιέρρεον ἡμᾶς κύκλῳ κομιδῇ, τότε δή, ὦ γεννάδα, εἶδόν τε τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἱματίου καὶ ἐφλεγόμην καὶ οὐκέτ' ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν καὶ ἐνόμισα σοφώτατον εἶναι τὸν Κυδίαν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὃς εἶπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων παιδός, ἄλλῳ ὑποτιθέμενος, εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ κατέναντα λέοντος νεβρὸν ἐλθόντα μοῖραν αἱρεῖσθαι
155d
he gave me such a look with his eyes as passes description, and was just about to plunge into a question, and when all the people in the wrestling-school surged round about us on every side—then, ah then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught fire, and could possess myself no longer; and I thought none was so wise in love-matters as Cydias,
who in speaking of a beautiful boy recommends someone to “beware of coming as a fawn before the lion, and being seized as his portion of flesh”; for I too felt
155e
κρεῶν: αὐτὸς γάρ μοι ἐδόκουν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου θρέμματος ἑαλωκέναι. ὅμως δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐρωτήσαντος εἰ ἐπισταίμην τὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον, μόγις πως ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι ἐπισταίμην.


τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐστίν;


καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι αὐτὸ μὲν εἴη φύλλον τι, ἐπῳδὴ δέ τις ἐπὶ τῷ φαρμάκῳ εἴη, ἣν εἰ μέν τις ἐπᾴδοι ἅμα καὶ χρῷτο αὐτῷ, παντάπασιν ὑγιᾶ ποιοῖ τὸ φάρμακον: ἄνευ δὲ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἴη τοῦ φύλλου.
155e
I had fallen a prey to some such creature. However, when he had asked me if I knew the cure for headache, I somehow contrived to answer that I knew.


Then what is it? he asked.


So I told him that the thing itself was a certain leaf, but there was a charm to go with the remedy; and if one uttered the charm at the moment of its application, the remedy made one perfectly well; but without the charm there was no efficacy in the leaf.
156a
καὶ ὅς, Ἀπογράψομαι τοίνυν, ἔφη, παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ἐπῳδήν.


πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐάν με πείθῃς ἢ κἂν μή;


γελάσας οὖν, ἐάν σε πείθω, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.


εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ: καὶ τοὔνομά μου σὺ ἀκριβοῖς;


εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε, ἔφη: οὐ γάρ τι σοῦ ὀλίγος λόγος ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἡλικιώταις, μέμνημαι δὲ ἔγωγε καὶ παῖς ὢν Κριτίᾳ τῷδε συνόντα σε.


καλῶς γε σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιῶν: μᾶλλον γάρ σοι παρρησιάσομαι
156a
Then I will take down the charm, said he, from you in writing.


Do you prefer, I asked, to get my consent first, or to do without it?


This made him laugh, and he said: To get your consent, Socrates.


Very well, I said; and are you certain of my name?


Unless I misjudge, he replied; for there is no little talk of you. among the set of our age, and I remember as a mere child the sight of you in company with Critias here.


That is a good thing, I said: for I shall speak more freely to you
156b
περὶ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς οἵα τυγχάνει οὖσα: ἄρτι δ' ἠπόρουν τίνι τρόπῳ σοι ἐνδειξαίμην τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς. ἔστι γάρ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, τοιαύτη οἵα μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἴσως ἤδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοῖς προσέλθῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσί που ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλλοι
156b
about the charm, and its real nature; just now I was at a loss for the way to apprise you of its power. For it is of such a nature, Charmides, that it cannot cure the head alone; I daresay you have yourself sometimes heard good doctors say, you know, when a patient comes to them with a pain in his eyes, that it is not possible for them to attempt a cure of his eyes alone, but that it is necessary to treat his head too at the same time,
156c
καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εὖ ἔχειν: καὶ αὖ τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἴεσθαι ἄν ποτε θεραπεῦσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἄνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι. ἐκ δὴ τούτου τοῦ λόγου διαίταις ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσιν θεραπεύειν τε καὶ ἰᾶσθαι: ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως λέγουσίν τε καὶ ἔχει;


πάνυ γε, ἔφη.


οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι καὶ ἀποδέχῃ τὸν λόγον;


πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη.
156c
if he is to have his eyes in good order; and so again, that to expect ever to treat the head by itself, apart from the body as a whole, is utter folly. And on this principle they apply their regimen to the whole body, and attempt to treat and heal the part along with the whole; or have you not observed that this is what they say, and is done in fact?


Certainly I have, he said.


And you consider it well said, and accept the principle?


Most assuredly, he said.
156d
κἀγὼ ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ ἐπαινέσαντος ἀνεθάρρησά τε, καί μοι κατὰ σμικρὸν πάλιν ἡ θρασύτης συνηγείρετο, καὶ ἀνεζωπυρούμην. καὶ εἶπον: τοιοῦτον τοίνυν ἐστίν, ὦ Χαρμίδη, καὶ τὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐπῳδῆς. ἔμαθον δ' αὐτὴν ἐγὼ ἐκεῖ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς παρά τινος τῶν Θρᾳκῶν τῶν Ζαλμόξιδος ἰατρῶν, οἳ λέγονται καὶ ἀπαθανατίζειν. ἔλεγεν δὲ ὁ Θρᾲξ οὗτος ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν [ἰατροὶ] οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, καλῶς λέγοιεν: ἀλλὰ Ζάλμοξις, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ ἡμέτερος βασιλεύς, θεὸς ὤν,
156d
Then I, on hearing his approval, regained my courage; and little by little I began to muster up my confidence again, and my spirit began to rekindle. So I said,—Such, then, Charmides, is the nature of this charm. I learnt it on campaign over there, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zalmoxis,
who are said even to make one immortal. This Thracian said that the Greeks were right in advising as I told you just now: “but Zalmoxis,” he said,
156e
ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἄνευ κεφαλῆς οὐ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἰᾶσθαι οὐδὲ κεφαλὴν ἄνευ σώματος, οὕτως οὐδὲ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἴη τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἰατροὺς τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, ὅτι τοῦ ὅλου ἀμελοῖεν οὗ δέοι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, οὗ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀδύνατον εἴη τὸ μέρος εὖ ἔχειν. πάντα γὰρ ἔφη ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡρμῆσθαι καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῷ σώματι καὶ παντὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιρρεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ
156e
“our king, who is a god, says that as you ought not to attempt to cure eyes without head, or head without body, so you should not treat body without soul”; and this was the reason why most maladies evaded the physicians of Greece—that they neglected the whole, on which they ought to spend their pains, for if this were out of order it was impossible for the part to be in order. For all that was good and evil, he said, in the body and in man altogether was sprung from the soul, and flowed along from thence as it did
157a
τὰ ὄμματα: δεῖν οὖν ἐκεῖνο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλλει καὶ τὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος καλῶς ἔχειν. θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφη, ὦ μακάριε, ἐπῳδαῖς τισιν, τὰς δ' ἐπῳδὰς ταύτας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλούς: ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης ῥᾴδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ
157a
from the head into the eyes. Wherefore that part was to be treated first and foremost, if all was to be well with the head and the rest of the body. And the treatment of the soul, so he said, my wonderful friend, is by means of certain charms, and these charms are words of the right sort: by the use of such words is temperance engendered in our souls, and as soon as it is engendered and present we may easily secure health to the head and to the rest of the body also.
157b
σώματι πορίζειν. διδάσκων οὖν με τό τε φάρμακον καὶ τὰς ἐπῳδάς, “ὅπως,” ἔφη, “τῷ φαρμάκῳ τούτῳ μηδείς σε πείσει τὴν αὑτοῦ κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, ὃς ἂν μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν πρῶτον παράσχῃ τῇ ἐπῳδῇ ὑπὸ σοῦ θεραπευθῆναι. καὶ γὰρ νῦν,” ἔφη, “τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ ἁμάρτημα περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι χωρὶς ἑκατέρου, σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ὑγιείας, ἰατροί τινες ἐπιχειροῦσιν εἶναι:” καί μοι πάνυ σφόδρα ἐνετέλλετο μήτε πλούσιον οὕτω μηδένα εἶναι μήτε γενναῖον μήτε καλόν, ὃς
157b
Now in teaching me the remedy and the charms he remarked,—” Let nobody persuade you to treat his head with this remedy, unless he has first submitted his soul for you to treat with the charm. For at present,” he said, “the cure of mankind is beset with the error of certain doctors who attempt to practise the one method without the other.” And he most particularly enjoined on me not to let anyone, however wealthy or noble or handsome,
157c
ἐμὲ πείσει ἄλλως ποιεῖν. ἐγὼ οὖν—ὀμώμοκα γὰρ αὐτῷ, καί μοι ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι—πείσομαι οὖν, καὶ σοί, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ξένου ἐντολὰς τὴν ψυχὴν πρῶτον παρασχεῖν ἐπᾷσαι ταῖς τοῦ Θρᾳκὸς ἐπῳδαῖς, προσοίσω τὸ φάρμακον τῇ κεφαλῇ: εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὅτι ποιοῖμέν σοι, ὦ φίλε Χαρμίδη.


ἀκούσας οὖν μου ὁ Κριτίας ταῦτ' εἰπόντος, Ἕρμαιον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη ἡ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἀσθένεια τῷ νεανίσκῳ, εἰ ἀναγκασθήσεται καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν διὰ τὴν
157c
induce me to disobey him. So I, since I have given him my oath, and must obey him, will do as he bids; and if you agree to submit your soul first to the effect of the Thracian charms, according to the stranger's injunctions, I will apply the remedy to your head: otherwise we shall be at a loss what to do with you, my dear Charmides.


Then Critias, when he heard me say this, remarked,—This affection of the head, Socrates, will turn out to be a stroke of luck for the young man, if he is to be compelled
157d
κεφαλὴν βελτίων γενέσθαι. λέγω μέντοι σοι ὅτι Χαρμίδης τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν οὐ μόνον τῇ ἰδέᾳ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, οὗ σὺ φῂς τὴν ἐπῳδὴν ἔχειν: φῂς δὲ σωφροσύνης: ἦ γάρ;


πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.


εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι πάνυ πολὺ δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος εἶναι τῶν νυνί, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, εἰς ὅσον ἡλικίας ἥκει, οὐδενὸς χείρων ὤν.


καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δίκαιον, ὦ Χαρμίδη, διαφέρειν σε
157d
on account of his head to improve his understanding also. However, let me tell you, Charmides is considered to excel his comrades not only in appearance, but also in that very thing which you say is produced by your charm: temperance, you say it is, do you not?


Certainly, I replied.


Then be assured, he said, that he is considered to be far and away the most temperate person now alive, while in every other respect, for a youth of his age, he is second to none.


Why, yes, I said, and it is only right, Charmides, that you should excel the rest in all these respects; for
157e
τῶν ἄλλων πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις: οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐνθάδε ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἔχειν ἐπιδεῖξαι ποῖαι δύο οἰκίαι συνελθοῦσαι εἰς ταὐτὸν τῶν Ἀθήνησιν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων καλλίω ἂν καὶ ἀμείνω γεννήσειαν ἢ ἐξ ὧν σὺ γέγονας. ἥ τε γὰρ πατρῴα ὑμῖν οἰκία, ἡ Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου, καὶ ὑπὸ Ἀνακρέοντος καὶ ὑπὸ Σόλωνος καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πολλῶν ποιητῶν ἐγκεκωμιασμένη παραδέδοται ἡμῖν, ὡς διαφέρουσα κάλλει τε
157e
I do not suppose there is anyone else here who could readily point to a case of any two Athenian houses uniting together which would be likely to produce handsomer or nobler offspring than those from which you are sprung. For your father's house, which comes from Critias, son of Dropides, has been celebrated by Anacreon and Solon and many other poets, so that it is famed by tradition among us as preeminent in beauty and virtue
158a
καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ λεγομένῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, καὶ αὖ ἡ πρὸς μητρὸς ὡσαύτως: Πυριλάμπους γὰρ τοῦ σοῦ θείου οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ λέγεται καλλίων καὶ μείζων ἀνὴρ δόξαι εἶναι, ὁσάκις ἐκεῖνος ἢ παρὰ μέγαν βασιλέα ἢ παρὰ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ πρεσβεύων ἀφίκετο, σύμπασα δὲ αὕτη ἡ οἰκία οὐδὲν τῆς ἑτέρας ὑποδεεστέρα. ἐκ δὴ τοιούτων γεγονότα εἰκός σε εἰς πάντα πρῶτον εἶναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὁρώμενα τῆς
158a
and all else that is accounted happiness; and then, your mother's house is famous in the same way, for of Pyrilampes, your uncle, it is said that no one in all the continent was considered to be his superior in beauty or stature, whenever he came as envoy to the great king or anyone else in Asia, and his house as a whole is no whit inferior to the other. Sprung from such people, it is to be supposed that you would be first in all things. And indeed,
158b
ἰδέας, ὦ φίλε παῖ Γλαύκωνος, δοκεῖς μοι οὐδένα τῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑποβεβηκέναι: εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα κατὰ τὸν τοῦδε λόγον ἱκανῶς πέφυκας, μακάριόν σε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Χαρμίδη, ἡ μήτηρ ἔτικτεν. ἔχει δ' οὖν οὕτως. εἰ μέν σοι ἤδη πάρεστιν, ὡς λέγει Κριτίας ὅδε, σωφροσύνη καὶ εἶ σώφρων ἱκανῶς, οὐδὲν ἔτι σοι ἔδει οὔτε τῶν Ζαλμόξιδος οὔτε τῶν Ἀβάριδος τοῦ Ὑπερβορέου ἐπῳδῶν, ἀλλ' αὐτό σοι ἂν ἤδη δοτέον εἴη τὸ
158b
as regards your visible form, dear son of Glaucon, I consider that nowhere have you fallen behind any of your ancestors. But if your nature is really rich in temperance and those other things, as our friend here says, blessed is the son, dear Charmides, I exclaimed, that your mother has borne in you! However, the case stands thus: if you already possess temperance, as Critias here declares, and you are sufficiently temperate, then you never had any need of the charms of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean,
158c
τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον: εἰ δ' ἔτι τούτων ἐπιδεὴς εἶναι δοκεῖς, ἐπᾳστέον πρὸ τῆς τοῦ φαρμάκου δόσεως. αὐτὸς οὖν μοι εἰπὲ πότερον ὁμολογεῖς τῷδε καὶ φῂς ἱκανῶς ἤδη σωφροσύνης μετέχειν ἢ ἐνδεὴς εἶναι;


ἀνερυθριάσας οὖν ὁ Χαρμίδης πρῶτον μὲν ἔτι καλλίων ἐφάνη—καὶ γὰρ τὸ αἰσχυντηλὸν αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἔπρεψεν— ἔπειτα καὶ οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ἀπεκρίνατο: εἶπεν γὰρ ὅτι οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴη ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὔθ' ὁμολογεῖν οὔτε ἐξάρνῳ εἶναι τὰ
158c
and might well be given at once the remedy for the head; but if you prove to be still lacking that virtue, we must apply the charm before the remedy. So tell me yourself whether you agree with our friend, and can say that you are already sufficiently provided with temperance, or are deficient in it?


At this Charmides blushed and, for one thing, looked more beautiful then ever, for his modesty became his years; and then, too, he answered most ingenuously, saying it was no easy matter at the moment either to admit or to deny the words of the question. For if,
158d
ἐρωτώμενα. ἐὰν μὲν γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, μὴ φῶ εἶναι σώφρων, ἅμα μὲν ἄτοπον αὐτὸν καθ' ἑαυτοῦ τοιαῦτα λέγειν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ Κριτίαν τόνδε ψευδῆ ἐπιδείξω καὶ ἄλλους πολλούς, οἷς δοκῶ εἶναι σώφρων, ὡς ὁ τούτου λόγος: ἐὰν δ' αὖ φῶ καὶ ἐμαυτὸν ἐπαινῶ, ἴσως ἐπαχθὲς φανεῖται. ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι.


καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι μοι εἰκότα φαίνῃ λέγειν, ὦ Χαρμίδη. καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῇ ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον εἴτε κέκτησαι
158d
he went on, I say I am not temperate, not only is it a strange thing to say against oneself, but I shall at the same time be taxing with untruth both Critias and many others who consider me to be temperate, as he gives out; while if, on the other hand, I say I am, and praise myself, it will probably be found distasteful; so that I cannot see what answer I am to give you.


Then I said: Your answer is a natural one, in my opinion, Charmides; and I think, I went on, that we must join in inquiring whether you possess the thing I am asking after, or not, in order that
158e
εἴτε μὴ ὃ πυνθάνομαι, ἵνα μήτε σὺ ἀναγκάζῃ λέγειν ἃ μὴ βούλει, μήτ' αὖ ἐγὼ ἀσκέπτως ἐπὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν τρέπωμαι. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, ἐθέλω σκοπεῖν μετὰ σοῦ: εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν.


ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη, φίλον: ὥστε τούτου γε ἕνεκα, ὅπῃ αὐτὸς οἴει βέλτιον σκέψασθαι, ταύτῃ σκόπει.


τῇδε τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, δοκεῖ μοι βελτίστη εἶναι ἡ σκέψις περὶ αὐτοῦ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἴ σοι πάρεστιν σωφροσύνη,
158e
neither you may be forced to say what you do not wish, nor I on my part may recklessly try my hand at medicine. So if it is agreeable to you, I am ready to inquire with you; but, if it is not, to let it alone.


Why, nothing, he said, could be more agreeable to me : so far as that goes, therefore, inquire in whatever way you think we had better proceed.


Then this is the way, I said, in which I consider that our inquiry into this matter had best be conducted. Now, it is clear that, if you
159a
ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γάρ που ἐνοῦσαν αὐτήν, εἴπερ ἔνεστιν, αἴσθησίν τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἧς δόξα ἄν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη: ἢ οὐκ οἴει;


ἔγωγε, ἔφη, οἶμαι.


οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε, ἔφην, ὃ οἴει, ἐπειδήπερ ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασαι, κἂν εἴποις δήπου αὐτὸ ὅτι σοι φαίνεται;


ἴσως, ἔφη.


ἵνα τοίνυν τοπάσωμεν εἴτε σοι ἔνεστιν εἴτε μή, εἰπέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί φῂς εἶναι σωφροσύνην κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν.
159a
have temperance with you, you can hold an opinion about it. For being in you, I presume it must, in that case, afford some perception from which you can form some opinion of what temperance is, and what kind of thing it is : do you not think so ?


I do, he replied.


And since you understand the Greek tongue, I said, you can tell me, I suppose, your view of this particular thought of yours?


I daresay, he said.


Then in order that we may make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me, I said, what you say of temperance according to your opinion.
159b
καὶ ὃς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤκνει τε καὶ οὐ πάνυ ἤθελεν ἀποκρίνασθαι: ἔπειτα μέντοι εἶπεν ὅτι οἷ δοκοῖ σωφροσύνη εἶναι τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, ἔν τε ταῖς ὁδοῖς βαδίζειν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως ποιεῖν. καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, συλλήβδην ἡσυχιότης τις εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτᾷς.


ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὖ λέγεις; φασί γέ τοι, ὦ Χαρμίδη, τοὺς ἡσυχίους σώφρονας εἶναι: ἴδωμεν δὴ εἴ τι λέγουσιν.
159b
He at first hung back, and was not at all willing to answer: but presently he said that, to his mind, temperance was doing everything orderly and quietly—walking in the streets, talking, and doing everything else of that kind; and in a word, he said, I think the thing about which you ask may be called quietness.


Well, I said, are you right there? They do say, you know, Charmides, that quiet people are temperate : so let us see if there is anything in what they say. Tell me, is not temperance,
159c
εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, οὐ τῶν καλῶν μέντοι ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστίν;


πάνυ γε, ἔφη.


πότερον οὖν κάλλιστον ἐν γραμματιστοῦ τὰ ὅμοια γράμματα γράφειν ταχὺ ἢ ἡσυχῇ;


ταχύ.


τί δ' ἀναγιγνώσκειν; ταχέως ἢ βραδέως;


ταχέως.


καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ κιθαρίζειν ταχέως καὶ τὸ παλαίειν ὀξέως πολὺ κάλλιον τοῦ ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως;


ναί.


τί δὲ πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν; οὐχ ὡσαύτως;


πάνυ γε.


θεῖν δὲ καὶ ἅλλεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἅπαντα ἔργα,
159c
however, among the honorable things?


To be sure, he said.


Well, which is most honorable at the writing master's, to write the same sort of letters quickly or quietly?


Quickly.


And in reading, to do it quickly or slowly?


Quickly.


And so, in the same way, to play the lyre quickly, or to wrestle nimbly, is far more honorable than to do it quietly and slowly?


Yes.


And what of boxing, alone or combined with wrestling? Is it not the same there too?


To be sure.


And in running and leaping and all activities
159d
οὐ τὰ μὲν ὀξέως καὶ ταχὺ γιγνόμενα τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐστιν, τὰ δὲ [βραδέα] μόγις τε καὶ ἡσυχῇ τὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ;


φαίνεται.


φαίνεται ἄρα ἡμῖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, κατά γε τὸ σῶμα οὐ τὸ ἡσύχιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τάχιστον καὶ ὀξύτατον κάλλιστον ὄν. ἦ γάρ;


πάνυ γε.


ἡ δέ γε σωφροσύνη καλόν τι ἦν;


ναί.


οὐ τοίνυν κατά γε τὸ σῶμα ἡ ἡσυχιότης ἂν ἀλλ' ἡ ταχυτὴς σωφρονέστερον εἴη, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη.


ἔοικεν, ἔφη.
159d
of the body, are not nimble and quick movements accounted honorable, while sluggish and quiet ones are deemed disgraceful?


Apparently.


So we find, I said, that in the body, at least, it is not quietness, but the greatest quickness and nimbleness that is most honorable, do we not?


Certainly.


And temperance was an honorable thing?


Yes.


Then in the body, at least, it is not quietness but quickness that will be the more temperate thing, since temperance is honorable.


So it seems, he said.
159e
τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐμαθία κάλλιον ἢ δυσμαθία;


εὐμαθία.


ἔστιν δέ γ', ἔφην, ἡ μὲν εὐμαθία ταχέως μανθάνειν, ἡ δὲ δυσμαθία ἡσυχῇ καὶ βραδέως;


ναί.


διδάσκειν δὲ ἄλλον οὐ ταχέως [καὶ] κάλλιον καὶ σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως;


ναί.


τί δέ; ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι καὶ μεμνῆσθαι ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως κάλλιον ἢ σφόδρα καὶ ταχέως;


σφόδρ', ἔφη, καὶ ταχέως.
159e
Well now, I went on; in learning, is facility the more honorable, or difficulty?


Facility.


And facility in learning, I said, is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?


Yes.


And is it not more honorable to teach another quickly and forcibly, rather than quietly and slowly?


Yes.


Well now, is it more honorable to be reminded and to remember quietly and slowly, or forcibly and quickly?


Forcibly, he replied, and quickly.
160a
ἡ δ' ἀγχίνοια οὐχὶ ὀξύτης τίς ἐστιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἡσυχία;


ἀληθῆ.


οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ συνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἐν γραμματιστοῦ καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ ἄλλοθι πανταχοῦ, οὐχ ὡς ἡσυχαίτατα ἀλλ' ὡς τάχιστά ἐστι κάλλιστα;


ναί.


ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς ζητήσεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῷ βουλεύεσθαι οὐχ ὁ ἡσυχιώτατος, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, καὶ μόγις βουλευόμενός τε καὶ ἀνευρίσκων ἐπαίνου δοκεῖ ἄξιος εἶναι,
160a
And is not readiness of mind a sort of nimbleness of the soul, not a quietness?


True.


And to apprehend what is said, whether at the writing-master's or the lyre-master's or anywhere else, not as quietly as possible, but as quickly, is most honorable?


Yes.


Well, and in the searchings of the soul, and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, or he who deliberates and discovers with difficulty, that is held worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and quickly.
160b
ἀλλ' ὁ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ τάχιστα τοῦτο δρῶν.


ἔστιν ταῦτα, ἔφη.


οὐκοῦν πάντα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, τὰ τοῦ τάχους τε καὶ τῆς ὀξύτητος καλλίω φαίνεται ἢ τὰ τῆς βραδυτῆτός τε καὶ ἡσυχιότητος;


κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.


οὐκ ἄρα ἡσυχιότης τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, οὐδ' ἡσύχιος ὁ σώφρων βίος, ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν αὐτὸν δεῖ εἶναι σώφρονα ὄντα. δυοῖν γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἕτερα: ἢ οὐδαμοῦ
160b
That is so, he said.


Then in all, I said, Charmides, that concerns either our soul or our body, actions of quickness and nimbleness are found to be more honorable than those of slowness and quietness?


It looks like it, he said.


So temperance cannot be a sort of quietness, nor can the temperate life be quiet, by this argument at least; since, being temperate, it must be honorable.
160c
ἡμῖν ἢ πάνυ που ὀλιγαχοῦ αἱ ἡσύχιοι πράξεις ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλλίους ἐφάνησαν ἢ αἱ ταχεῖαί τε καὶ ἰσχυραί. εἰ δ' οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ἐλάττους αἱ ἡσύχιοι τῶν σφοδρῶν τε καὶ ταχειῶν πράξεων τυγχάνουσιν καλλίους οὖσαι, οὐδὲ ταύτῃ σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη μᾶλλόν τι τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχέως, οὔτε ἐν βαδισμῷ οὔτε ἐν λέξει οὔτε ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ, οὐδὲ ὁ ἡσύχιος βίος [κόσμιοσ] τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχίου
160c
For we have these two alternatives: either in no cases, or I should think in very few, can we find that the quiet actions in life are more honorable than the quick and vigorous ones; or at all events, my friend, if of the more honorable actions there are absolutely as many quiet ones as forcible and quick, not even so will temperance be acting quietly any more than acting forcibly and quickly, either in walking or in talking or in any other sphere; nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet; since
160d
σωφρονέστερος ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν τι ἡμῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη ὑπετέθη, καλὰ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον <τὰ> ταχέα τῶν ἡσυχίων πέφανται.


ὀρθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρηκέναι.


πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, μᾶλλον προσέχων τὸν νοῦν καὶ εἰς σεαυτὸν ἐμβλέψας, ἐννοήσας ὁποῖόν τινά σε ποιεῖ ἡ σωφροσύνη παροῦσα καὶ ποία τις οὖσα τοιοῦτον ἀπεργάζοιτο ἄν, πάντα ταῦτα συλλογισάμενος εἰπὲ εὖ καὶ
160d
in our argument we assumed that temperance is an honorable thing, and have found that quick things are just as honorable as quiet things.


Your statement, he said, Socrates, seems to me to be correct.


Once more then, I went on, Charmides, attend more closely and look into yourself; reflect on the quality that is given you by the presence of temperance, and what quality it must have to work this effect on you. Take stock of all this and tell me, like a good, brave fellow, what it appears to you to be.
160e
ἀνδρείως τί σοι φαίνεται εἶναι;


καὶ ὃς ἐπισχὼν καὶ πάνυ ἀνδρικῶς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διασκεψάμενος, δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ αἰσχυντηλὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰδὼς ἡ σωφροσύνη.


εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ καλὸν ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις τὴν σωφροσύνην εἶναι;


πάνυ γ', ἔφη.


οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οἱ σώφρονες;


ναί.


ἆρ' οὖν ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν ὃ μὴ ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται;


οὐ δῆτα.


οὐ μόνον οὖν ἄρα καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.
160e
He paused a little, and after a quite manly effort of self-examination: Well, I think, he said, that temperance makes men ashamed or bashful, and that temperance is the same as modesty.


Well now, I asked, did you not admit a moment ago that temperance is honorable?


Certainly I did, he said.


And temperate men are also good?


Yes.


Well, can that be good which does not produce good men?


No, indeed.


And we conclude that it is not only honorable, but good also.
161a
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.


τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ: Ὁμήρῳ οὐ πιστεύεις καλῶς λέγειν, λέγοντι ὅτι “αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι;”


ἔγωγ', ἔφη.


ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἰδὼς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.


φαίνεται.


σωφροσύνη δέ γε ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ οἷς ἂν παρῇ, κακοὺς δὲ μή.


ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις.


οὐκ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη αἰδώς, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν
161a
I think so.


Well then, I said, are you not convinced that Homer is right in saying— “Modesty, no good mate for a needy man?”


I am, he said.


Then it would seem that modesty is not good, and good.


Apparently.


But temperance is good, if its presence makes men good, and not bad.


It certainly seems to me to be as you say.


So temperance cannot be modesty, if it
161b
τυγχάνει ὄν, αἰδὼς δὲ [μὴ] οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ κακόν.


ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι: τόδε δὲ σκέψαι τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι περὶ σωφροσύνης. ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνεμνήσθην—ὃ ἤδη του ἤκουσα λέγοντος— ὅτι σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. σκόπει οὖν τοῦτο εἰ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ λέγων.


καὶ ἐγώ, ὦ μιαρέ, ἔφην, Κριτίου τοῦδε ἀκήκοας αὐτὸ ἢ
161b
is in fact good, while modesty is no more good than evil.


Why, I think, he said, Socrates, that is correctly stated; but there is another view of temperance on which I would like to have your opinion. I remembered just now what I once heard someone say, that temperance might be doing one's own business. I ask you, then, do you think he is right in saying this?


You rascal, I said, you have heard it from Critias here,
161c
ἄλλου του τῶν σοφῶν.


ἔοικεν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ἄλλου: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοῦ γε.


ἀλλὰ τί διαφέρει, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁ Χαρμίδης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτου ἤκουσα;


οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ: πάντως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ὅστις αὐτὸ εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀληθὲς λέγεται ἢ οὔ.


νῦν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἦ δ' ὅς.


νὴ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ εὑρήσομεν αὐτὸ ὅπῃ γε ἔχει, θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν: αἰνίγματι γάρ τινι ἔοικεν.


ὅτι δὴ τί γε; ἔφη.
161c
or some other of our wise men!


Seemingly, said Critias, from some other; for indeed he did not from me.


But what does it matter, Socrates, said Charmides, from whom I heard it?


Not at all, I replied; for in any case we have not to consider who said it, but whether it is a true saying or no.


Now you speak rightly, he said.


Yes, on my word, I said: but I shall be surprised if we can find out how it stands; for it looks like a kind of riddle.


Why so? he asked.


Because, I replied, presumably the speaker of the words
161d
ὅτι οὐ δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾗ τὰ ῥήματα ἐφθέγξατο ταύτῃ καὶ ἐνόει, λέγων σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. ἢ σὺ οὐδὲν ἡγῇ πράττειν τὸν γραμματιστὴν ὅταν γράφῃ ἢ ἀναγιγνώσκῃ;


ἔγωγε, ἡγοῦμαι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.


δοκεῖ οὖν σοι τὸ αὑτοῦ ὄνομα μόνον γράφειν ὁ γραμματιστὴς καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν ἢ ὑμᾶς τοὺς παῖδας διδάσκειν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἧττον τὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐγράφετε ἢ τὰ ὑμέτερα καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων ὀνόματα;


οὐδὲν ἧττον.


ἦ οὖν ἐπολυπραγμονεῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐσωφρονεῖτε τοῦτο
161d
“temperance is doing one's own business” did not mean them quite as he spoke them. Or do you consider that the scribe does nothing when he writes or reads?


I rather consider that he does something, he replied. And does the scribe, in your opinion, write and read his own name only, and teach you boys to do the same with yours? Or did you write your enemies' names just as much as your own and your friends'?


Just as much.


Well, were you meddlesome or intemperate
161e
δρῶντες;


οὐδαμῶς.


καὶ μὴν οὐ τὰ ὑμέτερά γε αὐτῶν ἐπράττετε, εἴπερ τὸ γράφειν πράττειν τί ἐστιν καὶ τὸ ἀναγιγνώσκειν.


ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστιν.


καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἰᾶσθαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ τὸ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ τὸ ὑφαίνειν καὶ τὸ ᾑτινιοῦν τέχνῃ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τέχνης ἔργων ἀπεργάζεσθαι πράττειν δήπου τί ἐστιν.


πάνυ γε.


τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ ἄν σοι πόλις εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἱμάτιον ἕκαστον ὑφαίνειν καὶ πλύνειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήκυθον καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον,
161e
in doing this?


Not at all.


And you know you were not doing your own business, if writing and reading are doing something.


Why, so they are.


And indeed medical work, my good friend, and building and weaving and producing anything whatever that is the work of any art, I presume is doing something.


Certainly.


Well then, I went on, do you think a state would be well conducted under a law which enjoined that everyone should weave and scour his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and scraper,
162a
τῶν μὲν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἅπτεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐργάζεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν;


οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς.


ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, σωφρόνως γε οἰκοῦσα εὖ ἂν οἰκοῖτο.


πῶς δ' οὔκ; ἔφη.


οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτά τε καὶ οὕτω τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη.


οὐ φαίνεται.


ἠινίττετο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὁ λέγων τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνην εἶναι: οὐ γάρ που οὕτω
162a
and everything else on the same principle of not touching the affairs of others but performing and doing his own for himself?


I think not, he replied.


But still, I said, a state whose conduct is temperate will be well conducted.


Of course, he said.


Then doing one's own business in that sense and in that way will not be temperance.


Apparently not.


So that person was riddling, it seems, just as I said a moment ago, when he said that doing one's own business is temperance. For I take it he was not such a fool as all that: or was it some idiot
162b
γε ἦν εὐήθης. ἤ τινος ἠλιθίου ἤκουσας τουτὶ λέγοντος, ὦ Χαρμίδη;


ἥκιστά γε, ἔφη, ἐπεί τοι καὶ πάνυ ἐδόκει σοφὸς εἶναι.


παντὸς τοίνυν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αἴνιγμα αὐτὸ προύβαλεν, ὡς ὂν χαλεπὸν τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν γνῶναι ὅτι ποτε ἔστιν.


ἴσως, ἔφη.


τί οὖν ἂν εἴη ποτὲ τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;


οὐκ οἶδα μὰ Δία ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς: ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐδὲν κωλύει μηδὲ τὸν λέγοντα μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὅτι ἐνόει. καὶ ἅμα ταῦτα λέγων ὑπεγέλα τε καὶ εἰς τὸν Κριτίαν ἀπέβλεπεν.
162b
that you heard saying this, Charmides?


Far from it, he replied, for indeed he seemed to be very wise.


Then it is perfectly certain, in my opinion, that he propounded it as a riddle, in view of the difficulty of understanding what “doing one's own business” can mean.


I daresay, he said.


Well, what can it mean, this “doing one's own business”? Can you tell me?


I do not know, upon my word, he replied: but I daresay it may be that not even he who said it knew in the least what he meant. And as he said this he gave a sly laugh and glanced at Critias.
162c
καὶ ὁ Κριτίας δῆλος μὲν ἦν καὶ πάλαι ἀγωνιῶν καὶ φιλοτίμως πρός τε τὸν Χαρμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἔχων, μόγις δ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν κατέχων τότε οὐχ οἷός τε ἐγένετο: δοκεῖ γάρ μοι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὃ ἐγὼ ὑπέλαβον, τοῦ Κριτίου ἀκηκοέναι τὸν Χαρμίδην ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης. ὁ μὲν οὖν Χαρμίδης βουλόμενος μὴ αὐτὸς ὑπέχειν λόγον ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον τῆς ἀποκρίσεως,
162c
Now Critias for some time had been plainly burning with anxiety to distinguish himself in the eyes of Charmides and the company, and having with difficulty restrained himself heretofore, he now could do so no longer; for I believe that what I had supposed was perfectly true—that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias. And so Charmides, wishing him to make answer
162d
ὑπεκίνει αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, καὶ ἐνεδείκνυτο ὡς ἐξεληλεγμένος εἴη: ὁ δ' οὐκ ἠνέσχετο, ἀλλά μοι ἔδοξεν ὀργισθῆναι αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ποιητὴς ὑποκριτῇ κακῶς διατιθέντι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ποιήματα. ὥστ' ἐμβλέψας αὐτῷ εἶπεν, οὕτως οἴει, ὦ Χαρμίδη, εἰ σὺ μὴ οἶσθα ὅτι ποτ' ἐνόει ὃς ἔφη σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἐκεῖνον εἰδέναι;


ἀλλ', ὦ βέλτιστε, ἔφην ἐγώ, Κριτία, τοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν
162d
instead of himself, sought to stir him up in particular, and pointed out that he himself had been refuted; but Critias rebelled against it, and seemed to me to have got angry with him, as a poet does with an actor who mishandles his verses on the stage: so he looked hard at him and said: Do you really suppose, Charmides, that if you do not know what can have been the meaning of the man who said that temperance was doing one's own business, he did not know either?


Why, my excellent Critias, I said, no wonder if our friend, at his age, cannot understand; but you,
162e
θαυμαστὸν ἀγνοεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα: σὲ δέ που εἰκὸς εἰδέναι καὶ ἡλικίας ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ οὖν συγχωρεῖς τοῦτ' εἶναι σωφροσύνην ὅπερ οὑτοσὶ λέγει καὶ παραδέχῃ τὸν λόγον, ἔγωγε πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον μετὰ σοῦ σκοποίμην εἴτ' ἀληθὲς εἴτε μὴ τὸ λεχθέν.


ἀλλὰ πάνυ συγχωρῶ, ἔφη, καὶ παραδέχομαι.


καλῶς γε σὺ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιῶν. καί μοι λέγε, ἦ καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἠρώτων ἐγὼ συγχωρεῖς, τοὺς δημιουργοὺς πάντας ποιεῖν τι;


ἔγωγε.
162e
I should think, may be expected to know, in view of your years and your studies. So if you concede that temperance is what he says, and you accept the statement, for my part I would greatly prefer to have you as partner in the inquiry as to whether this saying is true or not.


Well, I quite concede it, he said, and accept it.


That is good, then, I said. Now tell me, do you also concede what I was asking just now—that all craftsmen make something?


I do.


And do you consider that they make their own things only, or those of others also?
163a
ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι τὰ ἑαυτῶν μόνον ποιεῖν ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων;


καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων.


σωφρονοῦσιν οὖν οὐ τὰ ἑαυτῶν μόνον ποιοῦντες;


τί γὰρ κωλύει; ἔφη.


οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ: ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ ἐκεῖνον κωλύει, ὃς ὑποθέμενος σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν ἔπειτα οὐδέν φησι κωλύειν καὶ τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντας σωφρονεῖν.


ἐγὼ γάρ που, ἦ δ' ὅς, τοῦθ' ὡμολόγηκα, ὡς οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες σωφρονοῦσιν, εἰ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ὡμολόγησα.
163a
Those of others also.


And are they temperate in not making their own things only?


Yes: what reason is there against it? he said.


None for me, I replied; but there may be for him who, after assuming that temperance is doing one's own business, proceeds to say there is no reason against those also who do others' business being temperate.


And have I, pray, he said, admitted that those who do others' business are temperate? Or was my admission of those who make
things?


Tell me, I said, do you not call making and doing the same?
163b
εἰπέ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ ταὐτὸν καλεῖς τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν;


οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη: οὐδέ γε τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν. ἔμαθον γὰρ παρ' Ἡσιόδου, ὃς ἔφη ἔργον [δ'] οὐδὲν εἶναι ὄνειδος. οἴει οὖν αὐτόν, εἰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα ἐκάλει καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν, οἷα νυνδὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, οὐδενὶ ἂν ὄνειδος φάναι εἶναι σκυτοτομοῦντι ἢ ταριχοπωλοῦντι ἢ ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθημένῳ; οὐκ οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνος οἶμαι ποίησιν πράξεως καὶ ἐργασίας ἄλλο ἐνόμιζεν,
163b
No indeed, he replied, nor working and making the same either: this I learnt from Hesiod, who said, “Work is no reproach.” Now, do you suppose that if he had given the names of working and doing to such works as you were mentioning just now, he would have said there was no reproach in shoe-making or pickle-selling or serving the stews? It is not to be thought, Socrates; he rather held,
163c
καὶ ποίημα μὲν γίγνεσθαι ὄνειδος ἐνίοτε, ὅταν μὴ


1 μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ γίγνηται, ἔργον δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν ὄνειδος: τὰ γὰρ καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα ἔργα ἐκάλει, καὶ ἐργασίας τε καὶ πράξεις τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις. φάναι δέ γε χρὴ καὶ οἰκεῖα μόνα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτόν, τὰ δὲ βλαβερὰ πάντα ἀλλότρια: ὥστε καὶ Ἡσίοδον χρὴ οἴεσθαι καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις φρόνιμος τὸν τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττοντα τοῦτον σώφρονα καλεῖν.
163c
I conceive, that making was different from doing and working, and that while a thing made might be a reproach if it had no connection with the honorable, work could never be a reproach. For things honorably and usefully made he called works, and such makings he called workings and doings; and we must suppose that it was only such things as these that he called our proper concerns, but all that was harmful, the concerns of others. So that we must conclude that Hesiod, and anyone else of good sense, calls him temperate who does his own business.
163d
ὦ Κριτία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου σου σχεδὸν ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ οἰκεῖά τε καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοίης, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις πράξεις: καὶ γὰρ Προδίκου μυρία τινὰ ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιροῦντος. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι τίθεσθαι μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων δίδωμι ὅπῃ ἂν βούλῃ ἕκαστον: δήλου δὲ μόνον ἐφ' ὅτι ἂν φέρῃς τοὔνομα ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς. νῦν οὖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σαφέστερον ὅρισαι:
163d
Ah, Critias, I said, you had hardly begun, when I grasped the purport of your speech—that you called one's proper and one's own things good, and that the makings of the good you called doings; for in fact I have heard Prodicus drawing innumerable distinctions between names.
Well, I will allow you any application of a name that you please; only make clear to what thing it is that you attach such-and-such a name. So begin now over again, and define more plainly.
163e
ἆρα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν ἢ ποίησιν ἢ ὅπως σὺ βούλει ὀνομάζειν, ταύτην λέγεις σὺ σωφροσύνην εἶναι;


ἔγωγε, ἔφη.


οὐκ ἄρα σωφρονεῖ ὁ τὰ κακὰ πράττων, ἀλλ' ὁ τἀγαθά;


σοὶ δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ βέλτιστε, οὐχ οὕτω δοκεῖ;


ἔα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ: μὴ γάρ πω τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν σκοπῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὃ σὺ λέγεις νῦν.


ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἔγωγε, ἔφη, τὸν μὴ ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντα οὔ φημι σωφρονεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ μὴ κακὰ σωφρονεῖν: τὴν γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν σωφροσύνην εἶναι σαφῶς σοι διορίζομαι.
163e
Do you say that this doing or making, or whatever is the term you prefer, of good things, is temperance?


I do, he replied.


Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?


And do not you, my excellent friend, he said, think so?


Leave that aside, I said; for we have not to consider yet what I think, but what you say now.


Well, all the same, I say, he replied, that he who does evil instead of good is not temperate, whereas he who does good instead of evil is temperate : for I give you “the doing of good things is temperance” as my plain definition.
164a
καὶ οὐδέν γέ σε ἴσως κωλύει ἀληθῆ λέγειν: τόδε γε μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, θαυμάζω, εἰ σωφρονοῦντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγῇ σὺ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι σωφρονοῦσιν.


ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη.


οὐκ ὀλίγον πρότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ὅτι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ αὖ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοῦντας σωφρονεῖν;


ἐλέγετο γάρ, ἔφη: ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;


οὐδέν: ἀλλὰ λέγε εἰ δοκεῖ τίς σοι ἰατρός, ὑγιᾶ τινα
164a
And there is no reason, I daresay, why your statement should not be right; but still I wonder, I went on, whether you judge that temperate men are ignorant of their temperance.


No, I do not, he said.


A little while ago, I said, were you not saying that there was no reason why craftsmen should not be temperate in making others' things as well?


Yes, I was, he said, but what of it ?


Nothing; only tell me whether you think that a doctor, in making someone healthy,
164b
ποιῶν, ὠφέλιμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὃν ἰῷτο;


ἔμοιγε.


οὐκοῦν τὰ δέοντα πράττει ὅ γε ταῦτα πράττων;


ναί.


ὁ τὰ δέοντα πράττων οὐ σωφρονεῖ;


σωφρονεῖ μὲν οὖν.


ἦ οὖν καὶ γιγνώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἰατρῷ ὅταν τε ὠφελίμως ἰᾶται καὶ ὅταν μή; καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν δημιουργῶν ὅταν τε μέλλῃ ὀνήσεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔργου οὗ ἂν πράττῃ καὶ ὅταν μή;


ἴσως οὔ.


ἐνίοτε ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὠφελίμως πράξας ἢ βλαβερῶς ὁ
164b
makes a helpful result both for himself and for the person whom he cures.


I do.


And he who does this does his duty?


Yes.


Is not he who does his duty temperate?


Indeed he is.


Well, and must the doctor know when his medicine will be helpful, and when not? And must every craftsman know when he is likely to be benefited by the work he does, and when not?


Probably not.


Then sometimes, I went on, the doctor may have done what is helpful
164c
ἰατρὸς οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν: καίτοι ὠφελίμως πράξας, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, σωφρόνως ἔπραξεν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες;


ἔγωγε.


οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνίοτε ὠφελίμως πράξας πράττει μὲν σωφρόνως καὶ σωφρονεῖ, ἀγνοεῖ δ' ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ;


ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, ἀλλ' εἴ τι σὺ οἴει ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ὡμολογημένων εἰς τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι συμβαίνειν, ἐκείνων ἄν τι ἔγωγε
164c
or harmful without knowing the effect of his own action; and yet, in doing what was helpful, by your statement, he has done temperately. Or did you not state that?


I did.


Then it would seem that in doing what is helpful he may sometimes do temperately and be temperate, but be ignorant of his own temperance?


But that, he said, Socrates, could never be: if you think this in any way a necessary inference from my previous admissions,
164d
μᾶλλον ἀναθείμην, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθείην μὴ οὐχὶ ὀρθῶς φάναι εἰρηκέναι, μᾶλλον ἤ ποτε συγχωρήσαιμ' ἂν ἀγνοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἄνθρωπον σωφρονεῖν. σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἔγωγε αὐτὸ τοῦτό φημι εἶναι σωφροσύνην, τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν, καὶ συμφέρομαι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀναθέντι τὸ τοιοῦτον γράμμα. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακεῖσθαι, ὡς δὴ πρόσρησις οὖσα τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν εἰσιόντων ἀντὶ τοῦ χαῖρε, ὡς
164d
I would rather withdraw some of them, and not be ashamed to say my statements were wrong, than concede at any time that a man who is ignorant of himself is temperate. For I would almost say that this very thing, self-knowledge, is temperance, and I am at one with him who put up the inscription of those words at Delphi. For the purpose of that inscription on the temple, as it seems to me, is to serve as the god's salutation to those who enter it, instead of
164e
τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὀρθοῦ ὄντος τοῦ προσρήματος, τοῦ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἀλλὰ σωφρονεῖν. οὕτω μὲν δὴ ὁ θεὸς προσαγορεύει τοὺς εἰσιόντας εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν διαφέρον τι ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὡς διανοούμενος ἀνέθηκεν ὁ ἀναθείς, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ: καὶ λέγει πρὸς τὸν ἀεὶ εἰσιόντα οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ Σωφρόνει, φησίν. αἰνιγματωδέστερον δὲ δή, ὡς μάντις, λέγει: τὸ γὰρ Γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ τὸ Σωφρόνει ἔστιν
164e
“Hail!”—this is a wrong form of greeting, and they should rather exhort one another with the words, “Be temperate!” And thus the god addresses those who are entering his temple in a mode which differs from that of men; such was the intention of the dedicator of the inscription in putting it up, I believe; and that he says to each man who enters, in reality, “Be temperate !” But he says it in a rather riddling fashion, as a prophet would; for “Know thyself!” and “Be temperate!” are the same, as
165a
μὲν ταὐτόν, ὡς τὰ γράμματά φησιν καὶ ἐγώ, τάχα δ' ἄν τις οἰηθείη ἄλλο εἶναι, ὃ δή μοι δοκοῦσιν παθεῖν καὶ οἱ τὰ ὕστερον γράμματα ἀναθέντες, τό τε μηδὲν ἄγαν καὶ τὸ Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι συμβουλὴν ᾠήθησαν εἶναι τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν εἰσιόντων [ἕνεκεν] ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόσρησιν: εἶθ' ἵνα δὴ καὶ σφεῖς μηδὲν ἧττον συμβουλὰς χρησίμους ἀναθεῖεν, ταῦτα γράψαντες ἀνέθεσαν. οὗ δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα πάντα, τόδ' ἐστίν: τὰ μὲν
165a
the inscription
and I declare, though one is likely enough to think them different—an error into which I consider the dedicators of the later inscriptions fell when they put up “Nothing overmuch”
and “A pledge, and thereupon perdition.”
For they supposed that “Know thyself!” was a piece of advice, and not the god's salutation of those who were entering; and so, in order that their dedications too might equally give pieces of useful advice, they wrote these words and dedicated them. Now my object in saying all this, Socrates, is to abandon to you all the previous argument—
165b
ἔμπροσθέν σοι πάντα ἀφίημι—ἴσως μὲν γάρ τι σὺ ἔλεγες περὶ αὐτῶν ὀρθότερον, ἴσως δ' ἐγώ, σαφὲς δ' οὐδὲν πάνυ ἦν ὧν ἐλέγομεν—νῦν δ' ἐθέλω τούτου σοι διδόναι λόγον, εἰ μὴ ὁμολογεῖς σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν.


ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, σὺ μὲν ὡς φάσκοντος ἐμοῦ εἰδέναι περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶ προσφέρῃ πρός με, καὶ ἐὰν δὴ βούλωμαι, ὁμολογήσοντός σοι: τὸ δ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ γὰρ μετὰ σοῦ ἀεὶ τὸ προτιθέμενον διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς
165b
for, though perhaps it was you who were more in the right, or perhaps it was I, yet nothing at all certain emerged from our statements—and to proceed instead to satisfy you of this truth, if you do not admit it, that temperance is knowing oneself.


Why, Critias, I said, you treat me as though I professed to know the things on which I ask questions, and needed only the will to agree with you. But the fact of the matter is rather that I join you in the inquiry, each time that a proposition is made, because I myself do not know; I wish therefore to consider first,
165c
εἰδέναι. σκεψάμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν εἴτε ὁμολογῶ εἴτε μή. ἀλλ' ἐπίσχες ἕως ἂν σκέψωμαι.


σκόπει δή, ἦ δ' ὅς.


καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σκοπῶ. εἰ γὰρ δὴ γιγνώσκειν γέ τί ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἂν εἴη καὶ τινός: ἢ οὔ;


ἔστιν, ἔφη, ἑαυτοῦ γε.


οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρική, ἔφην, ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ;


πάνυ γε.


εἰ τοίνυν με, ἔφην, ἔροιο σύ: “ἰατρικὴ ὑγιεινοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὖσα τί ἡμῖν χρησίμη ἐστὶν καὶ τί ἀπεργάζεται,”
165c
before I tell you whether I agree or not. Now, give me a moment to consider.


Consider then, he said.


Yes, and I am considering, I said. For if temperance is knowing anything, obviously it must be a kind of science, and a science of something, must it not?


It is, he replied, and of itself.


And medicine, I said, is a science of health?


Certainly.


Then if you should ask me, I said, wherein medicine, as a science of health, is useful to us, and what it produces,
165d
εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι οὐ σμικρὰν ὠφελίαν: τὴν γὰρ ὑγίειαν καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, εἰ ἀποδέχῃ τοῦτο.


ἀποδέχομαι.


καὶ εἰ τοίνυν με ἔροιο τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν, τί φημι ἔργον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι οἰκήσεις: ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. χρὴ οὖν καὶ σὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἐπειδὴ φῂς αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἐρωτηθέντα, “ὦ Κριτία, σωφροσύνη,
165d
I should say it is of very great benefit, since it produces health; an excellent result, if you allow so much.


I allow it.


And so, if you should ask me what result I take to be produced by building, as the builder's science, I should say houses; and it would be the same with the other arts. Now it is for you, in your turn, to find an answer to a question regarding temperance—since you say it is a science of self, Critias—and to tell me what excellent result it produces for us,
165e
ἐπιστήμη οὖσα ἑαυτοῦ, τί καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται καὶ ἄξιον τοῦ ὀνόματος;” ἴθι οὖν, εἰπέ.


ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία αὕτη πέφυκεν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, οὐδέ γε αἱ ἄλλαι ἀλλήλαις: σὺ δ' ὡς ὁμοίων οὐσῶν ποιῇ τὴν ζήτησιν. ἐπεὶ λέγε μοι, ἔφη, τῆς λογιστικῆς τέχνης ἢ τῆς γεωμετρικῆς τί ἐστιν τοιοῦτον ἔργον οἷον οἰκία οἰκοδομικῆς ἢ ἱμάτιον ὑφαντικῆς ἢ ἄλλα τοιαῦτ' ἔργα, ἃ πολλὰ ἄν τις ἔχοι πολλῶν τεχνῶν
165e
as science of self, and what it does that is worthy of its name. Come now, tell me.


But, Socrates, he said, you are not inquiring rightly. For in its nature it is not like the other sciences, any more than any of them is like any other; whereas you are making your inquiry as though they were alike. For tell me, he said, what result is there of the arts of reckoning and geometry, in the way that a house is of building, or a coat of weaving, or other products of the sort that one might point to
166a
δεῖξαι; ἔχεις οὖν μοι καὶ σὺ τούτων τοιοῦτόν τι ἔργον δεῖξαι; ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξεις.


καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγεις: ἀλλὰ τόδε σοι ἔχω δεῖξαι, τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἑκάστη τούτων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ὃ τυγχάνει ὂν ἄλλο αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπιστήμης. οἷον ἡ λογιστική ἐστίν που τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ τοῦ περιττοῦ, πλήθους ὅπως ἔχει πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα: ἦ γάρ;


πάνυ γε, ἔφη.


οὐκοῦν ἑτέρου ὄντος τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αὐτῆς τῆς λογιστικῆς;


πῶς δ' οὔ;
166a
in various arts? Well, can you, for your part, point to any such product in those two cases? You cannot.


To this I replied: What you say is true; but I can point out to you what is the peculiar subject of each of these sciences, distinct in each case from the science itself. Thus reckoning, I suppose, is concerned with the even and the odd in their numerical relations to themselves and to one another, is it not?


Certainly, he said.


And you grant that the odd and the even are different from the actual art of reckoning?


Of course.
166b
καὶ μὴν αὖ ἡ στατικὴ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου σταθμοῦ ἐστιν στατική: ἕτερον δέ ἐστιν τὸ βαρύ τε καὶ κοῦφον τῆς στατικῆς αὐτῆς. συγχωρεῖς;


ἔγωγε.


λέγε δή, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕτερον ὂν αὐτῆς τῆς σωφροσύνης;


τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες: ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἥκεις ἐρευνῶν τὸ ᾧ διαφέρει πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ σωφροσύνη: σὺ δὲ ὁμοιότητά τινα ζητεῖς αὐτῆς ταῖς ἄλλαις. τὸ δ' οὐκ
166b
And once more, weighing is concerned with the heavier and the lighter weight; but the heavy and the light are different from the actual art of weighing: you agree?


I do.


Then tell me, what is that of which temperance is the science, differing from temperance itself?


There you are, Socrates, he said: you push your investigation up to the real question at issue—in what temperance differs from all the other sciences—but you then proceed to seek some resemblance between it
166c
ἔστιν οὕτως, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἄλλου εἰσὶν ἐπιστῆμαι, ἑαυτῶν δ' οὔ, ἡ δὲ μόνη τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς. καὶ ταῦτά σε πολλοῦ δεῖ λεληθέναι, ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι ὃ ἄρτι οὐκ ἔφησθα ποιεῖν, τοῦτο ποιεῖς: ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ἐάσας περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστίν.


οἷον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιεῖς ἡγούμενος, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα σὲ ἐλέγχω, ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκα ἐλέγχειν ἢ οὗπερ ἕνεκα κἂν
166c
and them; whereas there is no such thing, for while all the rest of the sciences have something other than themselves as their subject, this one alone is a science of the other sciences and of its own self. And of this you are far from being unconscious, since in fact, as I believe, you are doing the very thing you denied you were doing just now: for you are attempting to refute me, without troubling to follow the subject of our discussion.


How can you think, I said, if my main effort is to refute you, that I do it with any other motive than that which
166d
ἐμαυτὸν διερευνῴμην τί λέγω, φοβούμενος μή ποτε λάθω οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή. καὶ νῦν δὴ οὖν ἔγωγέ φημι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα, ἴσως δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων: ἢ οὐ κοινὸν οἴει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι σχεδόν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὅπῃ ἔχει;


καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.


θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ μακάριε, ἀποκρινόμενος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται, ἔα χαίρειν εἴτε Κριτίας ἐστὶν
166d
would impel me to investigate the meaning of my own words—from a fear of carelessly supposing, at any moment, that I knew something while I knew it not? And so it is now: that is what I am doing, I tell you. I am examining the argument mainly for my own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of my other intimates. Or do you not think it is for the common good, almost, of all men, that the truth about everything there is should be discovered?


Yes indeed, he replied, I do, Socrates.


Then take heart, I said, my admirable friend, and answer the question put to you as you deem the case to be, without caring a jot
166e
εἴτε Σωκράτης ὁ ἐλεγχόμενος: ἀλλ' αὐτῷ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν τῷ λόγῳ σκόπει ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἐκβήσεται ἐλεγχόμενος.


ἀλλά, ἔφη, ποιήσω οὕτω: δοκεῖς γάρ μοι μέτρια λέγειν.


λέγε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης πῶς λέγεις;


λέγω τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι μόνη τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αὐτή τε αὑτῆς ἐστιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη.


οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμης;


πάνυ γε, ἔφη.
166e
whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted: give the argument itself your attention, and observe what will become of it under the test of refutation.


Well, he said, I will do so; for I think there is a good deal in what you say.


Then tell me, I said, what you mean in regard to temperance.


Why, I mean, he said, that it alone of all the sciences is the science both of itself and of the other sciences.


So then, I said, it will be the science of the lack of science also, besides being the science of science?


Certainly, he replied.
167a
ὁ ἄρα σώφρων μόνος αὐτός τε ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται καὶ οἷός τε ἔσται ἐξετάσαι τί τε τυγχάνει εἰδὼς καὶ τί μή, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὡσαύτως δυνατὸς ἔσται ἐπισκοπεῖν τί τις οἶδεν καὶ οἴεται, εἴπερ οἶδεν, καὶ τί αὖ οἴεται μὲν εἰδέναι, οἶδεν δ' οὔ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδείς: καὶ ἔστιν δὴ τοῦτο τὸ σωφρονεῖν τε καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν, τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν. ἆρα ταῦτά ἐστιν ἃ λέγεις;


ἔγωγ', ἔφη.


πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι, ὥσπερ ἐξ
167a
Then only the temperate person will know himself, and be able to discern what he really knows and does not know, and have the power of judging what other people likewise know and think they know, in cases where they do know, and again, what they think they know, without knowing it; everyone else will be unable. And so this is being temperate, or temperance, and knowing oneself—that one should know what one knows and what one does not know. Is that what you mean?


It is, he replied.


Once more then, I said, as our third offering to the Saviour,
167b
ἀρχῆς ἐπισκεψώμεθα πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν τοῦτ' εἶναι ἢ οὔ—τὸ ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι <ὅτι οἶδε καὶ> ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν—ἔπειτα εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατόν, τίς ἂν εἴη ἡμῖν ὠφελία εἰδόσιν αὐτό.


ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη, σκοπεῖν.


ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, σκέψαι, ἐάν τι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐπορώτερος φανῇς ἐμοῦ: ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορῶ. ᾗ δὲ ἀπορῶ, φράσω σοι;


πάνυ γ', ἔφη.


ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη, εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, μία τις ἐπιστήμη, ἣ οὐκ ἄλλου τινός
167b
let us consider afresh, in the first place, whether such a thing as this is possible or not—to know that one knows, and does not know, what one knows and what one does not know; and secondly, if this is perfectly possible, what benefit we get by knowing it.


We must indeed consider, he said.


Come then, I said, Critias, consider if you can show yourself any more resourceful than I am; for I am at a loss. Shall I explain to you in what way?


By all means, he replied.


Well, I said, what all this comes to, if your last statement was correct, is merely that there is one science which
167c
ἐστιν ἢ ἑαυτῆς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἡ αὐτὴ αὕτη;


πάνυ γε.


ἰδὲ δὴ ὡς ἄτοπον ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγειν: ἐν ἄλλοις γάρ που τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐὰν σκοπῇς, δόξει σοι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀδύνατον εἶναι.


πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῦ;


ἐν τοῖσδε. ἐννόει γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ὄψις τις εἶναι, ἣ ὧν μὲν αἱ ἄλλαι ὄψεις εἰσίν, οὐκ ἔστιν τούτων ὄψις, ἑαυτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων ὄψις ἐστὶν καὶ μὴ ὄψεων ὡσαύτως,
167c
is precisely a science of itself and of the other sciences, and moreover is a science of the lack of science at the same time.


Certainly.


Then mark what a strange statement it is that we are attempting to make, my friend: for if you will consider it as applied to other cases, you will surely see—so I believe—its impossibility.


How so? In what cases?


In the following: ask yourself if you think there is a sort of vision which is not the vision of things that we see in the ordinary way, but a vision of itself and of the other sorts of vision,
167d
καὶ χρῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ οὐδὲν ὄψις οὖσα, αὑτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὄψεις: δοκεῖ τίς σοι εἶναι τοιαύτη;


μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.


τί δὲ ἀκοήν, ἣ φωνῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀκούει, αὑτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκοῶν ἀκούει καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀκοῶν;


οὐδὲ τοῦτο.


συλλήβδην δὴ σκόπει περὶ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰσθήσεων μὲν αἴσθησις καὶ ἑαυτῆς, ὧν δὲ δὴ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται, μηδενὸς αἰσθανομένη;


οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
167d
and of the lack of vision likewise; which, while being vision, sees no color, but only itself and the other sorts of vision. Do you think there is any such?


Upon my word, I do not.


And what do you say to a sort of hearing which hears not a single sound, but hears itself and the other sorts of hearing and lack of hearing?


I reject that also.


Then take all the senses together as a whole, and consider if you think there is any sense of the senses and of itself, but insensible of any of the things of which the other senses are sensible.


I do not.
167e
ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμία δοκεῖ τίς σοι εἶναι, ἥτις ἡδονῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, αὑτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν;


οὐ δῆτα.


οὐδὲ μὴν βούλησις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἣ ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὐδὲν βούλεται, αὑτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας βουλήσεις βούλεται.


οὐ γὰρ οὖν.


ἔρωτα δὲ φαίης ἄν τινα εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὃς τυγχάνει ὢν ἔρως καλοῦ μὲν οὐδενός, αὑτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων;


οὔκ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε.


φόβον δὲ ἤδη τινὰ κατανενόηκας, ὃς ἑαυτὸν μὲν καὶ τοὺς
167e
Now, do you think there is any desire which is the desire, not of any pleasure, but of itself and of the other desires ?


No, indeed.


Nor, again, is there a wish, I imagine, that wishes no good, but wishes itself and the other wishes.


Quite so; there is not.


And would you say there is any love of such a sort that it is actually a love of no beauty, but of itself and of the other loves?


Not I, he replied.


And have you ever observed any fear which fears itself
168a
ἄλλους φόβους φοβεῖται, τῶν δεινῶν δ' οὐδὲ ἓν φοβεῖται;


οὐ κατανενόηκα, ἔφη.


δόξαν δὲ δοξῶν δόξαν καὶ αὑτῆς, ὧν δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι δοξάζουσιν μηδὲν δοξάζουσαν;


οὐδαμῶς.


ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, φαμέν τινα εἶναι τοιαύτην, ἥτις μαθήματος μὲν οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, αὑτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη;


φαμὲν γάρ.


οὐκοῦν ἄτοπον, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἔστιν; μηδὲν γάρ πω διισχυριζώμεθα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστιν ἔτι σκοπῶμεν.
168a
and the other fears, but has no fear of a single dreadful thing?


No, I have not, he replied.


Or an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself, but without any opinion such as the other opinions have?


By no means.


But it is apparently a science of this kind that we are assuming—one that is a science of no branch of study, but a science of itself and of the other sciences.


So we are.


And it is a strange thing, if it really exists? For we should not affirm as yet that it does not exist, but should still consider whether it does exist.
168b
ὀρθῶς λέγεις.


φέρε δή: ἔστι μὲν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἔχει τινὰ τοιαύτην δύναμιν ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι: ἦ γάρ;


πάνυ γε.


καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεῖζόν φαμεν τοιαύτην τινὰ ἔχειν δύναμιν, ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι μεῖζον;


ἔχει γάρ.


οὐκοῦν ἐλάττονός τινος, εἴπερ ἔσται μεῖζον.


ἀνάγκη.


εἰ οὖν τι εὕροιμεν μεῖζον, ὃ τῶν μὲν μειζόνων ἐστὶν μεῖζον καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ὧν δὲ τἆλλα μείζω ἐστὶν μηδενὸς μεῖζον,
168b
You are right.


Well now, this science is a science of something, that is, it has a certain faculty whereby it can be a science of something, has it not?


Certainly.


For, you know, we say the greater has a certain faculty whereby it can be greater than something?


Quite so.


That is, than something smaller, if it is to be greater.


Necessarily.


So if we could find a greater which is greater than other greater things, and than itself, but not greater than the things
168c
πάντως ἄν που ἐκεῖνό γ' αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, εἴπερ ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον εἴη, καὶ ἔλαττον ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι: ἢ οὔ;


πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.


οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴ τι διπλάσιόν ἐστιν τῶν τε ἄλλων διπλασίων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡμίσεος δήπου ὄντος ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διπλάσιον ἂν εἴη: οὐ γάρ ἐστίν που ἄλλου διπλάσιον ἢ ἡμίσεος.


ἀληθῆ.


πλέον δὲ αὑτοῦ ὂν οὐ καὶ ἔλαττον ἔσται, καὶ βαρύτερον ὂν κουφότερον, καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὂν νεώτερον, καὶ τἆλλα
168c
beside which the others are greater, I take it there can be no doubt that it would be in the situation of being, if greater than itself, at the same time smaller than itself, would it not?


Most inevitably, Socrates, he said.


Or again, if there is a double of other doubles and of itself, both it and the others must of course be halves, if it is to be their double; for, you know, a double cannot be “of” anything else than its half.


True.


And what is more than itself will also be less, and the heavier will be lighter, and the older
168d
πάντα ὡσαύτως, ὅτιπερ ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἔχῃ, οὐ καὶ ἐκείνην ἕξει τὴν οὐσίαν, πρὸς ἣν ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε: οἷον ἡ ἀκοή, φαμέν, οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἦν ἀκοὴ ἢ φωνῆς: ἦ γάρ;


ναί.


οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἀκούσεται, φωνὴν ἐχούσης ἑαυτῆς ἀκούσεται: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἀκούσειεν.


πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.


καὶ ἡ ὄψις γέ που, ὦ ἄριστε, εἴπερ ὄψεται αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν, χρῶμά τι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη ἔχειν: ἄχρων γὰρ ὄψις οὐδὲν [ἂν]
168d
younger, and so on with everything else: whatever has its own faculty applied to itself will have also the natural quality to which its faculty was applicable, will it not? For instance, hearing is, as we say, just a hearing of sound, is it not?


Yes.


So if it is to hear itself, it will hear a sound of its own; for it would not hear otherwise.


Most inevitably.


And sight, I suppose, my excellent friend, if it is to see itself, must needs have a color; for sight
168e
μή ποτε ἴδῃ.


οὐ γὰρ οὖν.


ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Κριτία, ὅτι ὅσα διεληλύθαμεν, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀδύνατα παντάπασι φαίνεται ἡμῖν, τὰ δ' ἀπιστεῖται σφόδρα μή ποτ' ἂν τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτὰ σχεῖν; μεγέθη μὲν γὰρ καὶ πλήθη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον: ἢ οὐχί;


πάνυ γε.


ἀκοὴ δ' αὖ καὶ ὄψις καὶ ἔτι γε κίνησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν κινεῖν, καὶ θερμότης κάειν, καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς
168e
can never see what is colorless.


No more it can.


Then do you perceive, Critias, in the various cases we have propounded, how some of them strike us as absolutely impossible, while others raise serious doubts as to the faculty of the thing being ever applicable to itself? For with magnitudes, numbers, and the like it is absolutely impossible, is it not?


Certainly.


But again, with hearing and sight, or in the further bases of motion moving itself and heat burning itself, and all other
169a
μὲν ἀπιστίαν <ἂν> παράσχοι, ἴσως δέ τισιν οὔ. μεγάλου δή τινος, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς δεῖ, ὅστις τοῦτο κατὰ πάντων ἱκανῶς διαιρήσεται, πότερον οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πέφυκεν ἔχειν [πλὴν ἐπιστήμησ], ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλο, ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δ' οὔ: καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὖ ἅτινα αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτὰ ἔχει, ἆρ' ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἣν δὴ ἡμεῖς σωφροσύνην φαμὲν εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ πιστεύω ἐμαυτῷ ἱκανὸς εἶναι ταῦτα διελέσθαι: διὸ καὶ οὔτ' εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι τοῦτο γενέσθαι,
169a
actions of the sort, the fact must appear incredible to some, but perhaps not to others. So what we want, my friend, is some great man who will determine to our satisfaction in every respect whether there is nothing in nature so constituted as to have its own faculty applicable to itself, and not only some other object, or whether there are some such, and others not such; and whether, again, if there are things that have such relation to themselves, they include a science which we assert to be temperance. For my part, I distrust my own competence to determine these questions, and hence I am neither able to affirm whether it is possible
169b
ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἔχω διισχυρίσασθαι, οὔτ' εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἔστι, σωφροσύνην ἀποδέχομαι αὐτὸ εἶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἐπισκέψωμαι εἴτε τι ἂν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ τοιοῦτον ὂν εἴτε μή. τὴν γὰρ οὖν δὴ σωφροσύνην ὠφέλιμόν τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν μαντεύομαι εἶναι: σὺ οὖν, ὦ παῖ Καλλαίσχρου—τίθεσαι γὰρ σωφροσύνην τοῦτ' εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης—πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἔνδειξαι, ὅτι δυνατὸν [ἀποδεῖξαί σε] ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἔπειτα πρὸς τῷ δυνατῷ ὅτι
169b
that there should be a science of science, nor willing, let it be ever so true, to acknowledge this to be temperance until I have made out whether such a thing as this would benefit us or not. For, you see, I have a presentiment that temperance is something beneficial and good; and you, therefore, son of Callaeschrus—since you lay it down that temperance is this very science of science, and moreover of the lack of science—shall first indicate the possibility, as I put it just now, and then the benefit added to the possibility, of such a thing;
169c
καὶ ὠφέλιμον: κἀμὲ τάχ' ἂν ἀποπληρώσαις ὡς ὀρθῶς λέγεις περὶ σωφροσύνης ὃ ἔστιν.


καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα καὶ ἰδών με ἀποροῦντα, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς χασμωμένους καταντικρὺ ὁρῶντες ταὐτὸν τοῦτο συμπάσχουσιν, κἀκεῖνος ἔδοξέ μοι ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀποροῦντος ἀναγκασθῆναι καὶ αὐτὸς ἁλῶναι ὑπὸ ἀπορίας. ἅτε οὖν εὐδοκιμῶν ἑκάστοτε, ᾐσχύνετο τοὺς παρόντας, καὶ οὔτε συγχωρῆσαί μοι ἤθελεν ἀδύνατος εἶναι διελέσθαι ἃ προυκαλούμην
169c
and perhaps you will then satisfy me that your definition of temperance is correct.


Now when Critias heard this and saw me in a difficulty, he seemed to me—just as the sight of someone yawning opposite causes people to be affected in the same way—to be compelled by the sense of my difficulty to be caught in a difficulty himself. And so, since he usually contrived to distinguish himself, he was too ashamed to bring himself to admit to me before the company that he was unable to determine the questions
169d
αὐτόν, ἔλεγέν τε οὐδὲν σαφές, ἐπικαλύπτων τὴν ἀπορίαν. κἀγὼ ἡμῖν ἵνα ὁ λόγος προΐοι, εἶπον: ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ὦ Κριτία, νῦν μὲν τοῦτο συγχωρήσωμεν, δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης: αὖθις δὲ ἐπισκεψόμεθα εἴτε οὕτως ἔχει εἴτε μή. ἴθι δὴ οὖν, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατὸν τοῦτο, τί μᾶλλον οἷόν τέ ἐστιν εἰδέναι ἅ τέ τις οἶδε καὶ ἃ μή; τοῦτο γὰρ δήπου ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὑτὸν καὶ σωφρονεῖν: ἦ γάρ;


πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ συμβαίνει γέ που, ὦ Σώκρατες. εἰ
169d
with which I challenged him, and he made a very indistinct reply in order to conceal his difficulty. Then I, to forward the discussion, remarked: Well, if you prefer, Critias, let us concede for the moment that there may possibly be a science of science : some other time we shall consider whether such is the fact or not. Come then; suppose it is perfectly possible: how is one helped thereby to know what one knows and does not know? For this, you are aware, we said
was the meaning of self-knowledge and temperance, did we not?


Certainly, he said; and it must surely follow, Socrates;
169e
γάρ τις ἔχει ἐπιστήμην ἣ αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει, τοιοῦτος ἂν αὐτὸς εἴη οἷόνπερ ἐστὶν ὃ ἔχει: ὥσπερ ὅταν τάχος τις ἔχῃ, ταχύς, καὶ ὅταν κάλλος, καλός, καὶ ὅταν γνῶσιν, γιγνώσκων, ὅταν δὲ δὴ γνῶσιν αὐτὴν αὑτῆς τις ἔχῃ, γιγνώσκων που αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τότε ἔσται.


οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφισβητῶ, ὡς οὐχ ὅταν τὸ αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκόν τις ἔχῃ, αὐτὸς αὑτὸν γνώσεται, ἀλλ' ἔχοντι τοῦτο τίς ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν;
169e
for if a man has a science which knows itself, he will be similar himself to that which he has. For instance, he who has swiftness will be swift, he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know; and when he has knowledge that is of itself, he will then, surely, be in the position of knowing himself.


I do not dispute, I said, that when a man has that which knows itself he will know himself; but having that, how is he bound to know what he knows and what he does not know?
170a
ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταὐτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ.


ἴσως, ἔφην, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ κινδυνεύω ἀεὶ ὅμοιος εἶναι: οὐ γὰρ αὖ μανθάνω ὡς ἔστιν τὸ αὐτό, ἃ οἶδεν εἰδέναι καὶ ἅ τις μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι.


πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη;


ὧδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἐπιστήμη που ἐπιστήμης οὖσα ἆρα πλέον τι οἵα τ' ἔσται διαιρεῖν, ἢ ὅτι τούτων τόδε μὲν ἐπιστήμη, τόδε δ' οὐκ ἐπιστήμη;


οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον.


ταὐτὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμῃ τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ ὑγιεινοῦ,
170a
Because, Socrates, the two things are the same.


I daresay, I said; but I am afraid I am still my old self: I still do not see how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same as the other.


How do you mean? he asked.


In this way, I replied: will a science of science, if such exists, be able to do more than determine that one of two things is science, and the other is not science?


No, only that.
170b
καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ δικαίου;


οὐδαμῶς.


ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν οἶμαι ἰατρική, τὸ δὲ πολιτική, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμη.


πῶς γὰρ οὔ;


οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὴ προσεπίστηταί τις τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμην μόνον γιγνώσκῃ ἅτε τούτου μόνον ἔχων ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι μέν τι ἐπίσταται καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, εἰκότως ἂν γιγνώσκοι καὶ περὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων: ἦ γάρ;


ναί.


ὅτι δὲ γιγνώσκει, ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ πῶς εἴσεται;
170b
Now, is science or lack of science of health the same as science or lack of science of justice?


By no means.


For the one, I suppose, is medicine, and the other politics, while the thing in question is merely science.


Yes, to be sure.


And if a man has no added knowledge of health and justice, but knows only science, as having science of that alone, he will probably know that he has a certain piece of scientific knowledge about himself and about other people, will he not?


Yes.
170c
γιγνώσκει γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀλλ' οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δ' ἁρμονικὸν μουσικῇ ἀλλ' οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δ' οἰκοδομικὸν οἰκοδομικῇ ἀλλ' οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, καὶ οὕτω πάντα: ἢ οὔ;


φαίνεται.


σωφροσύνῃ δέ, εἴπερ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, πῶς εἴσεται ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινὸν γιγνώσκει ἢ ὅτι τὸ οἰκοδομικόν;


οὐδαμῶς.


οὐκ ἄρα εἴσεται ὃ οἶδεν ὁ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οἶδεν μόνον.


ἔοικεν.
170c
But how will this science help him to know what he knows? For of course he knows health by means of medicine, not temperance, and harmony by means of music, not temperance, and building by means of the builder's art, not temperance; and so it will be in every case, will it not?


Apparently.


And how will temperance, supposing it is only a science of sciences, help him to know that he knows health, or that he knows building?


By no means.


Then he who is ignorant of all this will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.


So it seems.
170d
οὐκ ἄρα σωφρονεῖν τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν μόνον.


κινδυνεύει.


οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἄρα οἷός τε ἔσται οὗτος ἐξετάσαι φάσκοντά τι ἐπίστασθαι, πότερον ἐπίσταται ὅ φησιν ἐπίστασθαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταται: ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὡς ἔοικεν, γνώσεται, ὅτι ἔχει τινὰ ἐπιστήμην, ὅτου δέ γε, ἡ σωφροσύνη οὐ ποιήσει αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν.


οὐ φαίνεται.
170d
Then being temperate, or temperance, will not be this knowledge of what one knows or does not know, but, it would seem, merely knowing that one knows or does not know.


It looks like it.


Then such a person will also be unable to examine another man's claim to some knowledge, and make out whether he knows or does not know what he says he knows: he will merely know, it would seem, that he has a certain knowledge; but of what it is, temperance will not cause him to know.


Apparently not.
170e
οὔτε ἄρα τὸν προσποιούμενον ἰατρὸν εἶναι, ὄντα δὲ μή, καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντα οἷός τε ἔσται διακρίνειν, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ μή. σκεψώμεθα δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε: εἰ μέλλει ὁ σώφρων ἢ ὁστισοῦν ἄλλος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν διαγνώσεσθαι καὶ τὸν μή, ἆρ' οὐχ ὧδε ποιήσει: περὶ μὲν ἰατρικῆς δήπου αὐτῷ οὐ διαλέξεται—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπαΐει, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ νοσῶδες—ἢ οὔ;


ναί, οὕτως.


περὶ δέ γε ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ μόνῃ ἀπέδομεν.


ναί.


οὐδὲ περὶ ἰατρικῆς ἄρα οἶδεν ὁ ἰατρικός, ἐπειδήπερ ἡ
170e
So he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is none, from the man who really is one, nor any other man who has knowledge from him who has none. But let us consider it another way: if the temperate man or anybody else would discriminate between the true doctor and the false, he will go to work thus, will he not? He will surely not talk to him about medicine; for, as we were saying, the doctor understands nothing else but health and disease. Is not that so?


Yes, it is.


But about science he knows nothing, for that, you know, we assigned to temperance alone.


Yes.


So the medical man knows nothing about medicine either, since
171a
ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη οὖσα τυγχάνει.


ἀληθῆ.


ὅτι μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, γνώσεται ὁ σώφρων τὸν ἰατρόν: δέον δὲ πεῖραν λαβεῖν ἥτις ἐστίν, ἄλλο τι σκέψεται ὧντινων; ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ὥρισται ἑκάστη ἐπιστήμη μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τίς, τῷ τινῶν εἶναι;


τούτῳ μὲν οὖν.


καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὴ ἑτέρα εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ὡρίσθη τῷ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ εἶναι καὶ νοσώδους ἐπιστήμη.


ναί.


οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν τὸν βουλόμενον
171a
medicine is, of course, a science.


True.


Then the temperate man will know, indeed, that the doctor has a certain science; but when he has to put its nature to the proof, must he not consider what its subjects are? Is not each science marked out, not merely as a science, but as a particular one, by the particular subjects it has?


It is, to be sure.


And medicine is marked out as different from the other sciences by being a science of health and disease.


Yes.


And so anyone who wishes to inquire into medicine
171b
ἰατρικὴν σκοπεῖν, ἐν οἷς ποτ' ἔστιν: οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς ἔξω, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν;


οὐ δῆτα.


ἐν τοῖς ὑγιεινοῖς ἄρα καὶ νοσώδεσιν ἐπισκέψεται τὸν ἰατρόν, ᾗ ἰατρικός ἐστιν, ὁ ὀρθῶς σκοπούμενος.


ἔοικεν.


οὐκοῦν ἐν τοῖς οὕτως ἢ λεγομένοις ἢ πραττομένοις τὰ μὲν λεγόμενα, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεται, σκοπούμενος, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα, εἰ ὀρθῶς πράττεται;


ἀνάγκη.


ἦ οὖν ἄνευ ἰατρικῆς δύναιτ' ἄν τις τούτων ποτέροις ἐπακολουθῆσαι;


οὐ δῆτα.
171b
must make those things, whatever they may be, with which it is concerned, the matter of his inquiry; not those foreign things, I presume, with which it is not?


No, indeed.


Then he who conducts his inquiry aright will consider the doctor, as a medical man, in connection with cases of health and disease.


So it seems.


And will inquire whether, in what is said or done in such cases, his words are truly spoken, and his acts rightly done?


He must.


Well now, could anyone follow up either of these points without the medical art?


No, indeed.
171c
οὐδέ γε ἄλλος οὐδείς, ὡς ἔοικεν, πλὴν ἰατρός, οὔτε δὴ ὁ σώφρων: ἰατρὸς γὰρ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.


ἔστι ταῦτα.


παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον, εἰ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη μόνον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, οὔτε ἰατρὸν διακρῖναι οἵα τε ἔσται ἐπιστάμενον τὰ τῆς τέχνης ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, προσποιούμενον δὲ ἢ οἰόμενον, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπισταμένων καὶ ὁτιοῦν, πλήν γε τὸν αὑτοῦ ὁμότεχνον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί.


φαίνεται, ἔφη.
171c
Nobody at all, it would seem, but a doctor; and so not the temperate man either: for he would have to be a doctor, in addition to his temperance.


That is so.


Then inevitably, if temperance is only a science of science and of lack of science, it will be equally unable to distinguish a doctor who knows the business of his art from one who does not know but pretends or thinks he does, and any other person who has knowledge of anything at all: one will only distinguish one's fellow-artist, as craftsmen usually can.


Apparently, he said.
171d
τίς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, ὠφελία ἡμῖν ἔτι ἂν εἴη ἀπὸ τῆς σωφροσύνης τοιαύτης οὔσης; εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπετιθέμεθα, ᾔδει ὁ σώφρων ἅ τε ᾔδει καὶ ἃ μὴ ᾔδει, τὰ μὲν ὅτι οἶδεν, τὰ δ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, καὶ ἄλλον ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπονθότα ἐπισκέψασθαι οἷός τ' ἦν, μεγαλωστὶ ἂν ἡμῖν, φαμέν, ὠφέλιμον ἦν σώφροσιν εἶναι: ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον διεζῶμεν αὐτοί τε [καὶ] οἱ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἤρχοντο. οὔτε
171d
Then what benefit, I asked, Critias, can we still look for from temperance, if it is like that? For if, as we began by assuming, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know, and that he knows the one and does not know the other, and if he were able to observe this same condition in bother man, it would be vastly to our benefit, we agree, to be temperate; since we should pass all our lives, both we who had temperance and all the rest who were governed by us,
171e
γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἃ μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐξευρίσκοντες τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἐκείνοις ἂν παρεδίδομεν, οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπετρέπομεν, ὧν ἤρχομεν, ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἢ ὅτι πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἔμελλον πράξειν—τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἄν, οὗ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον—καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης οἰκία τε οἰκουμένη ἔμελλεν καλῶς οἰκεῖσθαι, πόλις τε πολιτευομένη, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν οὗ σωφροσύνη ἄρχοι: ἁμαρτίας γὰρ
171e
without error. For neither should we ourselves attempt to do what we did not know, instead of finding out those who knew and placing the matter in their hands, nor should we permit others under our governance to do anything but what they were likely to do aright; and they would do that when they had knowledge of it; and so it would be that a house which was ordered, or a state which was administered, as temperance bade, and everything else
172a
ἐξῃρημένης, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης, ἐν πάσῃ πράξει καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, τοὺς δὲ εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, ἐλέγομεν περὶ σωφροσύνης, λέγοντες ὅσον ἀγαθὸν εἴη τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδέν τις καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν;


πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως.


νῦν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τοιαύτη οὖσα πέφανται.


ὁρῶ, ἔφη.
172a
that was ruled by temperance, could not but be well ordered; for with error abolished, and rightness leading, in their every action men would be bound to do honorably and well under such conditions, and those who did well would be happy. Did we not so speak of temperance, I said, Critias, when we remarked how great a boon it was to know what one knows and what one does not know?


To be sure we did, he replied.


Whereas now, I went on, you see that nowhere can any such science be found.


I see, he said.
172b
ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἣν νῦν εὑρίσκομεν σωφροσύνην οὖσαν, τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ὅτι ὁ ταύτην ἔχων, ὅτι ἂν ἄλλο μανθάνῃ, ῥᾷόν τε μαθήσεται καὶ ἐναργέστερα πάντα αὐτῷ φανεῖται, ἅτε πρὸς ἑκάστῳ ᾧ ἂν μανθάνῃ προσκαθορῶντι τὴν ἐπιστήμην: καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δὴ κάλλιον ἐξετάσει περὶ ὧν ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς μάθῃ, οἱ δὲ ἄνευ τούτου ἐξετάζοντες ἀσθενέστερον καὶ φαυλότερον τοῦτο δράσουσιν; ἆρ', ὦ φίλε, τοιαῦτα
172b
Then may we say, I asked, that there is this good point in the knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, which we now find to be what temperance is, that he who has it will not only learn more easily whatever he learns, but will perceive everything more plainly, since besides the particular things that he learns he will behold the science; and hence he will probe more surely the state of other men respecting the things which he has learnt himself, while those who probe without such knowledge will do it more feebly and poorly? Are these, my friend, the kind of advantages that we shall gain
172c
ἄττα ἐστὶν ἃ ἀπολαυσόμεθα τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἡμεῖς δὲ μεῖζόν τι βλέπομεν καὶ ζητοῦμεν αὐτὸ μεῖζόν τι εἶναι ἢ ὅσον ἐστίν;


τάχα δ' ἄν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχοι.


ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ: ἴσως δέ γε ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἐζητήσαμεν. τεκμαίρομαι δέ, ὅτι μοι ἄτοπ' ἄττα καταφαίνεται περὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ἴδωμεν γάρ, εἰ βούλει, συγχωρήσαντες καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμην δυνατὸν εἶναι [εἰδέναι], καὶ ὅ γε ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐτιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην εἶναι, τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, μὴ
172c
from temperance? But are we really looking at something greater, and requiring it to be something greater than it really is?


Probably, he replied, that is so.


I daresay, I said; and I daresay also our inquiry has been worthless. And this I conclude, because I observe certain strange facts about temperance, if it is anything like that. For suppose, if you please, we concede that there may possibly be a science of science, and let us grant, and not withdraw, our original proposition that temperance is the knowledge of what one knows and does not know;
172d
ἀποστερήσωμεν, ἀλλὰ δῶμεν: καὶ πάντα ταῦτα δόντες ἔτι βέλτιον σκεψώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι καὶ ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει τοιοῦτον ὄν. ἃ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς μέγα ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη, ἡγουμένη διοικήσεως καὶ οἰκίας καὶ πόλεως, οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ὦ Κριτία, καλῶς ὡμολογηκέναι.


πῶς δή; ἦ δ' ὅς.


ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥᾳδίως ὡμολογήσαμεν μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰ ἕκαστοι ἡμῶν, ἃ μὲν ἴσασιν, πράττοιεν ταῦτα, ἃ δὲ μὴ ἐπίσταιντο, ἄλλοις παραδιδοῖεν τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις.
172d
granting all this, let us still more thoroughly inquire whether on these terms it will be of any profit to us. For our suggestion just now, that temperance of that sort, as our guide in ordering house or state, must be a great boon, was not, to my thinking, Critias, a proper admission.


How so? he asked.


Because, I replied, we too tightly admitted that it would be a great boon to mankind if each of us should do what he knows, but should place what he did not know in the hands of others who had the knowledge.
172e
οὐκ οὖν, ἔφη, καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν;


οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.


ἄτοπα λέγεις ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.


νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἔφην, καὶ ἐμοί τοι δοκεῖ οὕτω, κἀνταῦθα καὶ ἄρτι ἀποβλέψας ἄτοπ' ἄττ' ἔφην μοι προφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι φοβοίμην μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς σκοποῖμεν. ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδέν μοι
172e
Well, was that, he asked, not a proper admission?


Not to my mind, I answered.


In very truth, your words are strange! he said, Socrates.


Yes, by the Dog, I said, and they strike me too in the same way; and it was in view of this, just now, that I spoke of strange results that I noticed, and said I feared we were not inquiring rightly. For in truth, let temperance be ever so much what we say it is, I see nothing
173a
δῆλον εἶναι δοκεῖ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται.


πῶς δή; ἦ δ' ὅς. λέγε, ἵνα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰδῶμεν ὅτι λέγεις.


οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ληρεῖν με: ὅμως τό γε προφαινόμενον ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ παριέναι, εἴ τίς γε αὑτοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν κήδεται.


καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, λέγεις.


ἄκουε δή, ἔφην, τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ, εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος ἐλήλυθεν. εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα ἡμῶν ἄρχοι ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὖσα οἵαν νῦν ὁριζόμεθα, ἄλλο τι κατὰ τὰς
173a
to show what good effect it has on us.


How so? he asked: tell us, in order that we on our side may know what you mean.


I expect, I said, I am talking nonsense: but still one is bound to consider what occurs to one, and not idly ignore it, if one has even a little concern for oneself.


And you are quite right, he said.


Hear then, I said, my dream, whether it has come through horn or through ivory.
Suppose that temperance were such as we now define her,
173b
ἐπιστήμας πάντ' ἂν πράττοιτο, καὶ οὔτε τις κυβερνήτης φάσκων εἶναι, ὢν δὲ οὔ, ἐξαπατῷ ἂν ἡμᾶς, οὔτε ἰατρὸς οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς, προσποιούμενός τι εἰδέναι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, λανθάνοι ἄν: ἐκ δὴ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄλλο ἂν ἡμῖν τι συμβαίνοι ἢ ὑγιέσιν τε τὰ σώματα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν, καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ κινδυνεύοντας καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ τὰ σκεύη καὶ τὴν ἀμπεχόνην καὶ ὑπόδεσιν
173b
and that she had entire control of us: must it not be that every act would be done according to the sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he was not would deceive us, nor would a doctor, nor a general, nor anyone else pretending to know something he did not know, go undetected; and would not these conditions result in our having greater bodily health than we have now, safety in perils of the sea and war, and skilful workmanship in all our utensils, our clothes,
173c
πᾶσαν καὶ τὰ χρήματα πάντα τεχνικῶς ἡμῖν εἰργασμένα εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀληθινοῖς δημιουργοῖς χρῆσθαι; εἰ δὲ βούλοιό γε, καὶ τὴν μαντικὴν εἶναι συγχωρήσωμεν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, αὐτῆς ἐπιστατοῦσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἀλαζόνας ἀποτρέπειν, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάντεις καθιστάναι ἡμῖν προφήτας τῶν μελλόντων. κατεσκευασμένον δὴ οὕτω τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος
173c
our shoes, nay, everything about us, and various things besides, because we should be employing genuine craftsmen? And if you liked, we might concede that prophecy, as the knowledge of what is to be, and temperance directing her, will deter the charlatans, and establish the true prophets as our prognosticators. Thus equipped, the human race would indeed act and live
173d
ὅτι μὲν ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοι καὶ ζῴη, ἕπομαι—ἡ γὰρ σωφροσύνη φυλάττουσα οὐκ ἂν ἐῴη παρεμπίπτουσαν τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην συνεργὸν ἡμῖν εἶναι—ὅτι δ' ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοντες εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοῖμεν, τοῦτο δὲ οὔπω δυνάμεθα μαθεῖν, ὦ φίλε Κριτία.


ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ ῥᾳδίως εὑρήσεις ἄλλο τι τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν, ἐὰν τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἀτιμάσῃς.


σμικρὸν τοίνυν με, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι προσδίδαξον. τίνος ἐπιστημόνως λέγεις; ἦ σκυτῶν τομῆς;
173d
according to knowledge, I grant you (for temperance, on the watch, would not suffer ignorance to foist herself in and take a hand in our labors), but that by acting according to knowledge we should do well and be happy—this is a point which as yet we are unable to make out, my dear Critias.


But still, he replied, you will have some difficulty in finding any other fulfillment of welfare if you reject the rule of knowledge.


Then inform me further, I said, on one more little matter. Of what is this knowledge? Do you mean of shoe-making?
173e
μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.


ἀλλὰ χαλκοῦ ἐργασίας;


οὐδαμῶς.


ἀλλὰ ἐρίων ἢ ξύλων ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων;


οὐ δῆτα.


οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα. οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντες οὐχ ὁμολογοῦνται παρὰ σοῦ εὐδαίμονες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περί τινων ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα σὺ δοκεῖς μοι ἀφορίζεσθαι τὸν εὐδαίμονα. καὶ ἴσως λέγεις ὃν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸν
173e
Good heavens, not I!


Well, of working in brass?


By no means.


Well, in wool, or in wood, or in something else of that sort?


No, indeed.


Then we no longer hold, I said, to the statement that he who lives according to knowledge is happy; for these workers, though they live according to knowledge, are not acknowledged by you to be happy: you rather delimit the happy man, it seems to me, as one who lives according to knowledge about certain things. And I daresay you are referring to my instance of a moment ago, the man who knows
174a
εἰδότα τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι πάντα, τὸν μάντιν. τοῦτον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγεις;


καὶ τοῦτον ἔγωγε, ἔφη, καὶ ἄλλον.


τίνα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἆρα μὴ τὸν τοιόνδε, εἴ τις πρὸς τοῖς μέλλουσιν καὶ τὰ γεγονότα πάντα εἰδείη καὶ τὰ νῦν ὄντα, καὶ μηδὲν ἀγνοοῖ; θῶμεν γάρ τινα εἶναι αὐτόν. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι τούτου γε ἔτι ἂν εἴποις οὐδένα ἐπιστημονέστερον ζῶντα εἶναι.


οὐ δῆτα.


τόδε δὴ ἔτι προσποθῶ, τίς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονα; ἢ ἅπασαι ὁμοίως;


οὐδαμῶς ὁμοίως, ἔφη.
174a
all that is to come, the prophet. Do you refer to him or to someone else?


Yes, I refer to him, he said, and someone else too.


Whom? I asked. Is it the sort of person who might know, besides what is to be, both everything that has been and now is, and might be ignorant of nothing? Let us suppose such a man exists: you are not going to tell me, I am sure, of anyone alive who is yet more knowing than he.


No, indeed.


Then there is still one more thing I would fain know: which of the sciences is it that makes him happy? Or does he owe it to all of them alike?
174b
ἀλλὰ ποία μάλιστα; ᾗ τί οἶδεν καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι; ἆρά γε ᾗ τὸ πεττευτικόν;


ποῖον, ἦ δ' ὅς, πεττευτικόν;


ἀλλ' ᾗ τὸ λογιστικόν;


οὐδαμῶς.


ἀλλ' ᾗ τὸ ὑγιεινόν;


μᾶλλον, ἔφη.


ἐκείνη δ' ἣν λέγω μάλιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾗ τί;


ἧι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ κακόν.


ὦ μιαρέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, πάλαι με περιέλκεις κύκλῳ, ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἦν ζῆν τὸ εὖ πράττειν
174b
By no means to all alike, he replied.


But to which sort most? One that gives him knowledge of what thing, present, past or future? Is it that by which he knows draught-playing?


Draught-playing indeed! he replied.


Well, reckoning?


By no means.


Well, health?


More likely, he said.


And that science to which I refer as the most likely, I went on, gives him knowledge of what?


Of good, he replied, and of evil.


Vile creature! I said, you have all this time been dragging me round and round, while concealing the fact that the life according to knowledge does not make us do well and be happy, not even
174c
τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ συμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν. ἐπεί, ὦ Κριτία, εἰ 'θέλεις ἐξελεῖν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἧττόν τι ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει, ἡ δὲ σκυτικὴ ὑποδεδέσθαι, ἡ δὲ ὑφαντικὴ ἠμφιέσθαι, ἡ δὲ κυβερνητικὴ κωλύσει ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ ἡ στρατηγικὴ ἐν πολέμῳ;


οὐδὲν ἧττον, ἔφη.


ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε Κριτία, τὸ εὖ γε τούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεσθαι
174c
if it be knowledge of all the other knowledges together, but only if it is of this single one concerning good and evil. For, Critias, if you choose to take away this science from the whole number of them, will medicine any the less give us health, or shoemaking give us shoes, or weaving provide clothes, or will the pilot's art any the less prevent the loss of life at sea, or the general's in war?


None the less, he replied.


But, my dear Critias, to have any of these things well
174d
καὶ ὠφελίμως ἀπολελοιπὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσται ταύτης ἀπούσης.


ἀληθῆ λέγεις.


οὐχ αὕτη δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἀλλ' ἧς ἔργον ἐστὶν τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστημῶν γε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ: ὥστε εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη [ἡ ὠφελίμη] ἡμῖν.


τί δ', ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἂν αὕτη ὠφελοῖ; εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἐπιστατεῖ
174d
and beneficially done will be out of our reach if that science is lacking.


That is true.


And that science, it seems, is not temperance, but one whose business is to benefit us; for it is not a science of sciences and lack of sciences, but of good and evil: so that if this is beneficial, temperance must be something else to us.


But why, he asked, should not it be beneficial? For if temperance is above all a science of the sciences,
174e
δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, καὶ ταύτης δήπου ἂν ἄρχουσα τῆς περὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμης ὠφελοῖ ἂν ἡμᾶς.


ἦ κἂν ὑγιαίνειν ποιοῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ἰατρική; καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν αὕτη ἂν ποιοῖ, καὶ οὐχ αἱ ἄλλαι τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ἑκάστη; ἢ οὐ πάλαι διεμαρτυρόμεθα ὅτι ἐπιστήμης μόνον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός: οὐχ οὕτω;


φαίνεταί γε.


οὐκ ἄρα ὑγιείας ἔσται δημιουργός;


οὐ δῆτα.
174e
and presides too over the other sciences, surely she will govern this science of the good, and so benefit us.


And give us health also? I asked: will she, and not medicine, do this? And will the several works of the other arts be hers, and not the particular works of each art? Have we not constantly protested that she is only knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, and of nothing else? Is not that so?


Apparently it is.


Then she will not be a producer of health?


No, indeed.
175a
ἄλλης γὰρ ἦν τέχνης ὑγίεια: ἢ οὔ;


ἄλλης.


οὐδ' ἄρα ὠφελίας, ὦ ἑταῖρε: ἄλλῃ γὰρ αὖ ἀπέδομεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνῃ νυνδή: ἦ γάρ;


πάνυ γε.


πῶς οὖν ὠφέλιμος ἔσται ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας οὖσα δημιουργός;


οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικέν γε.


ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Κριτία, ὡς ἐγὼ πάλαι εἰκότως ἐδεδοίκη καὶ δικαίως ἐμαυτὸν ᾐτιώμην ὅτι οὐδὲν χρηστὸν περὶ σωφροσύνης σκοπῶ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ὅ γε κάλλιστον πάντων
175a
For health, we said, belongs to another art, did we not?


We did.


Nor of benefit, my good friend; for this work, again, we assigned to another art just now, did we not?


Certainly.


Then how will temperance be beneficial, if it produces no benefit?


By no means, Socrates, as it seems.


So do you see, Critias, how all the time I had good reason for my fear, and fair ground for the reproach I made against myself, that my inquiry regarding temperance was worthless?
For I cannot think that what is admitted to be the noblest thing in the world
175b
ὁμολογεῖται εἶναι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἀνωφελὲς ἐφάνη, εἴ τι ἐμοῦ ὄφελος ἦν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζητεῖν. νῦν δὲ πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα, καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα εὑρεῖν ἐφ' ὅτῳ ποτὲ τῶν ὄντων ὁ νομοθέτης τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔθετο, τὴν σωφροσύνην. καίτοι πολλά γε συγκεχωρήκαμεν οὐ συμβαίνονθ' ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης εἶναι συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ ἐῶντος τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι: καὶ ταύτῃ αὖ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γιγνώσκειν
175b
would have appeared to us useless if I had been of any use for making a good search. But now, you see, we are worsted every way, and cannot discover what thing it can possibly be to which the lawgiver gave this name, temperance. And yet we have conceded many points which were not deducible from our argument. For you know we conceded that there was a science of science, when the argument was against it and would not agree; and we further conceded that
175c
συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἐῶντος τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν γένοιτο ὁ σώφρων ἐπιστήμων ὧν τε οἶδεν ὅτι οἶδεν, καὶ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδ' ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅ τις μὴ οἶδεν μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἁμῶς γέ πως: ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, φησὶν αὐτὰ εἰδέναι ἡ ἡμετέρα ὁμολογία. καίτοι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτως ἡμῶν εὐηθικῶν
175c
this science could know the works also of the other sciences, when the argument was against this too, in order to make out that the temperate man had a knowledge of what he knew and did not know, so as to know that he knew the one and did not know the other. And we made this concession in a really magnificent manner, without considering the impossibility of a man knowing, in some sort of way, things that he does not know at all; for our admission says that he knows that he does not know them; and yet, in my opinion, there can be nothing more irrational than this. Nevertheless, although it has found us so simple-minded
175d
τυχοῦσα ἡ ζήτησις καὶ οὐ σκληρῶν, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον εὑρεῖν δύναται τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον κατεγέλασεν αὐτῆς, ὥστε ὃ ἡμεῖς πάλαι συνομολογοῦντες καὶ συμπλάττοντες ἐτιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην εἶναι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν πάνυ ὑβριστικῶς ἀνωφελὲς ὂν ἀπέφαινε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐμὸν καὶ ἧττον ἀγανακτῶ: ὑπὲρ δὲ σοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, πάνυ ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ σὺ τοιοῦτος ὢν τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν
175d
and tractable, the inquiry remains quite incapable of discovering the truth, but has utterly flouted it by most impudently showing us the inutility of that which we had been ever so long assuming, by our joint admissions and fictions, to be the meaning of temperance. Now, so far as I am concerned, I am not particularly distressed: but for your sake, I said, Charmides, I am seriously distressed to think that you, with your goodly form and
175e
σωφρονέστατος, μηδὲν ὀνήσῃ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σωφροσύνης μηδέ τί ς' ὠφελήσει ἐν τῷ βίῳ παροῦσα. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀγανακτῶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς ἣν παρὰ τοῦ Θρᾳκὸς ἔμαθον, εἰ μηδενὸς ἀξίου πράγματος οὖσαν αὐτὴν μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐμάνθανον. ταῦτ' οὖν πάνυ μὲν [οὖν] οὐκ οἴομαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ φαῦλον εἶναι ζητητήν: ἐπεὶ τήν γε σωφροσύνην μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ εἴπερ γε ἔχεις αὐτό,
175e
most temperate soul besides, are to have no profit or advantage from the presence of that temperance in all your life. And I am still more distressed about the charm which I learnt from the Thracian,
that I should have spent so much pains on a lesson which has had such a worthless effect. Now I really do not think that this can be the case, but rather that I am a poor hand at inquiring; for temperance I hold to be a great good, and you to be highly blessed,
176a
μακάριον εἶναί σε. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ ἔχεις τε καὶ μηδὲν δέῃ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς: εἰ γὰρ ἔχεις, μᾶλλον ἂν ἔγωγέ σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι ἐμὲ μὲν λῆρον ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι καὶ ἀδύνατον λόγῳ ὁτιοῦν ζητεῖν, σεαυτὸν δέ, ὅσῳπερ σωφρονέστερος εἶ, τοσούτῳ εἶναι καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερον.


καὶ ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω: πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰδείην ὅ γε μηδ' ὑμεῖς οἷοί τέ ἐστε ἐξευρεῖν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν,
176a
if you actually have it. See now whether you have it, and are in no need of the charm; for if it is yours, I should rather advise you to regard me as a babbler who is unable to argue out any subject of inquiry whatsoever, and yourself as advancing in happiness as you advance in temperance.


Then Charmides said: Why, upon my word, Socrates, I do not know at all whether I have it or have it not. For how can I know, when even you two are unable
176b
ὡς φῂς σύ; ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι, καὶ ἐμαυτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάνυ οἶμαι δεῖσθαι τῆς ἐπῳδῆς, καὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπᾴδεσθαι ὑπὸ σοῦ ὅσαι ἡμέραι, ἕως ἂν φῇς σὺ ἱκανῶς ἔχειν.


εἶεν: ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ὦ Χαρμίδη, <ἢν> δρᾷς τοῦτο ἔμοιγ' ἔσται τοῦτο τεκμήριον ὅτι σωφρονεῖς, ἢν ἐπᾴδειν παρέχῃς Σωκράτει καὶ μὴ ἀπολείπῃ τούτου μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν.


ὡς ἀκολουθήσοντος, ἔφη, καὶ μὴ ἀπολειψομένου: δεινὰ
176b
to discover what this thing is?—so you say, but of this you do not at all convince me—and I quite believe, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and for my part I have no objection to being charmed by you every day of my life, until you say I have had enough of the treatment.


Very well, said Critias: now, Charmides, if you do this, it will be a proof to me of your temperance—if you submit to be charmed by Socrates and do not forsake him through thick and thin.


Count on me to follow, he said, and not forsake him;
176c
γὰρ ἂν ποιοίην, εἰ μὴ πειθοίμην σοὶ τῷ ἐπιτρόπῳ καὶ μὴ ποιοίην ἃ κελεύεις.


ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, κελεύω ἔγωγε.


ποιήσω τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἀπὸ ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἀρξάμενος.


οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί βουλεύεσθον ποιεῖν;


οὐδέν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύμεθα.


βιάσῃ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οὐδ' ἀνάκρισίν μοι δώσεις;


ὡς βιασομένου, ἔφη, ἐπειδήπερ ὅδε γε ἐπιτάττει: πρὸς ταῦτα σὺ αὖ βουλεύου ὅτι ποιήσεις.
176c
for it would ill become me to disobey you, my guardian, and refuse to do your bidding.


Well now, he said, I bid you.


Then I will do as you say, he replied, and will start this very day.


There, there, I said, what are you two plotting to do?


Nothing, replied Charmides; we have made our plot.


So you will use force, I said, before even allowing me to make my affidavit?


You must expect me to use force, he replied, since he gives me the command: take counsel, therefore, on your side, as to what you will do
176d
ἀλλ' οὐδεμία, ἔφην ἐγώ, λείπεται βουλή: σοὶ γὰρ ἐπιχειροῦντι πράττειν ὁτιοῦν καὶ βιαζομένῳ οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἔσται ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἀνθρώπων.


μὴ τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, μηδὲ σὺ ἐναντιοῦ.


οὐ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντιώσομαι.
176d
But that leaves no room, I said, for counsel; for if once you set about doing anything and use force, no man alive will be able to withstand you.


Then do not you, he said, withstand me.


Then I will not withstand you, I replied.